“My Career Would Have Been Ruined for Exposing Corruption in the AFP” - Jarque

One of the speakers in the Bayan-sponsored forum on the Oakwood mutiny held last August 16 at the UP University Hotel was Rene Jarque. He is a West Point graduate and a former army captain who resigned from the service in 1998 due to disillusionment with the rampant unprofessionalism and corruption in the military organization. He is also a son of former Army Gen. Raymundo Jarque, who shocked the nation by defecting to the National Democratic Front in 1995.

Bulatlat.com’s Alexander Martin Remollino (AMR) talked to Jarque after the forum. He shared personal experiences with and observations on the military establishment, particularly on issues behind the Oakwood mutiny. Excerpts of the interview:

AMR: How many were your personal encounters with actual corruption cases in the military?

Jarque: My involvement was more indirect, because I refused to be assigned to positions where I would have a direct hand. I already knew what was happening. I mean, these positions include those of supply officer, finance officer, or an admin officer of an office where you really have to sign documents which are not in accordance with...which are illegal.

I knew what was happening because the offices where I went to had their own supply officers from whom I derived support. But I myself was not directly involved because I didn’t want to be assigned to such positions, where things were not right. So I would rather fill in the operational aspects, where if I needed support I would ask them for it.

AMR: At what point in your career did you first learn of corruption in the military? Were you already aware of it as early as during your days as a cadet, or only later in the service?

Jarque:  Actually I already knew something of it before I entered the service since my father also used to be a military officer. I was already hearing stories, and of course I could see the lifestyles of the generals, and I wondered why our lifestyle was not as lavish since my father was also a general and had the same salary.

But I fully learned of it at the very beginning of my military service. You would immediately see the difference, and I could see it even at the time I left.

AMR: I actually heard somewhere that your father is one of those who reached the rank of general without getting rich.

Jarque: Of course I cannot say that he was a saint. I myself cannot claim that I was a saint. Because when you’re in the system, somehow—one way or another—you are involved, at the very least by tolerating the corruption.

But in Daddy’s case, I remember, when he retired, he really had nothing, as in never in our life did we buy a new car, never in our life did we have a house built that was as splendid as the houses of other generals. Basically, when he retired, he had no house, he was only about to have a house built. And he had to use help from my sibling in the States so that he could have a house built and buy a new car.

To this day, he works because he never was able to save money from the service.

AMR: As you said you were involved in the 1989 coup, and you wrote exposes of cases of corruption after that. Before 1989, did you attempt to bring these cases to the attention of the higher-ups through dialogues or other such ways?

Jarque: There were many. In 1987-89, there were discussions and dialogues between senior officers and the lieutenants and captains or company commanders. I was able to attend a company commander seminar/workshop, and we took up these things.

When I was already a captain, and I was already involved in publications, we exposed these cases of corruption. But the reactions showed that they didn’t care much about these things. For my part, I tried, but nothing came out of it.

AMR: How about the repercussions? Were there any forms of punishment that were visited upon you for your attempts at dialogue?

Jarque: For a while, there were none, because they knew Daddy was also a general in the service, so perhaps they could not hurt me that much.

But there was an instance where I wrote on the corrupt practices in the armed forces, and I was suddenly given instructions. I was suddenly relieved of my post in Camp Aguinaldo, and I heard from our personnel officer that I was to be thrown out to the farthest army assignment. I was suddenly relieved from Camp Aguinaldo and transferred to Fort Bonifacio, and then my assignment was in the field—I was being sent back to the field after having been there for almost six years. So my career was almost ruined because of that.

Fortunately, Secretary (Fortunato) Abat took over as secretary of national defense, and he took me in as one of his special assistants. Perhaps he recognized by capabilities, and I am thankful to him for what happened, otherwise my career would have been ruined for exposing the corruption in the armed forces.

AMR: You mentioned, and we are also aware, that among those involved in the 1989 coup, there were those who were jailed and there were others who weren’t. Those who were jailed—what were they mostly, were they ranking officials or simple enlisted men?

Jarque: That time, most of those who were jailed were enlisted men and junior officers: lieutenants and captains at that time. They were incarcerated in different places: Fort Bonifacio, Camp Aguinaldo.

But among the senior officers, people as highly-placed as colonels were also imprisoned. Colonel Galvez was jailed, Colonel Rojo was also jailed. So the punishment also went out to high-ranking officials.

But most of those who were jailed were junior officers and enlisted personnel.

AMR: Going to the Defense Policy Guidelines. You mentioned that one of the points there is that the armed forces should not be dependent upon any other country. In  that light, what can you say about the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement between the Philippines and the U.S.?

Jarque: That’s the point. Right now we have only one Mutual Defense Treaty. It was signed in 1951. Part of that provides that there will be military exercises within Philippine territory.

Now the problem of the Americans is the status of their soldiers when they enter the Philippines. They say that their soldiers, in the absence of any visa, should be allowed to come in and conduct training and be granted some form of immunity with regards criminal acts that may take place. Of course, we see in the experiences of Okinawa and Korea, where their personnel are subject to their own articles of war, which is unfair to the countries where they are stationed.

Now this Mutual Defense Treaty of ours, it’s a bit of an irony, because we would like to push for military self-reliance but we have a Mutual Defense Treaty only with the United States, not with other countries.

But maybe it’s not so much of a wonder, because other countries have mutual defense treaties and visiting forces agreements: Turkey, Thailand. In my view, whether these agreements would be favorable to us or not rests upon our government. What is bad is if these agreements are written in favor of the United States to the disadvantage of the Philippines.

AMR: Our present Visiting Forces Agreement and the MLSA—who do you think they favor, the Philippines or the United States?

Jarque: Well, if you look at the Mutual Defense Treaty, it says that if any of the two countries will be attacked, the other country will provide support. You can see that this is lopsided in terms of equipment.

If America is attacked, shall we send support? What have we to send?

If we are attacked, the Americans shall send support. Definitely they have much to send in terms of equipment and money.

So it’s lopsided, to the point that the Mutual Defense Treaty puts us to shame, that’s what I see.

When it comes to the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement, actually this is only a formalization of what has been happening in the past. When American servicemen come here and bring equipment, we can support them: example, toilet paper, urinals—it’s not weapons—we give them these, they pay us.

At the same time, there are areas for planning out the terms and conditions, because it’s like a contract. When they give us particular equipment, at times it could be for free, at times we’d have to pay for it.

That is in support of the Mutual Defense Treaty. But in terms of an actual basing, it is written in the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement and the MDT that no bases shall be put up in the Philippines—that’s very clear. But indirectly, when the Americans are here, they of course need to have their own basing arrangements, in the form of temporary camps.

AMR: The lopsided character of these agreements, as you said—do you think this is a manifestation of unprofessionalism and corruption in the military?

Jarque: Maybe it’s a remote connection, because the corruption and unprofessionalism in the armed forces are inherent to the AFP. Indirectly, maybe, for sometimes when the Americans give equipment, inevitably there are unscrupulous soldiers who will sell these. But that’s beyond the control of the US Armed Forces, at the same time it’s an internal problem of the AFP.

AMR: Going to the charge of the Magdalo group that Defense Secretary AngeloRreyes masterminded the Davao bombings. What can you say about this?

Jarque: Personally, I don’t believe in that allegation of theirs. Probably there are rogue elements in the military who would do that for whatever purpose: to discredit the defense secretary or the armed forces, or to sow discord between Muslims and Christians. But for the secretary to order those kinds of things, I have no personal knowledge, although personally I find it rather unbelievable.

With regards the Magdalo group’s issue that Secretary Reyes is involved in the sale of ammunition, I find it unbelievable, that the defense secretary himself would be involved in this, because the supply passes through the logistics system of the armed forces, so again there are unscrupulous soldiers who could sell these. Now if Secretary Reyes wants to profit, why would he resort to ammunition sales, when he could get commissions from contracts—which is easier. I’m not saying that he does that—what I’m saying is, why go through all the difficulty of processes which could be disadvantageous to you, when there are easier ways of making money?

AMR: Going back to corruption and reforming the military. You said that the corps of officers have a prominent part to play in the institution of reforms. But as your talk suggest, it seems that in its present composition the corps of officers can hardly be relied upon to initiate these reforms.

Jarque: That’s what I forgot to mention in my talk earlier. With the present character of the armed forces’ officer corps, I seriously doubt that it will initiate reforms from within.

I suggest that the civil sector—not only the civilian government itself, but also the civilian sector in general. For example, if we have congressional hearings, these should not be only for show, they should really look into what’s happening. Another example, the executive should also be involved, because these corruption cases are hard to find documents for—no one would put them out. But if the Department of Budget and Management or the Department of Finance or the Commission on Audit would do investigations, these documents could be ferreted out. They could also investigate the suppliers, on the threat that they could be banned if they lie. These could be done.

Now, with regards the civil sector, the different sectors should be involved in terms of pushing the government and the armed forces towards reform, and continuing to keep reform issues alive, on the part of the media, so that these would not be forgotten.

If we cannot expect reform within the armed forces, because there are interests being protected, the civil sector must be involved—not only the civilian government but the civil sector in general: the youth sector, the left sector, the right sector, everybody. These armed forces are our only armed forces, and the future of our country also rests on how professional our armed forces are.

AMR: The final question, Sir, is rather sensitive, because your father was also disillusioned with what is happening in the military and the bureaucracy. What can you say about the path he took?

Jarque: Looking back in hindsight, what he did was his decision.

 On the ideological side or the idealistic side, he was really frustrated with the system. Things were bound to come to nothing. He was being played with inside. The cases were fabricated, and his fellow generals knew that, but because he was rather honest and did not approve of what the other generals were doing, he was pinned down—even by his comrades.

On the practical side or the legal side, under such circumstances he could do nothing. He was trapped, in a manner of speaking, or whatever. Maybe it was best for him to elevate it into a political statement.

And in this case, he didn’t bring people, he didn’t bring arms, he was retired at that time, his personal and political statement was to remove himself from the ranks and then join the National Democratic Front.

It’s like what the Magdalo people are doing now. They cannot do anything inside, so for a political statement—because legally they cannot do anything within the system—they did their own thing in Oakwood. So I don’t see any difference—only the approaches are different. Bulatlat.com

Related article: Ex-AFP Psy-Ops Chief says GMA Can’t Reform Military

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