Analysis

Browbeating Pyongyang: Drawing Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq

In the current circumstances, it would be untimely to shift our attention already to the potential victims of future imperialist aggression while the Iraqi people are still putting up fierce resistance to the U.S.-British occupation army. However, the meeting of the United Nations Security Council on North Korea last April 9 reminds us of the threats this country is facing and the lessons it can draw from the fate of Iraq, its co-member in the so-called "Axis of Evil."

By Edwin Licaros 
Written for the Center for Anti-Imperialist Studies (CAIS)
Posted by Bulatlat.com

As one of the countries that pursued a socialist development model and has consistently upheld its independence and sovereignty, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), has been an evident whipping boy for the hardliners in Washington since the end of the Second World War. Moreover, the subsequent occupation of the Korean Peninsula's southern half by the United States, and the latter's 1950-1953 war against the North and its allies, fought on Korean soil, and ending with an armistice but without a peace treaty, has left more than enough potential conflicts that have been played up by warmongers in Washington at will.

Especially the DPRK's supposed nuclear threat has been used to justify an aggressive U.S. military posture in East Asia. The country's voluntary freezing of its nuclear program in the 1994 "Agreed Framework" in exchange for some concessions from the U.S. should have been able to remove all apprehensions about the country's nuclear ambitions. Since the signing of this agreement, however, a series of events have been created deliberately to undermine diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions.

In 1998, for example, Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Bill Clinton's state secretary, called the "suspected nuclear facility" in a secret underground complex in Kumchang-ri a "huge threat" that demanded the right of the U.S. to conduct inspections when and where it chooses.¹ When the DPRK finally allowed American officials to visit the site, in exchange for a handsome amount of aid, they only found a huge empty tunnel. 

It is Clinton's successor, George W. Bush, who is responsible for the preposterous "Axis of Evil" concept that lumps together Iraq, Iran, Syria, Cuba and the DPRK in a supposed terrorist alliance. Despite claiming to be "prepared to talk anytime, anywhere, without conditions," the Bush administration had spurned formal talks with the DPRK for 22 months until U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary James Kelly's visit last October to Pyongyang. This visit came after a series of exciting developments that seemed to bring about the eventual reunification of the Koreas and a dramatic softening in the relations between the DPRK and Japan.

"In fact," observes Desaix Anderson, the former director of the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) that was created to implement the Agreed Framework, "Kelly refused to talk, and only demanded that North Korea end its new nuclear activities."² Although the DPRK flatly denied any new nuclear weapons program, Kelly's accusations sparked an escalating crisis resulting in the eventual announcement by the DPRK, last Jan. 10, of its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Last Wednesday's meeting of the Security Council came after the International Atomic Energy Agency referred the issue of the DPRK's withdrawal to the council in February, saying the DPRK was not complying with nuclear agreements. In the closed-door meeting, China and Russia refused to back U.S. pressures to issue a statement condemning Pyongyang for quitting the NPT.

To underline its belligerence, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency timed the disclosure of an "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions" to coincide with the Security Council meeting. The content of this report, however, is much less spectacular than its title and only repeats Kelly's claims that "North Korea began seeking centrifuge-related materials (and) obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems." In an apparent bid to alarm the Security Council members, the CIA report concludes that "North Korea's goal appears to be a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational."³

Lessons from Iraq

"Iraq now, North Korea next?" has been a question on numerous placards at peace demonstration in South Korea. Returning from his second visit to Pyongyang in as many months, Maurice Strong, the United Nations special envoy to the DPRK, observed recently: "The Iraq war has really deepened their concern that they are next on the list. They look at it very seriously, as evidence that the U.S. is actually following this policy of pre-emptive strike." That is not surprising, as on the very day the bombing of Iraq began U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made a direct warning to North Korea not to provoke his nation or it would face "serious consequences."⁴

Call it irony or just bad timing but the Security Council meeting coincided with the occupation of Iraq's capital, Baghdad, by the U.S., which justifies its military aggression with ample references to Security Council resolutions. Moreover, the invasion of Iraq came after more than 10 years of a debilitating embargo and stringent weapons inspections, all mandated by the same Security Council at the instigation of the U.S.

This week, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., John Negroponte, admitted that for them: "It is not just a matter of getting the North to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions." In a hardly-concealed reference to his country's preparation of the current invasion of Iraq Negroponte added: "North Korea must also accept a reliable verification regime."⁵  It must be recalled that, at least until 1998, the U.S. relied on spies in the U.N. weapons inspection teams to identify targets for air raids.

In the light of the U.S. provocative acts against Iraq, and the Security Council's role in incapacitating Iraq's military capabilities before it was finally invaded, a DPRK official's statement that the Security Council's "handling of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula itself is precisely a prelude to war," is not exactly unreasonable. Also China, through Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao, confirmed this position saying on the eve of the meeting that "it is not appropriate for the U.N. Security Council to get involved in these issues."⁶

Not disarming

Although the DPRK denied the existence of any military nuclear program, it announced that it would ignore any Security Council resolution to disarm. Many observers have already pointed out that the U.S.'s perceived leniency toward North Korea in comparison with its aggression against Iraq, can be explained at least partly by the super power's suspicion of the DPRK's ability to make nuclear weapons. Apparently, deterrence works.

One lesson the DPRK has learned therefore from the war on Iraq is that peace will not be brought about by disarmament. To the contrary, it is of the opinion that only by arming itself with a "tremendous military deterrent" could the country guarantee its security.⁷ Consequently, on March 26 the annual session of the People's Assembly allocated 15.4 percent of this year's budgeted expenditure to defense, up from 14.9 percent last year. Finance Minister Mun Il-Bong said the increase was needed to develop the DPRK's defense industry and train troops "as an invincible army and thus consolidate the country's defenses as an impregnable fortress."⁸

On April 3, the North Korean newspaper Nodong Sinmun explained in a special article: "military-first politics is a precious sword of sure victory for national sovereignty." The article begins with the assertion that "the strong pluck [courage] to face the imperialists' high-handed and outrageous threat and blackmail head-on, and the high national dignity that solves every problem according to independent decisions and judgments by resolutely driving away all sorts of pressure and interference from outside forces, come from the mighty gun-barrel."⁹

Non-aggression treaty

North Korea actually has a proposal to defuse the current crisis. Not allowing any multilateral arrangement to obfuscate the issue, it has consistently demanded bilateral talks with the U.S. that should result in a non-aggression treaty.

Russia and China, two important stakeholders and neighbors of Korea endorse the idea of a bilateral dialogue and therefore prevented a Security Council condemnation last Wednesday. The Non-Aligned Movement also supported bilateral negotiations at the organization's 13th Summit last year. Arriving at the UN headquarters in New York for the Security Council meeting, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan likewise referred to a bilateral negotiation when he said the challenge is "to find a format that will be acceptable to both parties and bring them to the table to talk."¹⁰

Even a group of prominent U.S. experts on Korea, including four former ambassadors, three former top-ranking military officers, missile experts and academics, has advocated direct negotiations with North Korea to break the deadlock between Washington and Pyongyang.¹¹

Not surprisingly, however, the Bush administration rejects direct talks with North Korea and was the only member of the Security Council eager to take up the issue. Undoubtedly, John Bolton, the State Department's undersecretary for international security, did not have negotiations in mind when he said threateningly that he is "hopeful that a number of regimes will draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq that the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is not in their national interest."¹² The lessons North Korea, Iran, Syria, and others will draw from Iraq might well be exactly the opposite and definitely, they'll try to do their homework better. Bulatlat.com

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1 Chalmers Johnson "Blowback. The Costs and Consequences of American Empire," Henry Holt and Company, Ne York, 2000: 135

2 Desaix Anderson "Crisis in North Korea: the U.S. Strategic Future in East Asia" The Nautilus Institute, March 21, 2003 (http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0325A_Anderson.html)

3 "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002" Central Intelligence Agency, April 10, 2003 (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_apr_2003.htm)

4 CanKor # 120  Special Edition, March 31, 2003

5 "China, Russia block UN condemnation of North Korea" AFP, April 10, 2003

6 Edith M. Lederer "UN Panel Mulls North Korea Pact Withdrawal" AFP, April 9, 2003 and James Brooke "North Korea's Neighbors Seek Crisis Role" New York Times Seoul, April 9, 2003

7 Howard W. French "North Korea Says Its Arms Will Deter Us Attack" The New York Times, April 7, 2003

8 NAPSNet Daily Report, March 27, 2003 (http://nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0303/MAR27.html#item1)

9 "Military-First Ideology Is an Ever-Victorious, Invincible Banner for Our Era's Cause of Independence" NAPSNet Special Report, April 11, 2003 (http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/index.html)

10 "China, Russia block UN condemnation of North Korea" AFP, April 10, 2003

11 Members include retired Navy Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Ronald Reagan; retired Air Force Brig. Gen. James F. Grant, who headed US Army intelligence in South Korea; retired Air Force Col. John E. Endicott, former head of strategic studies at National Defense University; former US ambassadors to South Korea James T. Laney and Donald P. Gregg; arms control expert and former ambassador James E. Goodby; and former assistant secretary of state Robert L. Gallucci. Doug Struck "Experts Call For Direct US-DPRK Bilateral Negotiations" Washington Post, March 19, 2003

12 Philip Pullella "U.S. Tells Iran, Syria, N. Korea 'Learn from Iraq'" Reuters,  April 9, 2003

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