Gov't’s Sincerity in Peace Process Questioned  

“The State has the responsibility to take the moral high ground. Its primary responsibility is to make sure that the peace process prospers. It cannot invoke the presence of criminals in Central Mindanao to destroy the peace process.”

By Carlos H. Conde 
Bulatlat.com

Is the Arroyo administration really serious about the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front? Or is it, like the other administrations before it, merely taking its cue from the military and the likes of Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes?

These questions now surface in the wake of the military offensive against the MILF in Central Mindanao. Peace advocates are convinced that, in this case, the government betrayed its insincerity in the peace process.

Sources said the justification by the government for the offensive – that it was going after kidnap-for-ransom groups and other criminal elements who had supposedly sought sanctuary in and around the MILF-controlled Liguasan Marsh – is weak, mainly because there are mechanisms that should have taken care of police problems such as the Pentagon Gang.

According to a source familiar with the peace negotiations, the government – and to some extent, the MILF -- failed to honor the Joint Communique signed by both panels in Malaysia in May last year. The communiqué recognized the threat criminal elements in MILF areas pose to the peace process and provided mechanisms to deal with these criminals.

“Both sides agreed that the activities of these criminal groups impede the peace process, the effective pursuit of development programs, and the efficient delivery of basic services to the poor,” it says. “For this purpose, immediate and joint action is needed for the security and upliftment of the affected communities.”

The communiqué also says that “the AFP/PNP shall convey to the MILF an order of battle containing the names and identities of criminal elements… suspected of hiding in MILF areas/communities.”

Sources said the government/AFP/PNP failed to draw up any such order of battle, let alone provide the MILF with one. Eid Kabalu, spokesman of the MILF, confirmed this.

A crucial provision of the joint communiqué is the formation of an “ad hoc joint action group” composed of members from the MILF and the government. The joint action group, which is supposed to operate with both panels’ Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), is tasked to go after criminals. A “quick coordination system” is supposed to “to enhance their (government and MILF members) communications and working relations for the successful apprehension or capture of criminal elements in accordance with this agreement…”

According to Kabalu, the joint action group was never convened “despite our repeated requests to the government panel.” Jesus Dureza, chairman of the government panel, denied this, saying that the ceasefire committees of each panel, the CCCH, “were acting as such (joint action group)” and that this set-up had been “discussed in several CCCH meetings.” Kabalu belied this, saying that there was only one meeting regarding the joint action group.

The government has said that it was the MILF that failed to honor the agreement because the front failed to block the entry of criminals into its areas -- a provision clearly stated in the joint communiqué. MILF’s Kabalu responds by saying that “it is the government’s responsibility to determine who these criminals are. What it should have done is give us its findings about these individuals and we would have acted accordingly.”

The failure to convene the joint action group, says Kabalu, is partly to blame for this.

On that point, the government is not inconsistent. If it failed to act as a State should in the matter of the joint communiqué – that is, it should take the initiative to ensure that mechanisms for peace are put in place – it basically did the same thing with the so-called Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs).

The creation of the LMTs is provided for in an August 2001 agreement that convened the CCCH. The LMTs, as its name implies, would monitor, at the local level, the ceasefire agreements in the hope of preventing violations and skirmishes. Unlike its predecessor, the Independent Fact-Finding Committee chaired by Fr. Eliseo Mercado Jr. OMI, which functioned as one unit and was thus spread too thinly considering the numerous cease-fire violations, the LMTs would work at the municipal level and would be composed of representatives from the local government, the MILF, NGOs, and the religious sector. Because each member of the LMT is empowered to initiate his or her own investigation into a ceasefire violation, the LMT was viewed as an effective deterrent.

But it took more than a year for the LMTs to be convened, and in limited areas at that. According to the Initiatives for International Dialogue, which has been monitoring the peace process, only the LMT in Lanao del Sur has been formed. The LMTs in other areas such as Maguindanao, Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat are “non-operational.”

If the LMTs, like the joint action group, were such a good idea, why the failure? To peace advocates, this indicates a lack of desire, if not sincerity, on the government’s part. “The burden of pushing the LMTs, to ensure its success, lies with the government,” said one peace advocate.

The Rev. Bert Layson, the parish priest of Pikit who is himself monitoring the peace negotiations, is convinced that both sides in the present conflict are answerable for the damage they wrought on the communities. “Why are they settling their differences on the field when they could have done so at the negotiating table?” he asked during an interview last week. “Why do all this at the expense of thousands of innocent civilians?” he said, adding: “They have lost the confidence of the people.”

“I will throw it back to them: they signed the joint communiqué, didn’t they? I suppose they signed it in good faith?” the priest said. That the battle around Pikit happened nonetheless broke his heart, he said. “I feel deceived,” Father Layson said.

He is convinced, however, that the government should take the moral high ground in instances like this. “The State has the responsibility to take the moral high ground. Its primary responsibility is to make sure that the peace process prospers. It cannot invoke the presence of criminals here to destroy the peace process.”

Meanwhile, Father Mercado, who spent considerable time and resources helping the peace process move forward, is aghast at the decision by the government to launch the war. In a commentary published in the Inquirer on Sunday, Father Mercado said: “I could not believe myself that a new military operation could take place at this time that the formal resumption of the peace talks was almost imminent.”

He wrote that there was already a “climate of peace” because the prospects of a peace settlement “looked bright.”  

In the same article, Father Mercado put the blame for the recent war squarely on Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes. “Deep in my heart, I have always doubted (Reyes). I cannot imagine how a man who was responsible for that destruction in 2000 would provide an environment for the all-out-peace initiative of the Macapagal administration. At the back of my mind, Angelo Reyes, so long as he remains defense secretary, will always be the biggest obstacle to peace.”

Given the history of the military establishment to function as the veritable attack dogs and security guards of the powers that be and of big business interests – some of whom are reportedly eyeing the riches of Central Mindanao, principally the Liguasan Marsh (see related story) -- it is not surprising that such a perception about Reyes and the military persists.

Amirah Ali Lidasan, secretary general of the Moro-Christian People’s Alliance, put it this way: “President Arroyo should be condemned for making Reyes in command of the situation… She has bared how subservient she is to the military and the dogs of war in her Cabinet.” Bulatlat.com

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