The Macapagal-Arroyo regime’s puppetry to United States (U.S.) imperialism is unsurpassed in the Philippines’ nearly six decades of nominal flag independence. In exchange it will get what it deserves: recognition as U.S. imperialism’s premier lapdog in the region and barely even scraps from its master.
Written
for the Center for Anti-Imperialist Studies (CAIS)
Posted by Bulatlat.com
Volume IV, Number 7 - March 14 - 20, 2004
Imperialism is intolerant of even the mildest assertions of economic independence and national sovereignty by its neocolonies, recognizing these as strategic challenges to its hegemony. Nevertheless it doesn’t always demand utter and brazen subservience from its puppet regimes, recognizing how these can stoke nationalist and patriotic sentiments among oppressed and dominated peoples. Having said that, dogged submissiveness is certainly welcome for being the best and cheapest way for the United States (U.S.) to get what it wants – as the case of the Philippines in its fervent support for the U.S. “war on terror” shows.
The regime of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has committed its “all-out” military, political and diplomatic support to the U.S. “war on terror” and moreover has embraced increasing U.S. intervention in domestic affairs, making it the most enthusiastic neocolonial supporter of U.S. imperialism’s renewed drive for global hegemony in all of Asia.
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, President Arroyo not only expressed sympathy with its victims but, in the same breath, eagerly and unconditionally committed the country’s “all-out support” to the U.S. – there was not even the pretense of going through the motions of understanding the entirety of the situation and what such support entails. On Sept. 12 she wrote U.S. President George W. Bush: “We extend whatever support we can muster… We will help in whatever way we can to strengthen the global effort to crush those responsible for this barbaric act.”[1] Subsequent events showed this was no simple emotional outburst borne of the tragedy.
Nine days after 9/11, in a speech at a joint session of the U.S. Congress, President Bush declared the U.S.’s protracted and borderless “war on terror” and threatened “every nation, in every region… either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Less than a week later, on Sept. 26, President Arroyo wholeheartedly and unqualifiedly offered overflight rights and the use of the country’s airfields and naval facilities for the transit, staging and refueling of whatever military response the U.S. undertakes. More than that, she also declared preparedness to deploy Philippine soldiers, support and medical personnel if requested. The very next day she proudly announced efforts for a U.S.-inspired and ASEAN-endorsed regional anti-terrorist campaign. The Philippines was the first country in Asia to offer such concrete, categorical and, indeed, fawning support.
All that in barely two weeks after 9/11. Since then the Macapagal-Arroyo regime has continued to affirm its extraordinary loyalty to U.S. imperialism in a host of ways, completely reversing any gains made by the people’s movement for national independence and democracy in the previous decades that peaked with the removal of the U.S. bases in 1991.
Direct military support for worldwide U.S. militarism has so far consisted of allowing the use of the country’s airspace, air and naval facilities by American invasion and occupation forces during so-called “Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom.”[2] However the U.S.’s overall geopolitical agenda for the Philippines goes far beyond just this and it aims to consolidate the country as a vital strategic location for regional force projection.[3]
To begin with, this involves ensuring a rotating presence of up to 2,000 or more U.S. troops through at least 18 bilateral military exercises annually each lasting anywhere from a week to over six months.[4] Resumed in 2000 after a six-year hiatus, these are conducted under cover of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The VFA was ratified by the Philippine Senate as a treaty in May 1999 amid strong nationalist protest. With the signing of the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) in November 2002 – this time furtively and as a mere executive agreement to undercut public protests – the U.S. is also now able to store war materiel in the country or otherwise use Philippine resources upon request. U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) chief Admiral Thomas Fargo also explains the advantage that “Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) or Mutual Logistic Support Agreements (MLSA) [enhance] interoperability and readiness and [provide] a cost effective mechanism for mutual logistics support for the U.S.”[5]
In addition, the Philippines is apparently also immediately being targeted as a regular training area for U.S. forces – including live-fire bombing and artillery exercises and low-altitude aircraft maneuvers – in the face of mounting protests against these in Japan, Korea and even Guam and Hawaii.[6]
All these lay the basis for an eventual larger and more permanent U.S. military presence in the country when the U.S. so requires. As things stand, the Philippines joins Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand as U.S. allies in Asia providing important support ranging from overflight, access and basing to escort, logistics and even troops.
The November 2001 visit of President Macapagal-Arroyo to the U.S. was politically and symbolically significant. Apart from coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Cold War vintage U.S.-Republic of the Philippines (RP) Mutual Defense Treaty, the president reaffirmed her support to the U.S.’s global “war on terror” and President Bush acknowledged the Philippines’ leadership in the region in that regard.
The Macapagal-Arroyo regime has also been unabashed in giving its support to U.S. imperialism on the political and diplomatic front whether locally, regionally or elsewhere. Certainly, Washington for its part implicitly supported then Vice President Macapagal-Arroyo as the constitutional successor during the movement to oust then President Joseph Estrada and provided immediate official recognition of the Macapagal-Arroyo government, whose legitimacy was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
As an individual country, rapid positive responses or immediate expressions of support by the Philippines for the U.S. in its global anti-terrorist drive contribute to a semblance of “legitimacy” by the “international community.” More so since there is a pathological hewing to the U.S. line. Macapagal-Arroyo declared on Oct. 8, 2001, upon the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, “the Philippines stands together with the United States” and that “the military action… is just, legitimate, urgent, and unavoidable.”[7]
The Arroyo regime is also an eager supporter of the invasion of Iraq. On March 20, 2003, the day after the start of the U.S. attack, Macapagal-Arroyo immediately declared: “We are part of the coalition of the willing… We are part of [the] global coalition against terrorism.”[8] The U.S. declared its victorious conquest on April 9 and, the very same day, President Macapagal-Arroyo quickly hailed the “freedom” of the Iraqi people and said “we are now safer from weapons of mass destruction… we are more secure from the tentacles of worldwide terrorism.”[9] The next day she was rapturous about “the sweetness of [Iraqi] freedom… the restoration of democracy and human dignity to their country… the triumph of democracy over despotism and terrorism… the victory of the Iraqi people [and their] brighter future.”[10]
And though there was never any doubt on the matter President Arroyo still declared in May 2003 that “the Philippines has chosen to fight terrorism,” in obvious reference to Pres. Bush’s “with us, or… with the terrorists” challenge. Macapagal-Arroyo last year also granted U.S. forces in the Philippines immunity from prosecution before the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Also proving important given the distinctly anti-Islam flavor of the U.S. “war on terror” is the Philippines’ neocolonial role as a leading U.S. dummy, proxy or agent in Asia where over half or 670 million out of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims live. As it is, predominantly Islamic Indonesia and Malaysia, whose populations are about 45 percent of the whole of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), continue to express concerns about the U.S. “war on terror” and condemn the occupation of Iraq. They see the former as anti-Muslim and the latter as unilateral, preemptive and unjustifiably militaristic. Muslims comprise some 220 million or over 40 percent of the ASEAN’s combined population of about 540 million.
Among the rest of the six core ASEAN countries, Thailand and Singapore with a combined population of only some 70 million join the Philippines as U.S. imperialism’s closest allies in the region.[11]
Against this backdrop the Macapagal-Arroyo regime has actively pushed the U.S. anti-terrorist agenda in key regional and international multilateral forums over the past two-and-a-half years – in ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the United Nations (UN).
Philippine lobbying in ASEAN began with Macapagal-Arroyo calling for an ASEAN Declaration against Terrorism during its summit in November 2001. She also pushed for a regional anti-terrorist campaign beginning with “simulation exercises” among the core group composed of the original ASEAN five. In May 2002, the Philippines initiated a trilateral counter-terrorist agreement among the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia which was subsequently joined by Thailand and Cambodia. Initial focus areas are preventing the movement of terrorists, arms smuggling, financial controls and coordinated intelligence information-sharing.
In the ARF meeting in June last year, participated in by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, the general framework for increased cooperation among regional security and law enforcement agencies was agreed upon. The Philippines here also took the opportunity to echo the U.S. line badgering North Korea to denuclearize.
In October last year, the Philippines helped the U.S. in its efforts to broaden the 21-country APEC grouping’s agenda to incorporate security issues in parallel to economic issues. Originally conceived as an exclusively economic forum focused on trade and investment matters, other APEC countries – conspicuously Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam – had resisted taking the US anti-terrorist agenda on board.
It is worth highlighting that the U.S. linking of economic with security issues also lays the basis for new forms of U.S. protectionism. The potential for the U.S. government to control commercial access to the U.S. market by invoking the failure of trading partners to take appropriate security precautions in such varied matters as the transport of goods to anti-terrorist money laundering is rising. For instance, among the specific actions recommended after the October 2003 APEC summit included tighter security on shipping both at ports and on the high seas, increased monitoring of cross-border movements, and financial controls versus terrorist financing. As it is, the U.S. Bio-Terrorism Act in force from mid-December 2003 creates the possibility for the U.S. to refuse entry to agricultural products from countries that do not use electronically-sealed containers. [12] Discretionary trade barriers, in short, on national security-cum-anti-terrorist grounds.
The Philippines’ usefulness as a U.S. mouthpiece is magnified by its entry into the coveted UN Security Council as a non-permanent member for the 2004-2005 term. Though formally nominated by Asian countries, the U.S. push and support to gain an additional ally in the Council – which the U.S. was not able to swing the way it wanted in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – was decisive.
The Macapagal-Arroyo regime’s direct support for the U.S. “war on terror” is also complemented by its own domestic “anti-terrorism” efforts. To be sure, Assistant of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly recently said that, in the Asia-Pacific region, the threat of terrorism is “greatest” in Southeast Asia “particularly in the Philippines and Indonesia.”[13] The government’s primary targets are the revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP-NPA-NDFP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).[14] Also identified as “terrorists” are the supposedly locally-based cells of the international network Jemaaah Islamiyah (JI) and even the bandit Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
The multi-fronted offensive combines military, legal and propaganda efforts. The military option is the overarching framework for dealing with alleged terrorists. This is reflected not only in continuing military offensives but also in persistent efforts to strengthen Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) fighting capacity through increased national budget allocations for “modernization.” Other modes are clearly subordinate. Pseudo-peace talks are engineered to fail with excessively unreasonable and unprincipled demands made of belligerent forces – the aim apparently being to eventually portray the MILF and CPP-NPA-NDFP as warmongers uninterested in peace. Elsewhere, local “peace talks” are conducted with smaller armed splinter groups to turn them into government-sponsored paramilitaries.
U.S. imperialism is also directly inserting itself into the peace talks of the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) with the MILF and NDFP, respectively, through the Washington-based US Institute for Peace (USIP).[15] The USIP allegedly has expertise in peace negotiations and conflict resolution and is already a party to the GRP-MILF talks.
Innocuous so-called community development programs such as the Kalahi program are also more than they seem. They are packaged as recognition of the “social and economic underpinnings of terrorism” but overwhelmingly are only selectively implemented in rural strongholds of revolutionary forces under the military tactic of “clear-hold-consolidate-develop.”
At the same time even unarmed civilian organizations accused of aiding or abetting “terrorism” are coming under attack, in many cases already violently. Many dozens of leaders and members of progressive Left groups, human rights organizations and political parties have been killed nationwide in a systematic attempt to destroy their organizational machinery. This is complemented by efforts in the legal realm.
In March last year President Macapagal-Arroyo called on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to “conduct an immediate inventory of dubious organizations that may be working as fronts for terrorists and criminal activities, expose them and neutralize their operations by legal sanctions.”[16] Important legal bases for such attacks on open legal organizations are already being laid. The Anti-Money Laundering Act was passed last year giving license to government intrusions on financial privacy as well as freezing and confiscation of financial assets.
Perpetually in the works though for the moment held at bay by protests are a National Identification System (NIDS) and a far-reaching Anti-Terrorist Bill patterned after the fascist USA PATRIOT Act.
Macapagal-Arroyo has also called for combining “a policy of tactical counterforce with a set of strategic legal measures” and directed the Department of Justice (DoJ) to “[anticipate] all the legal issues and concerns that are expected to arise from the situation” as well as to “set up a special team to serve the special requirements of the war on terrorism including the speedy prosecution [of suspects].”[17]
The regime is also conscious of the influence of mass media in manipulating the public mind. Apart from the expected use of media outlets to promote government policies, programs and propaganda, the president has called on media “to deprive the terrorists of the benefit of glorified coverage and publicity.”[18] The Office of the Press Secretary, Philippine Information Agency and AFP from the national down to the regional levels have been instructed to arrange more frequent and periodic briefings and to deepen links with tri-media. A notable example is the increasing proliferation of news items in daily broadsheets one-sidedly culled from AFP press releases and uncritically regurgitating their facts and using their phraseology.
Both governments are eager to claim that the U.S. is showering the Philippines with bountiful military and economic “aid” in exchange for such enthusiastic support for the “war on terror.” U.S. spending on matters related to the Philippines has certainly increased dramatically in the last three years. Nevertheless they remain circumscribed by the calculus of U.S. foreign policy and are fully in the service of U.S. imperialism notwithstanding the rhetoric of “mutual benefit.” The so-called aid is for increasing U.S. control over the reactionary AFP, for solidifying direct U.S. military presence in the country and for determining domestic economic policy.
U.S. imperialism aims to consolidate, deepen and widen its control over the AFP. Bilateral military and economic collaboration fell sharply with the rejection of a new bases agreement in 1991. Military aid which reached as much as US$200 million annually before 1991 fell to virtually nothing by the 1995-98 period.[19] The new military imperatives for the U.S. since the onset of its economic crisis and intensifying challenges to its hegemony beginning in 2000 – or pre-dating the “war on terror” dramatically declared in 2001 – have changed that.
The Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) was quietly revitalized around 2000 and, soon after, the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) revived.[20] The U.S.-RP Defense Policy Board (DPB) – different from the MDB – was created as “a new bilateral defense consultative mechanism” and announced in November 2001.[21] Military aid, military-to-military engagement and civic projects (some coordinated with the U.S. Agency for International Development or USAID) quickly increased in the three years since 2000. In particular, US Adm. Fargo has already declared that “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) serves as the ideal vehicle for U.S. forces to advise and assist the AFP in the development of skills necessary to fight terrorists.”[22]
A ten-fold increase in military aid in 2001 from the year before was followed by further rises from being a “frontline ally” in the “war on terror” (see Table 1). By 2003 the Philippines was the world’s 4th biggest recipient of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the world’s 2nd biggest and Asia’s biggest recipient of the International Military Exercise and Training Program (IMET). These increases are part of the overall increase of U.S. military and “counter-terrorism” aid to neocolonial regimes around the world, many of whom have long been systematically engaged in gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
.
|
|
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) |
1.99 |
45.00 |
76.37 |
|
International
Military Exercise and Training Program (IMET) |
1.44 |
2.00 |
2.40 |
|
Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) |
34.60 |
37.50 |
25.69 |
|
Presidential
Drawdown Authority |
- |
10.00 |
10.0 |
|
TOTAL |
38.03 |
94.50 |
114.46 |
The 2003 FMF grants were in support of four mobility systems (US$19.87M), counter-terrorist modules mainly for three Light Reaction Companies and four Light Infantry Battalions (US$30.00M), engineering spares (US$25.00M) and a regional counter-terrorism program (US$1.50M).[23] The IMET funds of US$2.4 million went to the U.S.-based training of over 160 AFP personnel. Excess Defense Articles (EDA) transfers included the following: 15,000 M16 rifles (US$6.60M), 33 2½-ton trucks (US$1.45M), three UH-1H helicopters (US$2.76M), Humanitarian Assistance Program/Excess Property (US$0.88M), and a Cyclone Class Ship (US$14.00M).
Additional commitments made during President Bush’s state visit in October included: US$25 million for army engineering spares, 20 UH-1H refurbished helicopters plus 10 unrefurbished airframes for use as spare parts (as they become available), and another US$10 million in Presidential Drawdown Authority from existing U.S. military inventories. At the moment Philippine requests for 108 more trucks, 11-meter rigid inflatable boats, additional fast patrol crafts, and body armor are pending.
Yet all this military “aid” is unambiguously in US interests. As US Admiral Fargo explains: “FMF delivers the military articles, services, and training required to support the efforts of our friends and allies that promote US security interests... IMET is an effective, low-cost component of the security assistance effort. The program provides US access to foreign governments and influences those governments far out of proportion to its modest cost. Furthermore, it exposes future leaders to US values and commitment to the rule of law.”[24]
The designation of the Philippines in October 2003 as a “Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)” considerably strengthens the U.S.-RP military relationship and contributes greatly to deepening US military intervention in the country. The Philippines is the first Asian neocolony to be given MNNA status – Thailand being the second, soon after – putting it in the same league as Israel and Egypt in the Middle East.
Significantly, a Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) of the AFP initiated by President Macapagal-Arroyo during her May 2003 state visit to Washington was concluded last year. The JDA including its recommendations and implementation plan were approved by Presidents Bush and Arroyo during the U.S. president’s state visit to Manila in October 2003.[25] A team including the USPACOM and U.S. Department of Defense drafted the report. In endorsing the findings Pres. Arroyo praised the “new perspective on political and economic security” and “[acknowledged] that strong relations with the US [would] contribute greatly.” The far-reaching JDA studied and identified ten key areas of intervention including the critical security areas of planning, training, doctrines development and logistics procurement. Although projected as reforming, enhancing and modernizing the AFP, the JDA is a barely disguised Trojan horse to lay bare its workings for U.S. military intelligence consumption and a means to ever more strongly align it with U.S. military doctrines, strategies, techniques, needs and practices to facilitate U.S. control.
As it is, considerable U.S. influence is already exerted through the IMET program and through the 13 regular bilateral conferences and trainings – distinct from the 18 military exercises mentioned above – held annually and even quarterly.[26] All told it is a comprehensive organizational, ideological and financial structure for the U.S. to directly and indirectly command the AFP. Still, and notwithstanding the basically mercenary and pro-U.S. character of the AFP, such brazen efforts by the U.S. cannot but stoke patriotic sentiments within the ranks of the AFP itself especially among junior ranking officers and enlisted personnel.
Forthcoming U.S. military aid will likely be according to priorities identified by the JDA. During his October 18, 2003 address to the Philippine Congress, Pres. Bush announced a joint U.S.-RP five-year AFP modernization and reform plan though it remains unclear – or at least not yet made public – what this will cost and how this will be distributed. Implementation of the JDA has been estimated to cost “several hundred millions [of dollars] over a five-year period,” to be shared by the US and the Philippines.[27] U.S. military aid strikingly drops in 2004 and 2005 though: FMF falls steeply from US$76.4 million in 2003 to just US$17 million in 2004 and rebounds slightly to US$30 million in 2005; IMET rises slowly from US$2.4 million in 2003 by US$300 thousand each year in to US$2.7 million in 2004 and US$3.0 million 2005.[28] No announcements have been made regarding EDA and Presidential Drawdown Authority. Elsewhere, the JUSMAG figure of US$114.46 million for 2003 has been reported as covering 2003-2005.[29]
This has alarming budget implications especially on much-needed domestic social and economic services if this implies that the Philippine government is expected to shoulder implementation of the “several hundred million dollar” JDA. More so since, in the U.S.-RP joint statement on the U.S. state visit, Macapagal-Arroyo “noted the determination of her government to move forward on an ambitious program of military reform, including increased allocation of resources to Philippine national defense.”[30] It is possible that the US, in the course of the JDA, may have realized how intractable is the problem of widespread AFP corruption. Regarding the AFP, the deputy assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Matthew P. Daley, warned the US Congress less than two weeks after Bush’s state visit that “The key factor, however, is institutional reform, without which US assistance will not avail.”[31]
The greatly increased U.S.-RP military cooperation is laying the basis for ever greater direct U.S. military intervention in the Philippines. Notably, the U.S. has since late 2002 been aiming for a more openly combat role especially by its Special Operations Forces (SOF) in “exercise” areas in zones of offensive military operations. A February 2003 Pentagon plan pushed a Balikatan “exercise” with no time limit and involving the deployment in Southern Mindanao of 3,050 US troops, including SOF soldiers at the AFP platoon level and an off-shore task force of attack jets and helicopters providing air strike support.[32] This was reportedly agreed to by Pres. Arroyo and AFP commanders though unimplemented amid strong nationalist protests.[33]
Substantial resources are also going towards pseudo-developmental projects aimed at defusing resistance to the increased U.S. military presence or in direct support of U.S. military interests or both. From as far north as the Batanes group of islands to as far south as Jolo in Sulu, millions of dollars in so-called civic and humanitarian projects are being implemented. The USAID is the main mechanism for these apart from joint military exercise-related components. Total USAID assistance – for development projects as well as policy reforms – increased from an average of US$45.7 million annually in 1994-2000 to US$49.1 million in 2001 then an average of US$84.5 million in 2002-2003 (see Table 2).
|
Fiscal Year |
TOTAL |
Of which to Mindanao |
|
1991 |
324,345 |
n/a |
|
1992 |
198,958 |
n/a |
|
1993 |
81,706 |
n/a |
|
1994 |
45,213 |
n/a |
|
1995 |
48,233 |
n/a |
|
1996 |
49,283 |
n/a |
|
1997 |
53,293 |
n/a |
|
1998 |
49,439 |
n/a |
|
1999 |
39,467 |
n/a |
|
2000 |
34,700 |
n/a |
|
2001 |
49,050 |
18,900 |
|
2002 |
83,000 |
47,400 |
|
2003 |
86,000 |
41,900 |
The distribution of this assistance makes the most sense if seen in the larger context of U.S. foreign policy in the Philippines.
Mindanao is a particular area of focus for being strategically important by its proximity to Indonesia and to critical chokepoints in the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar through which over 40 percent of Japanese, Australian and ASEAN trade transits.[34] The bulk of USAID assistance for the Philippines goes to Mindanao through its Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) program covering a wide range of socio-economic, infrastructure, education, governance, policy reform and conflict resolution projects in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In the last three years, 50 percent of USAID assistance has been allotted for Mindanao.
The Balikatan “exercises” beginning with the 6-month campaign in the first half of 2002 against the bandit ASG in Southern Mindanao are also illustrative of the underlying intent of these infrastructure and so-called civic and humanitarian programs. For the U.S., “the road that circled Basilan was repaired to support US/AFP tactical mobility”; meanwhile, the programs which included new water wells, school building and hospital repairs, and medical missions “acted as force multipliers for U.S. and AFP operations because the programs separated the citizens of Basilan from supporting the terrorist threat.”[35]
The U.S. has also committed an additional US$30 million for “post-conflict rehabilitation” contingent on the signing of a final peace accord in a repeat of similarly US-supported “reintegration” programs for former Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants.[36]
The US also provides economic-related “assistance” allegedly as rewards for staunch Philippine support but really directly in support of its economic interests. These are apart from the project-based aid in the service of its propaganda objectives. This sort of assistance is double-edged without exception.
US agricultural and industrial interests are the main beneficiaries of: food aid under PL480 (mainly rice) or Section 416 (non-fat dry milk); sovereign loan guarantee coverage of energy (PNOC, Napocor), water (MWSS), transport (MLRT Phase II) and telecommunication (Sun Cellular/Digitel) sector debt; and policy-making “technical assistance” and lobbying programs like the multi-year and multi-million dollar USAID-funded AGILE and Sustainable Energy Development programs.[37]
Even the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme through which the Philippines exports between US$650 million-US$1 billion worth of selected goods (mainly agricultural items and garments/textiles) at zero-duty into the US market cannot be considered inoffensive. It is important to note that the US makes this discretionary GSP-based access conditional, in the first instance, on the Philippine government implementing wide-ranging market-oriented policies. It can also be noted that US agri-transnationals exporting fruit and fruit juices from the Philippines are among the main gainers.
The
resulting ties to the US are apparent: the Philippines is the 19th
largest export market for US goods and the 20th largest supplier of
US imports.[38]
These aggregates however conceal the nuances of neocolonial import-export
trade. In 2002, Philippine exports to the US were some US$11.0 billion and
imports from the US were some US$7.3 billion. Yet around 65 percent of these
so-called Philippine exports to the US were of semiconductors
and computer accessories merely assembled locally in export processing
zones; on the other hand, around 75 percent of imports were of semiconductors, electric apparatus, computer accessories,
and telecommunications and energy equipment. The Philippines is the top ASEAN
purchaser of US agricultural, forestry and fisheries products while the US, in
turn, is the country’s largest foreign investor (US$4.1 billion cumulatively,
1973-2002).
To reiterate, so-called US military and economic “aid” to the Philippines in exchange for its support overwhelmingly serve US imperialist ambitions and needs more than anything else. The GRP line that the country and the people gain from its puppetry is furthest from the truth. The illusory gains from GRP support of the US conquest of Iraq via economic opportunities from reconstruction is a case study of sorts that affirms this.
The Philippine government, not long after the American invasion of Iraq and in the face of widespread public opposition to support for US imperialist ambitions, made a big deal out of supposed benefits Filipinos will reap from post-conquest reconstruction efforts. The gains bandied about were primarily in the provision of cheap skilled labor and, distantly secondarily, increased trade and investment relations with Iraq. Vulture-like, the Philippines needed only to wait for the dust to settle before feeding on economic opportunities created in the wake of widespread devastation.
As early as the end of April 2003, Macapagal-Arroyo sent Roberto Romulo, former foreign secretary and head of the newly-created Philippine Public-Private Sector Partnership for the Reconstruction and Development of Iraq (PPPSPRDI), to Washington to talk with US officials about opportunities for the Philippines in the reconstruction of Iraq.[39] Optimistically, he said that: “We realize that, as a part of the Coalition of the Willing, we will have some preferential treatment.”[40]
At the time it was estimated that the reconstruction of Iraq could cost US$100 billion dollars over five years and Philippine officials said that Filipino workers could find jobs working on infrastructure projects. It was argued that these opportunities justified the sending of a 500-person humanitarian contingent to Iraq at GRP expense of some PhP600 million over six months.[41] Secretary Romulo said in May that 30,000 Filipino workers could find reconstruction-related jobs.[42] The late foreign secretary Blas Ople meanwhile declared that “we are [conservatively] hoping to find work for at least 100,000 Filipinos in post-war Iraq.”[43]
There are basically two direct areas of involvement by the Philippines in the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq: 1) the humanitarian contingent and governance/democracy-building efforts; and 2) subcontracted Filipino labor and other business opportunities. Because of very limited government resources the first is, in the overall scheme of Iraq and notwithstanding some propaganda value for the US, really insignificant. To date, the second, or the projected economic gains from such contributions, have yet to materialize.
The so-called humanitarian contingent was finally sent to Iraq in August 2003 amid much controversy. The original 500-person team of military soldiers, police, medical workers and engineers offered by Pres. Arroyo was gradually scaled down as controversy mounted and as it became clear that the US would not be footing the bill. As of May, the proposed 175-person contingent consisted of 50 military engineers (AFP), 25 police personnel (PNP), 60 doctors and nurses (DOH), 39 social workers (DSWD), and a DFA officer familiar with Iraq and the surrounding region; the projected budget was PhP141 million for a six-month stay.[44]
By August 2003 the team grew to 178 persons with the addition of 6 soldiers and police and reduction of medical and social workers. However in October, during the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Malaysia, Macapagal-Arroyo pledged to the head of the puppet Iraq Governing Council, Ayad Alawi that the Philippines would “increase the size of our presence there to a total of 500.”[45] In November, Ople also announced the extension of the contingent’s stay for another six months after their current stint ends in February.[46]
These are not substantial commitments. There are around 145,000 US and British troops in Iraq of which about 130,000 are American and about 12,000 are British. There are an additional 16,000 foreign troops from 29 other countries; about 30,000 non-US troops are or will soon be on the ground in Iraq.[47]
The Philippines is also providing extremely small-scale technical assistance in governance/democracy-building efforts. Among others this has included PNP officers joining in training members of the Iraqi police force and having a team of Iraqis come to the Philippines for a seminar on democracy organized by the Department of Interior and Local Government’s (DILG) Local Government Academy.
The government argues that these contributions, especially coming on top of the gushing support of the US “war on terror,” will translate into benefits for the Filipino people. However not only are the potential gains greatly exaggerated but even these are diminished, almost to nothingness, by the particular status of the Philippines as a servile neocolonial puppet with an extremely backward economy.
The original estimated reconstruction and rehabilitation cost of US$100 billion over five years has been adjusted following a United Nations/World Bank (UN/WB) Joint Iraq Needs Assessment prepared for the Madrid International Donor’s Conference for Iraq in October 2003.
Iraq’s overall reconstruction needs are vast resulting from a combination of two wars and over a decade of crippling economic sanctions, both instigated by US imperialism. The country’s infrastructure, environment and social services are extremely degraded affecting the Iraqi people the worst. The assessment estimates the overall stock of reconstruction needs to be some US$36 billion over 2004-2007 covering 14 priority sectors (see Table 3). This is aside from an additional US$20 billion separately identified by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in other sectors – especially oil and security – not identified by the joint assessment (see Table 4).
Table 3: UN/World Bank Cumulative Iraq
Reconstruction Needs
by Sector on a Commitment Basis, 2004, 2005-2007 (in US$ million)
|
Sector |
2004 |
2005-
2007 |
TOTAL |
|
Infrastructure |
5,836 |
18,368 |
24,204 |
|
Transport
& Telecommunications |
1,043 |