NEWS ANALYSIS 

Generals in Arroyo’s Closet 

Only two months after being catapulted to power by a people’s uprising, Pres. Arroyo has turned her back on People Power 2. This is the message she sends by appointing so many generals, retired and active, to sensitive posts that normally belong to civilians, giving them unprecedented powers.

By EDMUNDO SANTUARIO III

Is the president, as some militant organizations said this week, scared of the military?

Probably. But the unlimited powers and favors being showered on these generals could have also been done to secure the loyalty of both the Armed Forces and the police and, hence, to consolidate the presidency.

The dominant presence of military men in the Arroyo cabinet and other line agencies was clinched the moment military men led by former Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief and Defense Secretary Renato de Villa arrogated unto themselves, without consulting other leaders of the oust-Estrada campaign, the right to negotiate for the surrender of the former president. That paved the way for De Villa as the first appointee in the successor presidency—as executive secretary, considered in Philippine politics as the “Little President.”

With this powerful post secure, the task of hauling in more military men into the civilian bureaucracy became smooth. De Villa himself has said quite arrogantly that nominees to cabinet positions should pass through him, bypassing the recommendatory powers of a screening committee led by now Labor Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas.

Other military men aside from De Villa are: newly-designated Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes (immediate former AFP chief); National Security Adviser Roilo Golez (a former Navy officer and congressman); Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Eduardo Ermita (former general and congressman); National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco (former police general); Task Force Anti-Smuggling chief Jose Calimlim, Jr. (former AFP vice chief and bungling chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP); National Telecommunications Commissioner Eliseo M. Rio, Jr. (a brigadier general); and former Marines chief Gen. Edgardo Espinosa, chief of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) in Taiwan.

Others are: Transportation and Communications Undersecretary Eduardo Abenina (a former general); Air Transport Office chief Gen. Adelberto Yap; and Poro Point Development Authority chief Fortunato Abat (another former AFP chief).

Giving favors to military men has gone beyond appointments to juicy government positions. Among the first priorities Arroyo announced after assuming the presidency was an increase in the salaries and benefits of military personnel. An exposé by the former Navy Marines chief about logistics scams in the AFP was immediately suppressed by his forced resignation in exchange for either an ambassadorial post or as new chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).

Military influence

How influential the military men have become in the Arroyo administration was initially shown by their attempt to derail the release of some 250 political prisoners, a commitment made by Arroyo at the height of the oust-Estrada campaign. Only a few have been freed so far—not as a sign of presidential magnanimity but because a hunger strike the prisoners had resorted to proved embarrassing to the Arroyo administration.

Doubts have been raised about the prospects of peace talks that Arroyo said she would initiate with the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Police Chief Inspector Abelardo Martin was to be released by the New People’s Army (NPA)–and this was in January–but the AFP top brass chose to mount a “rescue operation” which turned out to be disastrous. Martin was killed by government troops during what the military said was a “chance encounter” with the NPA custodial force in Gen. Nakar, Quezon last week.

The presence of military men in the Arroyo cabinet who continue to prefer a military solution to the rebellion problem makes the job of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) negotiating panel difficult. Right now, the negotiating functions of the GRP panel are being eclipsed by the generals’ insistence that the talks be held in the country and by their attempt to impose conditions that had long been resolved in 10 bilateral agreements with the NDFP.

Peace talks with the MILF may prove especially problematic. For one, Armed Forces chief Villanueva, who last year commanded government troops in launching an “all-out” offensive against the Moro guerillas, objects to the idea of returning some 40 camps to the MILF. The recovery of the camps captured by government forces during their offensive is one of the goodwill measures being sought by the MILF before going back to the negotiating table.

Militarization

The militarization of the civilian bureaucracy took root during the Marcos years when authoritarian rule was propped up by fascist military and police power. Top defense and military officials who tried to grab power from Marcos rode the crest of the 1986 people’s uprising thus enabling them to institute a commanding presence in the Aquino presidency. After easing out progressive members of the Aquino cabinet, they mounted a costly all-out war policy against Marxist and Moro guerillas and undermined peace efforts. They also opposed calls for the prosecution of military, police and paramilitary men who were involved in atrocities.

The pattern set by Aquino in appointing military men to civilian posts was promoted even more by Ramos. It was also during his watch that military men in the cabinet backed a secret plot to restore authoritarian rule by rigging the 1987 constitution. Ramos’ pro-US stance was accentuated by the signing of the onerous Philippine-US Visiting Forces Agreement.

In his short-lived presidency, Estrada courted the loyalty of the Armed Forces with promises of salary increases and other benefits and with a multi-billion peso modernization program, among others. The AFP also served as an instrument for recovering Estrada’s sagging “popularity” when it launched an “all-out war” against the MILF in Mindanao that resulted in many civilian deaths and the displacement of almost a million residents.

Arroyo has been mum on growing criticism about the unprecedented appointment of so many military men to government. But she has been emphatic in saying that all her appointments are on the basis of their qualifications and their ability to perform in pursuit of administration goals. Reyes himself has said that those who think that generals holding civilian positions retain their military mindset should have their heads examined. Perhaps that challenge should be posed instead on Arroyo and the generals themselves.

If the Arroyo presidency is serious in its policy of reconciliation with all political forces and a peace process with the revolutionary groups, then why appoint military men in government particularly in positions whose functions include the pursuit of peace?

Appointing military men to top government positions is Arroyo’s way of paying a political debt to people whom she erroneously assumes played a key role in her assumption to the presidency and who would help in consolidating her power. But she is in fact creating more problems than she can manage.

First, the military appointments have created divisiveness not only within her cabinet but also in the Armed Forces itself as seen in the intense jockeying for positions. Second, it only signaled an end to the tactical alliance with progressive forces who were instrumental in the ouster of a discredited president and in Arroyo’s ascendancy to the presidency. Third, she will only be further institutionalizing military factionalist power in government on a scale that, based on the military’s track record, will always undermine civilian supremacy especially in the pursuit of peace.

But, in the first place, why indeed accommodate a military mindset that has no tolerance for dissent and freedom of expression when the president herself always brags about bringing in a new style of leadership in government through what she calls “consensual politics?” #