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Ambushed: The US' Role In People Power 2 The first to congratulate Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as soon as People Power 2 swept her to the presidency was the United States government. That act was to be the culmination of a series of moves taken by the US in its bid to meddle in the country's constitutional crisis leading to the ouster of Joseph Ejercito Estrada. While the impeachment trial of Estrada was starting and mass protests were mounting, calling for his conviction, resignation or ouster, the US launched covert moves typical of American interventionism. First off, however, the International Monetary Fund-World Bank over which the US maintains strong influence withdrew its commitment to grant the Estrada administration a tranche of loans. At the same time, foreign risk-analysis groups identified with US transnational corporations described the Philippine economy under Estrada as "critical." The growing reluctance to support the Estrada administration on the part of the Americans became apparent. As in the dying days of the Marcos dictatorship, they saw the prospects of a president who has become unpopular, has gained worldwide notoriety and unable to steer an economy suitable for vital American corporate interests out of power. The greater fear, however, was seeing another People Power greatly influenced by militant groups especially those with revolutionary and anti-imperialist goals. This scenario had to be preempted. It was untimely that the constitutional crisis stemming from the Juetengate scandal would happen during the US presidential elections and in the transition period for the Bush takeover. Just the same, the machinery of US interventionist diplomacy cum military pressure worked quietly. 'Constitutional Process' On several occasions, top US embassy officials in Manila let it be known to the Estrada government, as well as to the Arroyo opposition, to allow the "constitutional process" to function, hinting likewise that any extra-constitutional means used either for supporting or unseating the disgraced president will not be welcomed. By "extra-constitutional means" they meant either a coup d'etat that would put up a military junta or a radical political option resembling an "uprising." The first option was untenable to the Americans as it would send a wrong signal to other Southeast Asian countries and, unlike in the Cold War period, would be embarrassing to support. The second option, in their own erroneous perception, would probably give the militant Left a strong presence in a new government that would be put up or create further trouble that would make the Philippines another "hot spot" in the region. Barely a week before January 16 when 11 Estrada senators voted against opening an envelope containing damaging evidence against the president, thus triggering People Power 2, two former US ambassadors to Manila -- Frank Wisner and Stephen Bosworth -- repeated the same message to Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara and other Estrada officials. Although they had no official designations, the two ex-envoys obviously had the imprimatur of Washington. The US government has been known to use even unofficial channels to deliver a pressure point. As some 75,000 anti-Estrada marchers prepared to converge in Mendiola near the presidential palace on January 20 to press the president to step down, an American embassy official was reported to have arranged an airflight for Estrada's exile. But Estrada probably had another plan: he opted to stay to prepare for his eventual comeback to power. While it was exerting economic and political pressure, the US government was also counting on its most reliable conduit in the Philippines, the Armed Forces, to make the proper move. In the events leading up to People Power 1 in 1986, the Reagan administration conditioned its support for Marcos by demanding, among other things, reforms in the AFP. While doing this, reports said, Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency operatives were overtly supporting the formation of the Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (RAM, now Reform the AFP Movement) as a leverage for ensuring the institutionalization of reforms and for reducing Marcos' clout in the AFP. RAM, which was identified with then AFP vice chief of staff (now former president) Fidel Ramos and Defense Minister (now senator) Juan Ponce Enrile, plotted the aborted coup against Marcos. But in parallel moves, US State Department officials and senators impressed upon Corazon Aquino the choice of severing her ties with the Left in exchange for American support for her presidency. The Americans were well aware that Left forces were growing in strength as they became a leading factor in the anti-dictatorship struggle. The Americans trembled in their knees, afraid that Aquino's continued association with the Left would expedite its ascendancy to political power. The Ramos Camp So it became of much advantage to the US government that, 15 years later, the reliable Ramos and his camp would be in the thick of efforts to win over AFP officials on the side of the Estrada resign movement - but more particularly, on the side of the constitutional presidential successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It was apparent that Arroyo had no strong political base of her own and therefore had to rely for support on Ramos, titular head of the opposition Lakas-NUCD and other small opposition groups. Ramos received military training from the West Point Military Academy as well as advanced counter-insurgency trainings from other US military institutes. A relative of Ferdinand Marcos, he was picked in 1966 to head the Philippine Civic Action Group (Philcag), a special counter-insurgency contingent that fought alongside the US forces in the Vietnam War. He was among the so-called Rolex 12 that plotted martial rule in 1972 and headed the Philippine Constabulary, which became notorious for human-rights atrocities. He became an "instant hero" in People Power 1, engineered the "total war policy" against the New People's Army and was endorsed by Aquino for the presidency in 1992. As president, Ramos championed the cause of globalization, the legislation for which was principally authored by then senator Arroyo. (See related story.) Ramos it was who, in 1994, said that the Philippines' security is anchored on strong US military presence in Asia-Pacific. He proved this point by signing, despite strong opposition, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the US. The VFA allowed American forces access to any part of the archipelago. As public indignation against Estrada mounted, Ramos was aware of the plan of the amalgamated forces of Arroyo to open a "tactical alliance" with militant and progressive organized forces. Ramos, as well as former Defense Secretary Renato de Villa and retired generals were likewise aware they could use this alliance to convince active AFP officials to withdraw their support for Estrada. They let it be known publicly - circulated in text messages - that the organized forces should mass at least a million people at Edsa; only then could the military would defect to their side. They knew that Estrada had the votes in the Senate impeachment court and he would be acquitted. The option of coordinating their own plan with the organized political forces that had forged a tactical alliance with Arroyo was therefore most viable. Serious Concern Back in November, the acting chief of mission of the US embassy, charge d'affaires Michael S. Malinowsky, expressed serious concern to reports that Arroyo had forged an alliance with the militant Bayan and the new party-group list Bayan Muna in Quezon City. To which the vice president immediately assuaged the official's fears, saying that nothing of that sort happened. The truth, it turned out, was that the militants only had a dialogue with her during which a "people's agenda" was discussed. It was useful for Ramos, de Villa and some retired generals that Kompil II served the purpose of rallying moderate forces thus "broadening" further the anti-Estrada united front while serving as well to check and possibly marginalize the leadership of the militant forces who had the bigger number and were the first to launch the oust-Estrada movement early in 1999. In the ensuing events, AFP chief Gen. Angelo Reyes, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado and other generals bolted the Estrada regime on January 20. A mutiny of sorts was also being plotted at Camp Crame (headquarters of the Philippine National Police). Faced with the AFP command's superior strength and pressured by some generals who had jumped ship, PNP chief Director General Panfilo Lacson, a close ally of Estrada, parted ways with his boss. Aside from saving his skin, Lacson took this wise decision in order to secure his senatorial plans. Military insiders say Reyes, Mercado and Lacson preconditioned their defection on a commitment by the Arroyo camp to get rid of the Left and that Estrada be allowed a "dignified exit." Whether the first line meant sidelining the Left from the new administration remains unclear, although Bayan and Bayan Muna leaders made it clear from the very start that joining the Arroyo government is far from their minds and that all they wanted is for the new president to give due course to the 20-point Comprehensive People's Agenda they presented to her last November. Up to the last minute, Reyes and his deputy, Lt. Gen. Jose Calimlim, protected Estrada and made sure that Malacaņang presidential security forces were beefed up by Marines, tanks, APCs and other reinforcements. The Palace forces, whose arsenal included anti-aircraft defense systems, machine guns and other powerful weapons, were ready to "die" for Estrada and were waiting for Reyes to issue his command to fire on the multitude that had massed up in Mendiola. Unknown to many Filipinos, hundreds of US commando and special forces were camped out at the former Clark airbase in Angeles City all along. It was explained that their presence was part of US-Philippine "Balikatan" war exercises. What a coincidence! (In People Power 1, US warships were anchored in Manila Bay while the American military command in the country was on high alert. Further bloodbath was avoided when the US Air Force intervened by airlifting Marcos out of the country to his final destination in Honolulu.) The Estrada defense officials and AFP generals who became turncoats have acceded to the civilian role in People Power 1 and that, they said, they only did what had to be done - to support People Power 1 and to avoid a split in the military. (Their senior counterparts could have done the same thing in People Power 1, where the likes of Enrile, Ramos and Honasan stole the show and the credit from the civilian uprising - a performance that furthered their careers.) When payback time came after People Power 2, Ramos and de Villa's camp got the juiciest positions in the Arroyo Cabinet. De Villa was appointed defense secretary, Police Deputy Director General Leandro Mendoza as acting PNP chief, former Gen. Lisandro Abadia as national security adviser and retired Gen. and Rep. Eduardo Ermita as peace process adviser and, later, acting defense chief. (Abadia's appointment was later recalled over graft charges.) More Ramos officials would also rejoin the Cabinet later. Payback time also saw another American, former Rep. Stephen Solarz, promising on January 29 continued US support for the new President. In 1986, Solarz, then chairman of the powerful House subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, played a key role in the events preceding Marcos' ouster and in Aquino's ascendancy. Solarz's courtesy call at Malacaņang on that day was immediately followed by a visit by the American chamber of commerce in the Philippines and other business groups. Happy days, indeed, are here again. |