News Analysis
Talking Peace in a Time of War

To listen to its critics, the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) is a war-mongering band of terrorists creating obstacles to peace by making unreasonable demands. Yet reviewing bilateral agreements since the talks started in 1992 yields what to many will be a surprising observation: they have in the main been faithful to them.

By Sandra Nicolas

Many fear their ideology, politics and adherence to armed struggle. Certainly the revolutionary forces of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP)—along with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed group the New People’s Army (NPA)—have been waging a war in the Philippine countryside for decades.

But, the NDFP holds, it is war fought not for the sake of battle but so that the vast majority of the Filipino people may be liberated from poverty. Their logic is that there would be no need to take up arms if the gross social inequities and the government policies that keep so many people poor were not there to begin with.

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) apparently agrees. The “common goal” of the talks was mutually agreed upon and spelled out in The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992 as “the attainment of a just and lasting peace.” In recognition that this was not to be had by a mere cessation of hostilities, two of the four substantive agenda of the talks were set as “social and economic reforms” and “political and constitutional reforms.”

The resumption of the peace process between the NDFP and the GRP comes at a time of worsening political and economic crisis for the country. With talks to resume on April 27, it is opportune to recall what has been achieved so far and what have been some major obstacles.

Back to the table

The on-and-off peace talks formally resumed during President Fidel Ramos’ administration in 1992, amidst GRP triumphalism that the mainstream revolutionary Left was irreparably torn into factions and already a spent force. In a security briefing for President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo last week, however, it was reported that the NPA’s strength has increased to over 13,000 regulars from around 11,000 just two years ago.

The talks have dragged on for years. Still, they have produced ten agreements covering not only agenda and procedures but, quite significantly, also the first of four substantive agenda. It took six years but the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) was finally signed and approved in 1998.

Last month, the two parties agreed to return to the table from where they left off when the talks broke down during former President Joseph Estrada’s term. According to an agreement between the NDFP and GRP negotiating panels and their principals, the peace negotiations will resume using the ten prior bilateral agreements as “framework and foundation.”

There is a guarded optimism surrounding the talks. Arroyo has so far released 42 out of 73 political prisoners promised for release (although as many as 250 have been languishing in jails nationwide, many for years now). She has also repeatedly reiterated that she will wage “all-out peace” as opposed to her predecessor’s “all-out war.” With the April 6 release of Army intelligence Major Noel Buan “on humanitarian grounds,” the NDFP no longer holds any more prisoners of war.

The NDFP and the GRP are not alone in their avowed pursuit of peace. Militant organizations of workers, peasants, youth, women and religious in the country have long expressed their support for the talks. Abroad, the European Parliament issued a resolution in 1997 “encouraging and supporting” the talks. The Belgian, Swiss and Norwegian governments are among those which offered their countries as venues for the talks.

This coming April 18, the National Council of Churches in the Philippines and the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines will jointly sponsor a “Solidarity Conference for Peace in the Philippines” in Manila. Intended to further drum up support, it will be attended not only by representatives of the NDFP and GRP but also by people’s organizations, civil society groups and other peace advocates.

But the Arroyo government is not quite united on the matter. As was the case under the Ramos and Estrada administrations, the political establishment is divided with some segments opposed to the talks because they doubt the NDFP’s sincerity or because the talks seemingly bestow to the NDFP an undue status of belligerency.

The military establishment has for its part always been predisposed to a military rather than a politically negotiated solution—believing, against the historical experience, that it could beat the guerrillas by sheer force. The release last year of P5.4 billion for the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) modernization can only make it more bullish about their military prospects.

Yet the talks have been able to proceed albeit in fits and starts since 1992. Why have there been so many indefinite recesses, suspensions and declarations of collapse?

Perpetual issues: constitutionality…

Expectedly, each side blames the other. The framework of the talks is the most recurring point of dispute. The GRP insists that the NDFP is being unreasonable when it refuses to cede to the GRP’s Constitution or otherwise tries to claim a status of belligerency. On the contrary, the NDFP retorts, it is the GRP that is being unreasonable when it reneges on prior agreements.

In September 1998, then President Estrada tried to claim the moral high ground in the talks which were then starting to stall. He said emphatically, “our peace efforts should not erode the sovereignty of the republic nor undermine its duly constituted government.”

This was underscored by then GRP peace panel chairman and former ambassador Howard Dee when he said that implementation of the CARHRIHL “must not in any manner impinge on the republic’s constitution and rule of law.”

NDFP panel chair and NDFP National Executive Committee member Luis Jalandoni replied that the GRP was in no way being asked to lay aside its constitutional framework. On the contrary, he said, the NDFP assumes that they have “their respective constitutional frameworks to follow in their respective areas of political authority.”

The crux, it seems, are the bilateral agreements which set the framework by which the talks are conducted (and whose validity Arroyo has affirmed).

On the specific issue of using the GRP Constitution, the Hague Joint Declaration (September 1, 1992) stipulates that the holding of talks “must be in accordance with mutually acceptable principles, including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice, and no precondition shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace negotiations. (Section 4, italics supplied)”

According to the NDFP, the “inherent character and purpose” of the talks is that they are between two equal parties negotiating towards mutual satisfaction of substantive demands. Thus, they hold, requiring as a precondition that the NDFP surrender to the GRP Constitution violates this.

And while this is open to interpretation, the Breukelen Joint Statement (June 14, 1994) is surprisingly clear. It states that, “GRP’s adherence to constitutional processes does not constitute the imposition of the GRP Constitution as framework for the peace talks. (Section 7, Article II, italics supplied)”

… And belligerence

But the larger context is simply that the GRP does not want the NDFP to be perceived as an equal sovereign power, such as by reference to the NDFP Constitution, territory, army and constituency. Even mere mention of covenants or instruments of international humanitarian law, the GRP argues, confers to the NDFP a status of belligerency.

But, the NDFP responds, belligerency is not something that is contingent on the GRP’s consent or otherwise. Rather, as NDFP Chief Political Consultant Jose Ma. Sison explains, it has been attained by virtue of the existence of “revolutionary organs of democratic political power” and “organized masses of the people in the territory of the people’s democratic government.”

The NDFP says that its diplomatic efforts to acquire international recognition of this status are also relevant. Thus the NDFP has issued its Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law and deposited its Unilateral Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I with the Swiss Federal Council independently of the peace talks. The 1997 European Parliament Resolution is also cited as material.

A frequent lightning rod of criticism used by the GRP in raising the issue of belligerency is the question of the venue of the talks. To hold them abroad, the GRP claims, implies such status.

Then acting Defense Secretary (and now Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process) Eduardo Ermita said last month that, “The status of belligerency always crops up and what we would like to emphasize is that these talks are between groups who are all Filipinos. That is why the talks should not be held outside of the country.” This, he said, is to “protect the country’s sovereignty and national integrity.”

But the NDFP is concerned about the security implications. Bayan Muna President and former NDFP negotiator (during the 1986 talks) Satur Ocampo, for one, cites negative experiences in 1986. According to him, the talks in the country gave the military the opportunity to conduct surveillance on the NDFP including its allies and friends. After the talks broke down in January 1987, many NDFP leaders were arrested and a number killed.

Yet the issue of venue was apparently already considered in an early agreement between the GRP and the NDFP. The Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (February 24, 1995) provides that, “The venue of the formal talks shall be in Brussels, Belgium, unless both parties mutually agree on another neutral venue,” in which case “both parties shall separately make arrangements with the host country concerned. (Section 6, Article III, italics supplied)”

Other issues

So despite presumably clear-cut agreements regarding framework and procedures for the talks, it apparently still matters that there are two contrary frameworks operating which can lead to friction. Yet there have also been contentious points regarding more specific matters.

On the CARHRIHL, for instance, there was dispute over the extent to which human rights violations (HRVs) under the Marcos and subsequent regimes would be made explicit, whether or not the indemnification of 10,000 victims of HRVs should be included and how the agreement would be implemented.

The NDFP also cited the arrest and detention of NDFP political consultants Sotero Llamas in 1995 and Danilo Borjal in 1996, both in violation of the JASIG.

Indeed, when the NDFP walked away from the table in 1999 it said that it was merely acknowledging the “de facto termination” by the GRP of the talks. “De facto” because although the GRP gave no formal notice, the NDFP asserted that it had virtually terminated the talks by its repeated violations of prior agreements.

The NDFP denounced the GRP for refusing to implement the CARHRIHL, violating the JASIG by unilaterally suspending immunity and safety guarantees, and setting as a precondition that the NDFP yield to the GRP’s Constitution. The GRP responded by declaring “all-out war.”

Protracted peace process

Can the peace process possibly move on, especially when it comes to negotiating on the next substantive agenda of social and economic reforms?

Certainly for so long as there are tangible benefits to be had. For the GRP, it is a semblance of political stability. For the NDFP, that the talks remain an arena to push its agenda for thoroughgoing social change.

That the NDFP-GRP talks have dragged on may seem disheartening especially considering the speed with which settlements were reached with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the RAM/YOU/SFP during President Ramos’ time.

But the speed with which these were arrived at perhaps explains how little they have, at the end of the day, achieved—the Moro people’s basic demands remain, with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front continuing with the armed struggle, and the military remains split into restive factions.

The prolonged nature of the NDFP-GRP talks may feed gloom about the prospects for peace, especially amidst a worsening economy. But as the unproductive settlements with the MNLF and rightist military factions have shown, the crucial issue is less that the talks finish swiftly. It is that the basis be laid for a genuine and lasting peace.  #