The May 10 elections
Unique – But the Same

THE May 10 elections had certain unique characteristics.  Overall, however, they were no different from past Philippine elections.

BY LUIS V. TEODORO 
POLITICAL ANALYST, CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT AND GOVERNANCE
Posted by Bulatlat.com

Monopoly of the Elite

From 1947 to 1969 Philippine elections had been the monopoly of the Philippine elite, whose political parties were basically committed to the same policies of governance, but which differed from each other only in name and the personalities that dominated them.

It has even been argued that these parties do not have platforms, and therefore do not consciously adopt policies once in power. This is a simplification.  Policies do exist.  But, as if carved in stone, they have basically remained the same.  

For over fifty years those policies have  faithfully followed the demands of international funding agencies and other instrumentalities of US economic and financial interests through which the neo-colonial status of the Philippines is perpetuated. Those policies have also served to keep intact the dominant economic and social relations, such as the feudal system of land tenancy,  despite tremendous pressures to address the poverty that is their consequence.

Given those policies’ remaining in force no matter what the regime, Philippine elections have basically been waged over who will wield power for the sake of personal and familial interests, rather than over the adoption of alternative programs of government.  

Fraudulent and violent since Marcos

 Because the economic spoils have been huge-- even gargantuan, as was the case of Ferdinand Marcos, whose illegally acquired assets run into billions of dollars-- the contention for political power among the elite is often fierce.  From the very first post-“independence” elections in 1947, the contest for power among the elite has been characterized by violence, fraud and the corruption of the electorate. 

All Philippine elections that followed were similarly flawed, giving rise to such descriptions of the process as “the politics of money,” “patronage politics,” the dominance of “guns, goons and gold,” and more recently, “traditional (trapo) politics.” 

However, the “reelection” of Ferdinand Marcos to a second term in 1969 was different in that it marked one of the lowest points of the electoral process, the 1969 exercise being characterized by large-scale vote-buying, systematic fraud through the corruption of the supposedly independent Commission on Elections, collusion between the ruling group and other election officials, and wide-spread violence among warring political dynasties including those allied with Marcos.   The May 10 elections is in the same category of difference in that it was the worst since 1992.

Marcos realized that the democratic façade of Philippine elections had become a hindrance to his remaining in power beyond 1973, given the prohibition on more than two presidential terms in the 1937 Constitution.  In addition, Marcos also faced increasing resistance to the corruption of his rule from other elite factions, and even more importantly, from the people themselves.

Martial law: response to the growth of authentic democracy

In 1972 Marcos’ intention to remain in power was in danger of being thwarted primarily by the growth of authentic democracy through the people’s organizations that were demanding accountability from government as well as the participation in policy and decision making of the  professionals, workers and peasants, urban poor and indigenous communities who had been denied a voice in their own governance in the three decades after “independence.”

 The declaration of martial law in 1972 was, among others, an attempt by the bureaucrat-capitalist wing of the Philippine ruling elite to monopolize political power at the expense of other elite sectors. But it was also intended to quell the demands for the reform and democratization of Philippine society from its dis-empowered sectors. 

As the leading representative of the bureaucrat-capitalist wing of the elite, Marcos succeeded in keeping himself in power and in suppressing the demand for democratization and social revolution only temporarily.   

Progressive strides

As a result of the martial law experience, conditions in the aftermath of  People Power 1 in 1986 made it possible for progressives to participate in the making of the 1987 Constitution.  Because of their efforts, that Constitution included attempts not only to create a multi-party system, but also to prevent the return of authoritarian rule, among other progressive and nationalist provisions. 

The ban on the President’s seeking a second term and his or her being limited to one six-year term was obviously meant to prevent the president’s use of government resources in campaigning for another term while providing him or her enough time to implement his or her program of government. But it also serves another purpose: that of preventing a president’s entrenching himself in power long enough for him or her to remain in power permanently.

On the other hand, a multi-party system rather than the so-called “two party system” was thought to be an antidote to elite monopoly over political power.

Towards this same end, and to encourage the development of program-based political parties, the Constitution also mandated the party-list system of representation, in which the parties of such under-represented sectors as labor, the peasantry, women, the urban poor, indigenous communities, professionals, etc.—the sectors that actually comprise the majority of the population--  rather than  individuals running by district would compete for 51 seats in the House of Representatives.

Despite these efforts to encourage democratic representation and efficient governance, however, the very first elections held under the auspices of the new Constitution, those of 1987, were characterized by the return of  traditional politics and of many of its expert practitioners from the traditional power elite.

This was inevitable under the circumstances.  The so-called “EDSA revolution” was a “revolution” limited to the ouster of Marcos and his cohorts, its leading lights having seen to it that it did not develop into an authentic revolution, and that it remained focused on restoring the power and privileges of the sectors of the elite Marcos had expelled from the political system. 

The EDSA “revolution” thus lacked the social base that would have permitted the vast majority to take power, since the social relations dominant in Philippine society—such as the tenancy system, for example—were untouched due to the failure of  the Aquino presidency to abolish it,  despite the urging of even US counter-insurgency experts who saw tenancy as the seed-bed of revolution in the Philippines.  

The return to traditional elite politics

In the elections that followed the Aquino transitional presidency as in those held before the martial law period, the result was the widespread use of money and influence, and even terrorism, by the political families including Marcos’ associates and kin.

During the Ramos presidency these families gained added strength, to the extent of permitting the return to the country of the Marcoses themselves. This led to the election of Marcos’ heirs to Congress and to other positions including governorships, even as his former associates, among them Eduardo Danding Cojuangco, regained their economic power and political influence through political parties supposedly established, ironically enough, in furtherance of the multi-party system sanctioned by the 1987 Constitution. Joseph Estrada was the front man of these Marcos heirs.

As may be gleaned from this quick summary, the post-EDSA period was far from a period of change, but was basically a period of restoration: of elections as a means of choosing leaders, yes, but primarily of traditional, elite-based and elite-monopolized politics through parties that offered no platforms of governance and which were basically ad hoc groups built around dominant personalities.

The implementation of the party list system after 1996 did mean the eventual election to Congress of program-based parties, but even that process invites qualified exceptions, among them the fact that even the traditional parties and sectors (for example, business and religious groups) that cannot be characterized as under-represented have managed, together with pseudo-progressive groups, to send their representatives to Congress.

May 10 Elections: complete restoration of neo-colonial politics

This is the context in which the May 10 elections occurred. Despite near-universal hopes for change and efforts by progressives to make it possible through their participation in the parliamentary struggle to further political reform, May 10 could mark the completion of the process of restoration—which had accelerated beginning 1992-- of the very same politics that had ruled it since the end of the country’s status as a formal colony and the beginning of its neo-colonial captivity in 1946.

The paradox is that the most obvious difference May 10 had from past elections since 1992 in the end made it no different from elections since 1947, and in many ways made it even worse.  One way of accounting for this is to realize that built into the political system is its capacity to protect and perpetuate itself no matter what the circumstances, and despite the best intentions of the progressive framers of the 1987 Constitution.

The difference in the May 10 elections was first of all the existence of a situation that very Constitution itself had sought to prevent: an incumbent president’s running for office, and his or her inevitable use of government resources.  The consequence of this factor among other factors was the triumph of money, of alliances of convenience, the use of public funds for private ends, and over-all, the decline of the political system to its lowest point since 1972.

The trapos call Philippine elections an exercise in democracy. But May 10 has once more shown that they are no more than contentions among the a handful of families of the traditional elite, the poor being so out of it except as window-dressing. 

The practice of elite politics demands, in the first place, huge war chests running into the billions on the part of those running for national office, and millions even to run for councilor. Estimates that a “credible” national campaign for president can be waged only with P3 to 10 billion in campaign funds are not exaggerated.  The result is the exclusion of even millionaires, and certainly of the poor, from any opportunity to run for office. 

 In almost cynical recognition of the exclusionary rather than democratic character of Philippine elections,  a candidate’s finances are the first thing the Commission on Elections looks into to determine his or her capacity to wage a “credible” campaign.

The second is “machinery”—a word that among others means one’s possession of a “party” or “coalition,” a network of campaigners,  poll watchers on election day, etc.-- all of these being dependent on the capacity of the candidate to spend billions. 

In Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo’s case, campaign funds and “machinery” also meant whatever public funds she could get her hands on to further her campaign, whether from PAGCOR or the Department of Agriculture, as well as the entire government bureaucracy of over one million, from department secretaries down to barangay chairs.

In the provinces and even in certain parts of metro Manila, “machinery”  includes the retinue of thugs in one’s employ who can dispense both largesse as well as threats, blows and bullets. When a candidate is said to have “a machinery” what he or she may have could include—it usually does—the means with which to buy or coerce the electorate, whose sole function in this “democracy” is to renew every so often their rulers’ “democratic mandate.” 

The May 10 elections not only demonstrated how true this still is, but went even further, as may be seen in the unprecedented number of election-related deaths.

But Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s strategy was not limited to the use of billions of pesos from various sources including the government.  It also included putting together alliances of convenience held together only by the prospect of personal advantage.

Thus did Arroyo include in her so-called “coalition” even the likes of John Osmena and Miriam Defensor Santiago, on no other basis than her anticipation of the votes these former “political enemies” of hers could bring to her campaign. 

At various levels, the Arroyo campaign crisscrossed and virtually erased party-lines, as groupings such as the Nationalist People’s Coalition hedged their bets and spread their support among the major contending groups including Arroyo’s-- in yet another demonstration of the essentially opportunist character of the so-called “parties.”

Destruction of the multi-party system

The Arroyo strategy in fact proved once again that there are no political parties among the elite in the Philippines, only groups held together by dominant personalities.  That strategy thus completed the destruction of the so-called multi-party system, as she cobbled together alliances based solely on the prospect of mutual advantage.  If Arroyo wins it will be on the ruins of that system. 

It is the absence of  authentic political parties—meaning groups contending for political power on the basis of visions of an alternative future, platforms, and programs of government—that has reduced Philippine elections to popularity contests in which the most alluring in terms of looks, singing and dancing ability and capacity to entertain the crowds wins.

This has made inevitable the involvement and even candidacies in what should be a serious matter of comedians, actors, singers and other personalities the mass media have popularized.  Indeed, despite Arroyo’s disparaging remarks about actor Fernando Poe, Jr., she herself made free use of celebrity endorsements as a necessary element in her own campaign.

The likely victory of Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo would be no more than another  triumph for traditional, elite politics. But it could also mean the end of at least one consequence of that politics’ civic bankruptcy: the myth that anyone made popular by the movies can be president, which in the present context would represent an inch of progress.

As things are now turning out, not even Fernando Poe Jr.’s kingship in Philippine movies won’t make him president.  For that his supporters can blame Arroyo for having so expertly risen from third and even fourth in the surveys to first by utilizing every conceivable means at her disposal, including the release of political prisoners and finally getting the government’s peace talks with the National Democratic Front somewhere, while steadfastly supporting the United States in Iraq and elsewhere.

Into the Arroyo witches’ brew of wild spending, alliances of convenience, and celebrity endorsement,  that by themselves  eroded Poe’s earlier lead over Arroyo, add the disenfranchisement of millions of voters,  the possibility of wide-spread fraud,  and the partisanship of the police, the military and the Commission on Elections. The result: an Arroyo “victory” through virtually the same overkill tactics Ferdinand Marcos used to win a second term in 1969.

Arroyo did not achieve this alone.  In further testimony to the bankruptcy of elite politics, the so-called opposition failed to put up candidates no better than Poe and Panfilo Lacson.  Fernando Poe Jr.’s camp so believed in the myth of the dumb voter they thought their candidate didn’t even have to campaign and would win points by being, if not dumb, at least silent.  Steadfast in that belief, they were so confident in Poe’s winnability because of his popularity as a movie star they wrote off a Poe-Lacson unity so early that that effort was doomed from the start. 

On the other hand, Lacson suffered from a myth of a different sort, the myth that says that the support of the Chinese Filipino community is enough, and that if there’s anything the electorate loves, it’s blood, vengeance and human rights shortcuts. 

In one more suggestion that Philippine elections are inevitably about self-interest, however, the possibility has arisen that Lacson may have persisted in running-- despite predictions that the division of the mainstream opposition  would result in an Arroyo victory --because he has managed to wrest from Arroyo a promise to stop any further government attempts to resurrect the Kurtatong Baleleng case.

Against elite politics

In the dreary landscape the elite politicians have sketched there is only one bright spot, and that is the possible victory of a handful of reform candidates at the local and provincial levels, and of some of the progressive party-list groups. The partisanship of the police and the military in favor of  the dynasties and elite groups was evident in this area, for the first time since the party-list system was put in place. 

The killing of the members of progressive party-list groups showed the capacity of the dominant system to protect itself via its instruments of coercion is intact and a barrier to any effort at reform.  

The progressive party-list groups’ offense against elite politics was fundamental in that, as mandated by the Party List Act (Republic Act 7941)  they presented programs and platforms to the electorate rather than personalities. 

What’s more, they also demonstrated, as per  their record in the past Philippine Congress, a capacity not only to check and hold the administration accountable for its policies and actions on the basis of principle, but to actually fill the gaps in the social services available to their constituencies through their construction of health centers and school rooms.

This bright spot was dimmed by the killings, intimidation, harassment and threats that before, during and after the elections the party-list groups had to absorb. 

In general and overwhelmingly, therefore, starting with the victory of Arroyo through the usual, well- worn paths of patronage, opportunism, the use of public funds and government facilities, and the partisanship of government agencies, the May 10 elections were unique-- but only in the possibility that they may have finally restored Philippine politics to what they were before 1972.   Bulatlat.com

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