News
Analysis
Talking Peace in a Time of War
To listen
to its critics, the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) is a
war-mongering band of terrorists creating obstacles to peace by making
unreasonable demands. Yet reviewing bilateral agreements since the talks started
in 1992 yields what to many will be a surprising observation: they have in the
main been faithful to them.
By Sandra
Nicolas
Many
fear their ideology, politics and adherence to armed struggle. Certainly the
revolutionary forces of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP)—along
with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed group the New
People’s Army (NPA)—have been waging a war in the Philippine countryside for
decades.
But,
the NDFP holds, it is war fought not for the sake of battle but so that the vast
majority of the Filipino people may be liberated from poverty. Their logic is
that there would be no need to take up arms if the gross social inequities and
the government policies that keep so many people poor were not there to begin
with.
The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) apparently agrees. The
“common goal” of the talks was mutually agreed upon and spelled out in The
Hague Joint Declaration of 1992 as “the attainment of a just and lasting
peace.” In recognition that this was not to be had by a mere cessation of
hostilities, two of the four substantive agenda of the talks were set as
“social and economic reforms” and “political and constitutional
reforms.”
The
resumption of the peace process between the NDFP and the GRP comes at a time of
worsening political and economic crisis for the country. With talks to resume on
April 27, it is opportune to recall what has been achieved so far and what have
been some major obstacles.
Back to the table
The
on-and-off peace talks formally resumed during President Fidel Ramos’
administration in 1992, amidst GRP triumphalism that the mainstream
revolutionary Left was irreparably torn into factions and already a spent force.
In a security briefing for President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo last week, however,
it was reported that the NPA’s strength has increased to over 13,000 regulars
from around 11,000 just two years ago.
The
talks have dragged on for years. Still, they have produced ten agreements
covering not only agenda and procedures but, quite significantly, also the first
of four substantive agenda. It took six years but the Comprehensive Agreement on
Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) was
finally signed and approved in 1998.
Last
month, the two parties agreed to return to the table from where they left off
when the talks broke down during former President Joseph Estrada’s term.
According to an agreement between the NDFP and GRP negotiating panels and their
principals, the peace negotiations will resume using the ten prior bilateral
agreements as “framework and foundation.”
There
is a guarded optimism surrounding the talks. Arroyo has so far released 42 out
of 73 political prisoners promised for release (although as many as 250 have
been languishing in jails nationwide, many for years now). She has also
repeatedly reiterated that she will wage “all-out peace” as opposed to her
predecessor’s “all-out war.” With the April 6 release of Army intelligence
Major Noel Buan “on humanitarian grounds,” the NDFP no longer holds any more
prisoners of war.
The
NDFP and the GRP are not alone in their avowed pursuit of peace. Militant
organizations of workers, peasants, youth, women and religious in the country
have long expressed their support for the talks. Abroad, the European Parliament
issued a resolution in 1997 “encouraging and supporting” the talks. The
Belgian, Swiss and Norwegian governments are among those which offered their
countries as venues for the talks.
This
coming April 18, the National Council of Churches in the Philippines and the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines will jointly sponsor a
“Solidarity Conference for Peace in the Philippines” in Manila. Intended to
further drum up support, it will be attended not only by representatives of the
NDFP and GRP but also by people’s organizations, civil society groups and
other peace advocates.
But
the Arroyo government is not quite united on the matter. As was the case under
the Ramos and Estrada administrations, the political establishment is divided
with some segments opposed to the talks because they doubt the NDFP’s
sincerity or because the talks seemingly bestow to the NDFP an undue status of
belligerency.
The
military establishment has for its part always been predisposed to a military
rather than a politically negotiated solution—believing, against the
historical experience, that it could beat the guerrillas by sheer force. The
release last year of P5.4 billion for the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP)
modernization can only make it more bullish about their military prospects.
Yet
the talks have been able to proceed albeit in fits and starts since 1992. Why
have there been so many indefinite recesses, suspensions and declarations of
collapse?
Perpetual issues: constitutionality…
Expectedly,
each side blames the other. The framework of the talks is the most recurring
point of dispute. The GRP insists that the NDFP is being unreasonable when it
refuses to cede to the GRP’s Constitution or otherwise tries to claim a status
of belligerency. On the contrary, the NDFP retorts, it is the GRP that is being
unreasonable when it reneges on prior agreements.
In
September 1998, then President Estrada tried to claim the moral high ground in
the talks which were then starting to stall. He said emphatically, “our peace
efforts should not erode the sovereignty of the republic nor undermine its duly
constituted government.”
This
was underscored by then GRP peace panel chairman and former ambassador Howard
Dee when he said that implementation of the CARHRIHL “must not in any manner
impinge on the republic’s constitution and rule of law.”
NDFP
panel chair and NDFP National Executive Committee member Luis Jalandoni replied
that the GRP was in no way being asked to lay aside its constitutional
framework. On the contrary, he said, the NDFP assumes that they have “their
respective constitutional frameworks to follow in their respective areas of
political authority.”
The
crux, it seems, are the bilateral agreements which set the framework by which
the talks are conducted (and whose validity Arroyo has affirmed).
On
the specific issue of using the GRP Constitution, the Hague Joint Declaration (September 1, 1992) stipulates that the
holding of talks “must be in accordance with mutually acceptable principles,
including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice, and no
precondition shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the
peace negotiations. (Section 4, italics supplied)”
According
to the NDFP, the “inherent character and purpose” of the talks is that they
are between two equal parties negotiating towards mutual satisfaction of
substantive demands. Thus, they hold, requiring as a precondition that the NDFP
surrender to the GRP Constitution violates this.
And
while this is open to interpretation, the Breukelen
Joint Statement (June 14, 1994) is surprisingly clear. It states that,
“GRP’s adherence to constitutional processes does not constitute the imposition of the GRP Constitution as framework
for the peace talks. (Section 7, Article II, italics supplied)”
…
And belligerence
But
the larger context is simply that the GRP does not want the NDFP to be perceived
as an equal sovereign power, such as by reference to the NDFP Constitution,
territory, army and constituency. Even mere mention of covenants or instruments
of international humanitarian law, the GRP argues, confers to the NDFP a status
of belligerency.
But,
the NDFP responds, belligerency is not something that is contingent on the
GRP’s consent or otherwise. Rather, as NDFP Chief Political Consultant Jose
Ma. Sison explains, it has been attained by virtue of the existence of
“revolutionary organs of democratic political power” and “organized masses
of the people in the territory of the people’s democratic government.”
The
NDFP says that its diplomatic efforts to acquire international recognition of
this status are also relevant. Thus the NDFP has issued its Declaration
of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law and deposited its Unilateral
Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I
with the Swiss Federal Council independently of the peace talks. The 1997
European Parliament Resolution is also cited as material.
A
frequent lightning rod of criticism used by the GRP in raising the issue of
belligerency is the question of the venue of the talks. To hold them abroad, the
GRP claims, implies such status.
Then
acting Defense Secretary (and now Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process)
Eduardo Ermita said last month that, “The status of belligerency always crops
up and what we would like to emphasize is that these talks are between groups
who are all Filipinos. That is why the talks should not be held outside of the
country.” This, he said, is to “protect the country’s sovereignty and
national integrity.”
But
the NDFP is concerned about the security implications. Bayan Muna President and
former NDFP negotiator (during the 1986 talks) Satur Ocampo, for one, cites
negative experiences in 1986. According to him, the talks in the country gave
the military the opportunity to conduct surveillance on the NDFP including its
allies and friends. After the talks broke down in January 1987, many NDFP
leaders were arrested and a number killed.
Yet
the issue of venue was apparently already considered in an early agreement
between the GRP and the NDFP. The Joint
Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (February 24, 1995) provides
that, “The venue of the formal talks shall be in Brussels, Belgium, unless
both parties mutually agree on another neutral venue,” in which case “both
parties shall separately make arrangements with the host country concerned. (Section 6, Article III, italics supplied)”
Other issues
So
despite presumably clear-cut agreements regarding framework and procedures for
the talks, it apparently still matters that there are two contrary frameworks
operating which can lead to friction. Yet there have also been contentious
points regarding more specific matters.
On
the CARHRIHL, for instance, there was dispute over the extent to which human
rights violations (HRVs) under the Marcos and subsequent regimes would be made
explicit, whether or not the indemnification of 10,000 victims of HRVs should be
included and how the agreement would be implemented.
The
NDFP also cited the arrest and detention of NDFP political consultants Sotero
Llamas in 1995 and Danilo Borjal in 1996, both in violation of the JASIG.
Indeed,
when the NDFP walked away from the table in 1999 it said that it was merely
acknowledging the “de facto termination” by the GRP of the talks. “De
facto” because although the GRP gave no formal notice, the NDFP asserted that
it had virtually terminated the talks by its repeated violations of prior
agreements.
The
NDFP denounced the GRP for refusing to implement the CARHRIHL, violating the
JASIG by unilaterally suspending immunity and safety guarantees, and setting as
a precondition that the NDFP yield to the GRP’s Constitution. The GRP
responded by declaring “all-out war.”
Protracted peace process
Can
the peace process possibly move on, especially when it comes to negotiating on
the next substantive agenda of social and economic reforms?
Certainly
for so long as there are tangible benefits to be had. For the GRP, it is a
semblance of political stability. For the NDFP, that the talks remain an arena
to push its agenda for thoroughgoing social change.
That
the NDFP-GRP talks have dragged on may seem disheartening especially considering
the speed with which settlements were reached with the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) and the RAM/YOU/SFP during President Ramos’ time.
But the speed with which these were arrived at perhaps explains how little they have, at the end of the day, achieved—the Moro people’s basic demands remain, with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front continuing with the armed struggle, and the military remains split into restive factions.
The
prolonged nature of the NDFP-GRP talks may feed gloom about the prospects for
peace, especially amidst a worsening economy. But as the unproductive
settlements with the MNLF and rightist military factions have shown, the crucial
issue is less that the talks finish swiftly. It is that the basis be laid for a
genuine and lasting peace. #