The Poll Watcher's
Guide to the Iraqi Election
By Michael
Schwartz
Znet
Most of us are pretty
certain that the Iraq elections this weekend will not change much -- the
U.S. will continue its attempt to pacify Iraq and the resistance will
continue resisting it. The level of violence will remain high, together
with the unemployment rate; the support for the American presence will
remain low, together with the amount of reconstruction.
But if the election
is not an important event, it is nevertheless an important indicator of
all sorts of things about the situation in Iraq. So those of us who are
forever trying to figure out what is going on have a good opportunity for
diagnostics based on what happens that day and afterward.
Here are a few of the
key indicators that we should all be looking at.
Voter Turnout
All the media are
talking about voter turnout, but to sort out the noise from the substance,
let's make a list of significant measures.
· Look for
overall turnout above or below 50%. Because of the Sunni boycott and the
threats against voting officials, polling places and even voters, the U.S.
is hoping that half of the 14 million voters will turn out. A lot less is
a major defeat, substantially more is a great victory for the U.S.
· Will the
Shia turn out in large numbers? Everyone knows that very few Sunni and
virtually all the Kurds will vote. The wild card is the Shia, and the U.S.
is banking on about 70% turnout in Shia areas like Sadr
City,
Basra
and even Najaf. Many independent reporters are saying, however, that large
numbers of Shia are either alienated or support Moqtada al Sadr's claim
that no elections are meaningful until the U.S. leaves. So if turnout in
the South (e.g., Najaf, Basra) is 50% or below, this is very bad news for
the U.S.
· Will any
Sunni's vote? The Sunnis are the ones who support both the insurgency and
the boycott. Turnout will be low in Sunni cities, particularly cities with
ongoing battles, like Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra (and almost non-existent
in Falluja). But how low? The U.S. claims that most Sunnis want to vote,
but are intimidated by the threat of violence (see below). The resistance
claims that Sunnis support the boycott. So anything over about 25% turnout
in key hotspots is a win for the
U.S.
· What about
Baghdad. Iyad Allawi has said he expects "up to 70%" turnout in Baghdad,
but that is almost certainly another gross overstatement by the Iraqi
Interim Prime Minister. Baghdad is mostly Sunni and it is one of the
places that the Interior Minister said was too dangerous to hold
elections. But it is also the one Sunni city where the U.S. is seriously
trying to defeat the boycott, and many of the Sunnis there are secular and
therefore less committed to the boycott. So if turnout in the Sunni areas
of Baghdad (about two-thirds of the city) is above 50%, the U.S. will have
a great victory. On the other hand, if it is below 30%, it will be a
defeat for the U.S.
Violence
There will be plenty
of violence on election day, but that won't make it much different from
any other day in recent Iraqi history. Even if it is much more violent
than usual, it will still be well within the range of expectations, given
the determination of at least a large segment of the resistance to disrupt
the elections. However, there are a couple of patterns to look out for
that could be highly significant.
· Are voters
targeted? Until now, the violence associated with the resistance campaign
against the elections has been directed almost exclusively at police and
government officials (a fact that the U.S. media has failed to highlight).
The few polling places that have been attacked have been empty. The U.S.
press has been advertising the threats against voters issued by some
elements of the resistance, promising to kill anyone who tries to vote.
These threats are not supported by many other elements of the resistance
(e.g., the Association of Muslim Scholars, a key clerical leadership
group), who support attacking only the Occupation and its direct allies
(government officials, police and military, and people who work for the
occupying armies). If the threats against ordinary civilians who try to
vote are enacted on election day, it will indicate substantial strength
for the terrorist wing of the resistance and it will be a setback for the
AMS and its allies who advocate winning over civilians.
· Are Shia
targeted? So far the anti-election campaign has been concentrated in Sunni
areas. There have been a few attacks on Shia clerical leaders who have
urged their followers to vote, but they represent a small proportion of
the anti-election violence and these attacks have been denounced by other
elements of the resistance (again, the AMS is the key group denouncing
such acts). If there is substantial violence in Shia areas on election
day, this will indicate the strength of sectarian elements in the
resistance who see the Shia as their enemy, as contrasted with the bulk of
the resistance who attack only the Occupation and its supporters.
Outcomes
We already know that
the election will not dislodge the U.S. from its command of the Iraqi
government. Nevertheless, the election will be an important indicator of
relative strength for various political tendencies. Pay particular
attention to these results
· Will the
Ali al Sistani loyalists dominate the new parliament? The slate put
together by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Unified Iraqi Coalition, will
surely get the most votes, but will they be able to command a majority of
the new parliament? If so, this is a big victory for Sistani and it may
mean that the parliament will be able to speak with a united voice that
could (if it wanted to) resist (at least rhetorically)
U.S.
policy (see below). Granted that the top of this slate (like virtually all
the major slates, is dominated by quislings who have worked with the
occupation and supported U.S. actions like the annihilation of the Najaf
Old City and the entirety of Falluja; nevertheless the logic of the
election will allow Sistani and his allies to push the parliament toward a
stance more consonant with their (at least moderate) critical stance
toward the Occupation.
· Will Allawi
be strong enough to retain a leadership position. Allawi's slate, The
Iraqi List, will not even approach the strength of Sistani's slate, but he
(and the U.S. ) is hoping for a good enough showing to project him as a
viable leader. If he is far behind, then it will be a repudiation of the
interim government, and a setback for the U.S., and it could mean the end
of his role as the most visible representative of the pro-Occupation
forces.
· Will the
Kurds win Kirkuk. Kirkuk
is one of the few areas where sectarian war is really possible. It has
always had strong Kurdish, Turkman, and Sunni Arab communities, but this
was made all the more fractious when Saddam engaged in ethnic cleansing
against the Kurds and moved several hundred thousand Sunni Arabs into the
city. Now the Kurds are trying to drive the Sunnis out, annex Kirkuk, make
it the Kurdish capital, and lay claim to the oil that lies underneath it.
If the election results in a Kurdish majority in the provincial
parliament, you can expect the Kurds to become much more aggressive in
their campaign, and this may result in genuine ethnic war like that often
predicted by U.S. leaders.
First Actions of the New Parliament
Even before they
begin to write a new constitution, the parliament will have to deal with
two issues that could make the
United States extremely
uncomfortable.
· Will the
new parliament select an pro-American prime minister. The U.S. is
maneuvering behind the scenes for the new parliament to select Iyad Allawi
to continue as Prime Minister, using its control of resources as a carrot
and a stick. However, if Allawi flounders in the election, they will have
to abandon him and select someone else with a modicum of credibility. If
the Shia gain their expected dominance, however, they could select someone
who is independent of the U.S. and create a major social control problem
for Occupation, particularly if the new leader chooses to consistently
criticize U.S. actions.
· Will the
new parliament demand that the U.S. withdraw its troops? Ali al Sistani's
Unified Iraqi Coalition has as its first platform plank that the U.S. set
a timetable for withdrawal. Most of the other slates have similar demands,
so it is almost inevitable that the new parliament will have an
overwhelming majority that was elected on a platform of U.S. withdrawal.
The handful of Sadrists in the parliament will demand that this be the
first order of business and therefore we might see an immediate
controversy within the parliament, and a major embarrassment for the U.S.
if they decide to proceed with such a demand. The key to the outcome will
be this: if the parliament demands a definite timetable, the U.S. will be
caught in a major dilemma (since Bush promised to honor such a request).
But if the parliament calls for withdrawal when the Iraqi military is
"ready to handle security," then the U.S. will have dodged the bullet. (In
the latter case, look out for a huge reaction from the Sadrists (see
below).)
Aftermath of the Election
The run-up to this
election has featured a number of promises -- explicit or subtle -- that
may be fulfilled once the election is over. So keep your eyes out for
these possible developments:
· Will
violence decrease? The Occupation and the Interim Iraqi Government has
been saying that the recent fighting is largely or even exclusively an
effort to disrupt the election (they often characterize it as a last gasp
of a dying movement). That is, we should expect violence to subside soon
after the election is over. Lately they have been hedging their bets on
this, but the world will still judge the credibility of the Occupation and
its client regime by the level of violence next month.
· Will the
U.S. withdraw from offensive operations. There have been systematic leaks
from Washington and Baghdad that once the election is over, the U.S. will
adopt a much less aggressive military stance, with some hinting that the
election will be used for a major drawdown of forces. The key symptom to
look for is whether the U.S. discontinues its major drives into rebel held
territory, using masses of troops and air power to demolish neighborhoods
or whole cities, or instead withdraws into bases and fights only on a
reactive basis.
· Will the UN
become more active in Iraq. Once the elections are complete, the UN could
declare that conditions have been met for it to engage more actively in
Iraq. This new activism might even include a role for Germany and France,
thus giving the U.S. the sort of international legitimacy they have failed
to gain until now. While this may be a long-shot, it is certainly
something that the Bush Administration will seek.
· Will the
Sadrists stake out a clear anti-government position? Moqtada al Sadr and
his Mahdi Army forces have adopted an ambivalent and ambiguous position
toward the election, apparently waiting to see the outcome before deciding
how to relate to the new leadership that emerges. One logical stance for
them to adopt is that this new government is just as illegitimate as the
old one, particularly if the new parliament fails to call for a withdrawal
timetable. If the Sadrists do adopt an antagonistic stance toward the new
government, it would inevitably mean that the Shia areas would be the
scene of major struggle -- and maybe renewed guerrilla war. But even if
they adopt less drastic tactics, Sadrist opposition to the new government
could either create a clear-cut duality in the Shia community between the
Sadrist forces and those of al Sistani, or push Sistani into a much more
anti-Occupation stance than he has had thus far.
That's all folks.
This should provide a scorecard for judging the results, even if we have
to dig deep into the Ethernet to find the relevant evidence.
Michael Schwartz,
Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook
has written extensively on popular protest and insurgency, and on American
business and government dynamics. His work on Iraq has appeared on ZNet
and TomDispatch, and in Z Magazine. His books include Radical Politics and
Social Structure, The Power Structure of American Business (with Beth
Mintz), and Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda (edited, with
Clarence Lo). He can be reached at
mschwartz25@aol.com.
Jan. 28, 2005
BACK TO TOP ■
COMMENT
© 2004 Bulatlat
■ Alipato Publications
Permission is granted to reprint or redistribute this article, provided its author/s and Bulatlat are properly credited and notified.