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Yearender
A Tough Year for U.S. Security Affairs in the
Philippines
Nationalism
is dead, its opponents in the Philippines are so fond of saying. However, with
the resurgence of anti-imperialist campaigns in the Philippines in 2002, those
who have taken to singing the funeral hymns for nationalism in the Philippines
shall have to shut their mouths.
By
Alexander
Martin Remollino
Bulatlat.com
2002 has been a year the critics of U.S. foreign policy in the Philippines would
have loved to witness. But it has also been a year that renewed U.S. armed
interventionism in the country sought to create a political divide even as
mainstream anti-imperialist groups rallied the people against what they believed
was a threat to national sovereignty.
In the previous decade, the big years for the anti-imperialist struggle in the
Philippines were 1991 and 1999.
1991 saw the rejection by the Senate of a treaty allowing the retention of the
U.S. military bases in the country. That legislative act served as a climax to a
strong anti-bases movement that traced its roots to the First Quarter Storm in
the 1970s as well as the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist components of the
Leftist underground movement during martial law and after.
Eight years later, the country witnessed the climax of a fierce fight against
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which provides for "military
exercises" between the U.S. and Philippine armed forces, aside from
granting extraterritorial and extrajudicial rights to visiting US servicemen.
With the 1991 anti-bases legislators gone, the Senate approved the VFA by a
majority vote. But the campaign against the treaty was such that it continued to
raise questions among the public long after it began to be implemented.
President Joseph Estrada’s posturing as pro-VFA and an ally the U.S.
government can trust drew strong denunciations from militant groups known for
their consistent anti-imperialist position. This, along with other reasons
particularly increasing reports of widespread corruption and plunder, galvanized
more forces leading to the birth of a broad coalition that campaigned for the
president’s ouster.
In
2002, as the plunder charges against the fallen Estrada were pursued, the
anti-imperialist struggle in the Philippines experienced a resurgence.
Shoulder-to-shoulder
It began with the entry of U.S. troops in the country under the Balikatan 02-1.
Government spokespersons said the Balikatan was to be conducted under the VFA.
This was to be a military exercise that would supposedly help the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) to hone its skills and thus be better equipped in the
fight against "terrorism."
At the same time, U.S. military spokespersons were saying that the entry of U.S.
troops into the Philippines was meant to fight off the Abu Sayyaf which,
according to U.S. intelligence, had strong links with the international
terrorist network al-Qaeda. Surveys commissioned by Malacañang claimed that the
new U.S. role – the war against Abu Sayyaf - had the support of many
Filipinos. The government used this finding to show that the war exercises were
indeed in the best interest of the people.
Critics of U.S. foreign policy in the Philippines such as the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan (Bayan – New Patriotic Alliance) and others insisted however that
the war exercise violated the VFA itself. The exercise, they opined, was being
conducted within "a period of not more than six months," in clear
violation of the VFA's provisions, which allow only short military exercises
lasting for no more than two months.
Furthermore,
they said, Balikatan 02-1 was against national sovereignty. Aside from allowing
the entry of foreign troops - in clear violation of the Constitution - it opened
the door for the deeper integration of the Philippines into the U.S. armed
network in the region. Denying the accusations, Macapagal-Arroyo officials led
by Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes stressed no such thing would happen and
invoked the Terms of Reference – a document that set the parameters of the war
exercise – to prove that Balikatan was precisely only for training.
But
the anti-U.S. armed aggression campaign heated up, mustering the support of old
and new anti-bases stalwarts from even the middle forces. The alliance U.S.
Troops Out Now! and other groups mounted street protests and brought their
demonstrations to the gates of the U.S. Embassy, in Mendiola and other rally
centers throughout the country as well as in some cities abroad. Balikatan 02-1
came under intense public scrutiny.
The
people's movement was vigilant at the slightest hint that the U.S. troops –
whose total reached close to 4,000 - were taking part in combat operations. It
threw itself behind two journalists, Jiggy Manicad and Jun Fronda, who were
reportedly harassed and threatened by U.S. servicemen for attempting to shed
light on an alleged encounter between U.S. soldiers and members of the Abu
Sayyaf.
The highlight of the campaign against the Balikatan was the International
Solidarity Mission, a fact-finding mission organized in July by militant groups.
The mission also enlisted the participation of foreign cause-oriented groups and
individuals, to investigate reports of human rights abuses committed by the U.S.
and Philippine troops engaged in joint "military exercises." It
yielded a long list of atrocities against the civilian populace in Basilan and
other Muslim provinces. The mission’s expose on the shooting of a suspected
member of the Abu Sayyaf by an American soldier, Reggie Lane, was held up as
evidence of the involvement of U.S. troops in actual combat operations - in
clear violation of the Balikatan 02-1 Terms of Reference.
Even
while the Balikatan 02-1 was ongoing, the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA)
became another thorny issue. The MLSA is an agreement that provides the legal
framework for ensuring logistic support for U.S. troops stationed in the
Philippines. But militant activists saw it as a "virtual basing
agreement" which would drag the Philippines into U.S. wars of aggression
abroad. They vehemently protested the manner it was forged and the tactic of
avoiding public scrutiny.
Terrorist bogey
Militant groups and other critics of U.S. foreign policy proved to be right when
they said early on that the U.S. military presence and the war against the Abu
Sayyaf were being used as a pretext for a hidden motive: to support
government’s anti-insurgency campaign. In August, the U.S. state department
came out with its updated list of “foreign terrorist organizations” (FTOs)
that included the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New
People’s Army (NPA).
As
if on cue, the Netherlands government followed by the European Union council came out with
their own list that included
Jose Maria Sison, CPP founding chair and chief political consultant of the
National Democratic Front (NDF). The Dutch and EU council decision, seen as part of a
conspiracy with the U.S. and Philippine governments, started orchestrated moves
leading to Sison’s possible extradition to the United States where he would
face trial as a “terrorist.” The council's decision is being challenged by
Sison's lawyers and European parliamentary members before the EU court.
Sison,
along with the CPP, NPA, NDF and their alleged front organizations in the
Philippines and abroad became fair targets of Bush’s and Macapagal-Arroyo’s
joint war against terror. All these also seemed to give the U.S. moral and legal
high grounds to extend its military presence in the Philippines. But the
branding of the CPP-NPA-NDF as a "foreign terrorist organization" also
dimmed prospects of resuming peace talks that would end the 33-year-old armed
conflict between the government and the Marxist guerrillas. And, as the year
ended, both sides of the conflict refused to declare unilateral ceasefire during
Christmas, with the CPP’s Gregorio “Ka Roger” Rosal citing as one reason
government’s relentless military operations in the countryside.
The
“terrorist tag” also drew criticisms from many sectors including Vice
President Teofisto Guingona and some legislators, stressing that even if they
did not support the armed Left’s armed struggle it had legitimate aims and
could not be labeled “terrorist.” Even those who had been critical of Sison
and the CPP-NPA-NDF came to their defense. Journalist Ramon Tulfo, for instance,
said in his Philippine Daily Inquirer column that NPA guerrillas cannot be
called "terrorists" because they do not kill civilians. The U.S.
government got a heavy dose of opposition and condemnation.
Groups opposed to the war exercises threw their support behind calls for
resuming the peace talks between the Macapagal-Arroyo government and the NDF
even as they joined worldwide movements against the imminent U.S. war on Iraq
and other targets. In the middle of the year, the Bush administration began to
threaten war against Iraq supposedly for its being a menace to its neighbors and for its alleged "weapons of
mass destruction". The Macapagal-Arroyo administration expressed support
early on for this impending war by offering Philippine air space to U.S. forces.
Such was the heat of the campaign the people's movement put up against the
impending U.S. war on Iraq that the Macapagal-Arroyo administration was forced
to backtrack on its offer of Philippine air space for use in that war, and
anti-Iraq war sentiments built up even among sectors least expected to take a
definite stand on the issue.
Tougher times ahead
Nationalism is dead, its opponents in the Philippines are so fond of saying.
However, with the resurgence of anti-imperialist campaigns in the Philippines in
2002, those who have taken to singing the funeral hymns for nationalism in the
Philippines shall have to shut their mouths.
But 2002 is just the beginning of the resurgence. The signs are everywhere that
U.S. imperialism is going to be in for tougher times in the Philippines. Bulatlat.com
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