The Macapagal-Arroyo regime’s puppetry to United States (U.S.) imperialism is unsurpassed in the Philippines’ nearly six decades of nominal flag independence. In exchange it will get what it deserves: recognition as U.S. imperialism’s premier lapdog in the region and barely even scraps from its master.
Written
for the Center for Anti-Imperialist Studies (CAIS)
Posted by Bulatlat.com
Volume IV, Number 7 - March 14 - 20, 2004
Imperialism is intolerant of even the mildest assertions of economic independence and national sovereignty by its neocolonies, recognizing these as strategic challenges to its hegemony. Nevertheless it doesn’t always demand utter and brazen subservience from its puppet regimes, recognizing how these can stoke nationalist and patriotic sentiments among oppressed and dominated peoples. Having said that, dogged submissiveness is certainly welcome for being the best and cheapest way for the United States (U.S.) to get what it wants – as the case of the Philippines in its fervent support for the U.S. “war on terror” shows.
The regime of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has committed its “all-out” military, political and diplomatic support to the U.S. “war on terror” and moreover has embraced increasing U.S. intervention in domestic affairs, making it the most enthusiastic neocolonial supporter of U.S. imperialism’s renewed drive for global hegemony in all of Asia.
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, President Arroyo not only expressed sympathy with its victims but, in the same breath, eagerly and unconditionally committed the country’s “all-out support” to the U.S. – there was not even the pretense of going through the motions of understanding the entirety of the situation and what such support entails. On Sept. 12 she wrote U.S. President George W. Bush: “We extend whatever support we can muster… We will help in whatever way we can to strengthen the global effort to crush those responsible for this barbaric act.”[1] Subsequent events showed this was no simple emotional outburst borne of the tragedy.
Nine days after 9/11, in a speech at a joint session of the U.S. Congress, President Bush declared the U.S.’s protracted and borderless “war on terror” and threatened “every nation, in every region… either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Less than a week later, on Sept. 26, President Arroyo wholeheartedly and unqualifiedly offered overflight rights and the use of the country’s airfields and naval facilities for the transit, staging and refueling of whatever military response the U.S. undertakes. More than that, she also declared preparedness to deploy Philippine soldiers, support and medical personnel if requested. The very next day she proudly announced efforts for a U.S.-inspired and ASEAN-endorsed regional anti-terrorist campaign. The Philippines was the first country in Asia to offer such concrete, categorical and, indeed, fawning support.
All that in barely two weeks after 9/11. Since then the Macapagal-Arroyo regime has continued to affirm its extraordinary loyalty to U.S. imperialism in a host of ways, completely reversing any gains made by the people’s movement for national independence and democracy in the previous decades that peaked with the removal of the U.S. bases in 1991.
Direct military support for worldwide U.S. militarism has so far consisted of allowing the use of the country’s airspace, air and naval facilities by American invasion and occupation forces during so-called “Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom.”[2] However the U.S.’s overall geopolitical agenda for the Philippines goes far beyond just this and it aims to consolidate the country as a vital strategic location for regional force projection.[3]
To begin with, this involves ensuring a rotating presence of up to 2,000 or more U.S. troops through at least 18 bilateral military exercises annually each lasting anywhere from a week to over six months.[4] Resumed in 2000 after a six-year hiatus, these are conducted under cover of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The VFA was ratified by the Philippine Senate as a treaty in May 1999 amid strong nationalist protest. With the signing of the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) in November 2002 – this time furtively and as a mere executive agreement to undercut public protests – the U.S. is also now able to store war materiel in the country or otherwise use Philippine resources upon request. U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) chief Admiral Thomas Fargo also explains the advantage that “Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) or Mutual Logistic Support Agreements (MLSA) [enhance] interoperability and readiness and [provide] a cost effective mechanism for mutual logistics support for the U.S.”[5]
In addition, the Philippines is apparently also immediately being targeted as a regular training area for U.S. forces – including live-fire bombing and artillery exercises and low-altitude aircraft maneuvers – in the face of mounting protests against these in Japan, Korea and even Guam and Hawaii.[6]
All these lay the basis for an eventual larger and more permanent U.S. military presence in the country when the U.S. so requires. As things stand, the Philippines joins Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand as U.S. allies in Asia providing important support ranging from overflight, access and basing to escort, logistics and even troops.
The November 2001 visit of President Macapagal-Arroyo to the U.S. was politically and symbolically significant. Apart from coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Cold War vintage U.S.-Republic of the Philippines (RP) Mutual Defense Treaty, the president reaffirmed her support to the U.S.’s global “war on terror” and President Bush acknowledged the Philippines’ leadership in the region in that regard.
The Macapagal-Arroyo regime has also been unabashed in giving its support to U.S. imperialism on the political and diplomatic front whether locally, regionally or elsewhere. Certainly, Washington for its part implicitly supported then Vice President Macapagal-Arroyo as the constitutional successor during the movement to oust then President Joseph Estrada and provided immediate official recognition of the Macapagal-Arroyo government, whose legitimacy was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
As an individual country, rapid positive responses or immediate expressions of support by the Philippines for the U.S. in its global anti-terrorist drive contribute to a semblance of “legitimacy” by the “international community.” More so since there is a pathological hewing to the U.S. line. Macapagal-Arroyo declared on Oct. 8, 2001, upon the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, “the Philippines stands together with the United States” and that “the military action… is just, legitimate, urgent, and unavoidable.”[7]
The Arroyo regime is also an eager supporter of the invasion of Iraq. On March 20, 2003, the day after the start of the U.S. attack, Macapagal-Arroyo immediately declared: “We are part of the coalition of the willing… We are part of [the] global coalition against terrorism.”[8] The U.S. declared its victorious conquest on April 9 and, the very same day, President Macapagal-Arroyo quickly hailed the “freedom” of the Iraqi people and said “we are now safer from weapons of mass destruction… we are more secure from the tentacles of worldwide terrorism.”[9] The next day she was rapturous about “the sweetness of [Iraqi] freedom… the restoration of democracy and human dignity to their country… the triumph of democracy over despotism and terrorism… the victory of the Iraqi people [and their] brighter future.”[10]
And though there was never any doubt on the matter President Arroyo still declared in May 2003 that “the Philippines has chosen to fight terrorism,” in obvious reference to Pres. Bush’s “with us, or… with the terrorists” challenge. Macapagal-Arroyo last year also granted U.S. forces in the Philippines immunity from prosecution before the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Also proving important given the distinctly anti-Islam flavor of the U.S. “war on terror” is the Philippines’ neocolonial role as a leading U.S. dummy, proxy or agent in Asia where over half or 670 million out of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims live. As it is, predominantly Islamic Indonesia and Malaysia, whose populations are about 45 percent of the whole of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), continue to express concerns about the U.S. “war on terror” and condemn the occupation of Iraq. They see the former as anti-Muslim and the latter as unilateral, preemptive and unjustifiably militaristic. Muslims comprise some 220 million or over 40 percent of the ASEAN’s combined population of about 540 million.
Among the rest of the six core ASEAN countries, Thailand and Singapore with a combined population of only some 70 million join the Philippines as U.S. imperialism’s closest allies in the region.[11]
Against this backdrop the Macapagal-Arroyo regime has actively pushed the U.S. anti-terrorist agenda in key regional and international multilateral forums over the past two-and-a-half years – in ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the United Nations (UN).
Philippine lobbying in ASEAN began with Macapagal-Arroyo calling for an ASEAN Declaration against Terrorism during its summit in November 2001. She also pushed for a regional anti-terrorist campaign beginning with “simulation exercises” among the core group composed of the original ASEAN five. In May 2002, the Philippines initiated a trilateral counter-terrorist agreement among the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia which was subsequently joined by Thailand and Cambodia. Initial focus areas are preventing the movement of terrorists, arms smuggling, financial controls and coordinated intelligence information-sharing.
In the ARF meeting in June last year, participated in by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, the general framework for increased cooperation among regional security and law enforcement agencies was agreed upon. The Philippines here also took the opportunity to echo the U.S. line badgering North Korea to denuclearize.
In October last year, the Philippines helped the U.S. in its efforts to broaden the 21-country APEC grouping’s agenda to incorporate security issues in parallel to economic issues. Originally conceived as an exclusively economic forum focused on trade and investment matters, other APEC countries – conspicuously Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam – had resisted taking the US anti-terrorist agenda on board.
It is worth highlighting that the U.S. linking of economic with security issues also lays the basis for new forms of U.S. protectionism. The potential for the U.S. government to control commercial access to the U.S. market by invoking the failure of trading partners to take appropriate security precautions in such varied matters as the transport of goods to anti-terrorist money laundering is rising. For instance, among the specific actions recommended after the October 2003 APEC summit included tighter security on shipping both at ports and on the high seas, increased monitoring of cross-border movements, and financial controls versus terrorist financing. As it is, the U.S. Bio-Terrorism Act in force from mid-December 2003 creates the possibility for the U.S. to refuse entry to agricultural products from countries that do not use electronically-sealed containers. [12] Discretionary trade barriers, in short, on national security-cum-anti-terrorist grounds.
The Philippines’ usefulness as a U.S. mouthpiece is magnified by its entry into the coveted UN Security Council as a non-permanent member for the 2004-2005 term. Though formally nominated by Asian countries, the U.S. push and support to gain an additional ally in the Council – which the U.S. was not able to swing the way it wanted in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – was decisive.
The Macapagal-Arroyo regime’s direct support for the U.S. “war on terror” is also complemented by its own domestic “anti-terrorism” efforts. To be sure, Assistant of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly recently said that, in the Asia-Pacific region, the threat of terrorism is “greatest” in Southeast Asia “particularly in the Philippines and Indonesia.”[13] The government’s primary targets are the revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP-NPA-NDFP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).[14] Also identified as “terrorists” are the supposedly locally-based cells of the international network Jemaaah Islamiyah (JI) and even the bandit Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
The multi-fronted offensive combines military, legal and propaganda efforts. The military option is the overarching framework for dealing with alleged terrorists. This is reflected not only in continuing military offensives but also in persistent efforts to strengthen Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) fighting capacity through increased national budget allocations for “modernization.” Other modes are clearly subordinate. Pseudo-peace talks are engineered to fail with excessively unreasonable and unprincipled demands made of belligerent forces – the aim apparently being to eventually portray the MILF and CPP-NPA-NDFP as warmongers uninterested in peace. Elsewhere, local “peace talks” are conducted with smaller armed splinter groups to turn them into government-sponsored paramilitaries.
U.S. imperialism is also directly inserting itself into the peace talks of the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) with the MILF and NDFP, respectively, through the Washington-based US Institute for Peace (USIP).[15] The USIP allegedly has expertise in peace negotiations and conflict resolution and is already a party to the GRP-MILF talks.
Innocuous so-called community development programs such as the Kalahi program are also more than they seem. They are packaged as recognition of the “social and economic underpinnings of terrorism” but overwhelmingly are only selectively implemented in rural strongholds of revolutionary forces under the military tactic of “clear-hold-consolidate-develop.”
At the same time even unarmed civilian organizations accused of aiding or abetting “terrorism” are coming under attack, in many cases already violently. Many dozens of leaders and members of progressive Left groups, human rights organizations and political parties have been killed nationwide in a systematic attempt to destroy their organizational machinery. This is complemented by efforts in the legal realm.
In March last year President Macapagal-Arroyo called on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to “conduct an immediate inventory of dubious organizations that may be working as fronts for terrorists and criminal activities, expose them and neutralize their operations by legal sanctions.”[16] Important legal bases for such attacks on open legal organizations are already being laid. The Anti-Money Laundering Act was passed last year giving license to government intrusions on financial privacy as well as freezing and confiscation of financial assets.
Perpetually in the works though for the moment held at bay by protests are a National Identification System (NIDS) and a far-reaching Anti-Terrorist Bill patterned after the fascist USA PATRIOT Act.
Macapagal-Arroyo has also called for combining “a policy of tactical counterforce with a set of strategic legal measures” and directed the Department of Justice (DoJ) to “[anticipate] all the legal issues and concerns that are expected to arise from the situation” as well as to “set up a special team to serve the special requirements of the war on terrorism including the speedy prosecution [of suspects].”[17]
The regime is also conscious of the influence of mass media in manipulating the public mind. Apart from the expected use of media outlets to promote government policies, programs and propaganda, the president has called on media “to deprive the terrorists of the benefit of glorified coverage and publicity.”[18] The Office of the Press Secretary, Philippine Information Agency and AFP from the national down to the regional levels have been instructed to arrange more frequent and periodic briefings and to deepen links with tri-media. A notable example is the increasing proliferation of news items in daily broadsheets one-sidedly culled from AFP press releases and uncritically regurgitating their facts and using their phraseology.
Both governments are eager to claim that the U.S. is showering the Philippines with bountiful military and economic “aid” in exchange for such enthusiastic support for the “war on terror.” U.S. spending on matters related to the Philippines has certainly increased dramatically in the last three years. Nevertheless they remain circumscribed by the calculus of U.S. foreign policy and are fully in the service of U.S. imperialism notwithstanding the rhetoric of “mutual benefit.” The so-called aid is for increasing U.S. control over the reactionary AFP, for solidifying direct U.S. military presence in the country and for determining domestic economic policy.
U.S. imperialism aims to consolidate, deepen and widen its control over the AFP. Bilateral military and economic collaboration fell sharply with the rejection of a new bases agreement in 1991. Military aid which reached as much as US$200 million annually before 1991 fell to virtually nothing by the 1995-98 period.[19] The new military imperatives for the U.S. since the onset of its economic crisis and intensifying challenges to its hegemony beginning in 2000 – or pre-dating the “war on terror” dramatically declared in 2001 – have changed that.
The Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) was quietly revitalized around 2000 and, soon after, the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) revived.[20] The U.S.-RP Defense Policy Board (DPB) – different from the MDB – was created as “a new bilateral defense consultative mechanism” and announced in November 2001.[21] Military aid, military-to-military engagement and civic projects (some coordinated with the U.S. Agency for International Development or USAID) quickly increased in the three years since 2000. In particular, US Adm. Fargo has already declared that “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) serves as the ideal vehicle for U.S. forces to advise and assist the AFP in the development of skills necessary to fight terrorists.”[22]
A ten-fold increase in military aid in 2001 from the year before was followed by further rises from being a “frontline ally” in the “war on terror” (see Table 1). By 2003 the Philippines was the world’s 4th biggest recipient of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the world’s 2nd biggest and Asia’s biggest recipient of the International Military Exercise and Training Program (IMET). These increases are part of the overall increase of U.S. military and “counter-terrorism” aid to neocolonial regimes around the world, many of whom have long been systematically engaged in gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
.
|
|
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) |
1.99 |
45.00 |
76.37 |
|
International
Military Exercise and Training Program (IMET) |
1.44 |
2.00 |
2.40 |
|
Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) |
34.60 |
37.50 |
25.69 |
|
Presidential
Drawdown Authority |
- |
10.00 |
10.0 |
|
TOTAL |
38.03 |
94.50 |
114.46 |
The 2003 FMF grants were in support of four mobility systems (US$19.87M), counter-terrorist modules mainly for three Light Reaction Companies and four Light Infantry Battalions (US$30.00M), engineering spares (US$25.00M) and a regional counter-terrorism program (US$1.50M).[23] The IMET funds of US$2.4 million went to the U.S.-based training of over 160 AFP personnel. Excess Defense Articles (EDA) transfers included the following: 15,000 M16 rifles (US$6.60M), 33 2½-ton trucks (US$1.45M), three UH-1H helicopters (US$2.76M), Humanitarian Assistance Program/Excess Property (US$0.88M), and a Cyclone Class Ship (US$14.00M).
Additional commitments made during President Bush’s state visit in October included: US$25 million for army engineering spares, 20 UH-1H refurbished helicopters plus 10 unrefurbished airframes for use as spare parts (as they become available), and another US$10 million in Presidential Drawdown Authority from existing U.S. military inventories. At the moment Philippine requests for 108 more trucks, 11-meter rigid inflatable boats, additional fast patrol crafts, and body armor are pending.
Yet all this military “aid” is unambiguously in US interests. As US Admiral Fargo explains: “FMF delivers the military articles, services, and training required to support the efforts of our friends and allies that promote US security interests... IMET is an effective, low-cost component of the security assistance effort. The program provides US access to foreign governments and influences those governments far out of proportion to its modest cost. Furthermore, it exposes future leaders to US values and commitment to the rule of law.”[24]
The designation of the Philippines in October 2003 as a “Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)” considerably strengthens the U.S.-RP military relationship and contributes greatly to deepening US military intervention in the country. The Philippines is the first Asian neocolony to be given MNNA status – Thailand being the second, soon after – putting it in the same league as Israel and Egypt in the Middle East.
Significantly, a Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) of the AFP initiated by President Macapagal-Arroyo during her May 2003 state visit to Washington was concluded last year. The JDA including its recommendations and implementation plan were approved by Presidents Bush and Arroyo during the U.S. president’s state visit to Manila in October 2003.[25] A team including the USPACOM and U.S. Department of Defense drafted the report. In endorsing the findings Pres. Arroyo praised the “new perspective on political and economic security” and “[acknowledged] that strong relations with the US [would] contribute greatly.” The far-reaching JDA studied and identified ten key areas of intervention including the critical security areas of planning, training, doctrines development and logistics procurement. Although projected as reforming, enhancing and modernizing the AFP, the JDA is a barely disguised Trojan horse to lay bare its workings for U.S. military intelligence consumption and a means to ever more strongly align it with U.S. military doctrines, strategies, techniques, needs and practices to facilitate U.S. control.
As it is, considerable U.S. influence is already exerted through the IMET program and through the 13 regular bilateral conferences and trainings – distinct from the 18 military exercises mentioned above – held annually and even quarterly.[26] All told it is a comprehensive organizational, ideological and financial structure for the U.S. to directly and indirectly command the AFP. Still, and notwithstanding the basically mercenary and pro-U.S. character of the AFP, such brazen efforts by the U.S. cannot but stoke patriotic sentiments within the ranks of the AFP itself especially among junior ranking officers and enlisted personnel.
Forthcoming U.S. military aid will likely be according to priorities identified by the JDA. During his October 18, 2003 address to the Philippine Congress, Pres. Bush announced a joint U.S.-RP five-year AFP modernization and reform plan though it remains unclear – or at least not yet made public – what this will cost and how this will be distributed. Implementation of the JDA has been estimated to cost “several hundred millions [of dollars] over a five-year period,” to be shared by the US and the Philippines.[27] U.S. military aid strikingly drops in 2004 and 2005 though: FMF falls steeply from US$76.4 million in 2003 to just US$17 million in 2004 and rebounds slightly to US$30 million in 2005; IMET rises slowly from US$2.4 million in 2003 by US$300 thousand each year in to US$2.7 million in 2004 and US$3.0 million 2005.[28] No announcements have been made regarding EDA and Presidential Drawdown Authority. Elsewhere, the JUSMAG figure of US$114.46 million for 2003 has been reported as covering 2003-2005.[29]
This has alarming budget implications especially on much-needed domestic social and economic services if this implies that the Philippine government is expected to shoulder implementation of the “several hundred million dollar” JDA. More so since, in the U.S.-RP joint statement on the U.S. state visit, Macapagal-Arroyo “noted the determination of her government to move forward on an ambitious program of military reform, including increased allocation of resources to Philippine national defense.”[30] It is possible that the US, in the course of the JDA, may have realized how intractable is the problem of widespread AFP corruption. Regarding the AFP, the deputy assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Matthew P. Daley, warned the US Congress less than two weeks after Bush’s state visit that “The key factor, however, is institutional reform, without which US assistance will not avail.”[31]
The greatly increased U.S.-RP military cooperation is laying the basis for ever greater direct U.S. military intervention in the Philippines. Notably, the U.S. has since late 2002 been aiming for a more openly combat role especially by its Special Operations Forces (SOF) in “exercise” areas in zones of offensive military operations. A February 2003 Pentagon plan pushed a Balikatan “exercise” with no time limit and involving the deployment in Southern Mindanao of 3,050 US troops, including SOF soldiers at the AFP platoon level and an off-shore task force of attack jets and helicopters providing air strike support.[32] This was reportedly agreed to by Pres. Arroyo and AFP commanders though unimplemented amid strong nationalist protests.[33]
Substantial resources are also going towards pseudo-developmental projects aimed at defusing resistance to the increased U.S. military presence or in direct support of U.S. military interests or both. From as far north as the Batanes group of islands to as far south as Jolo in Sulu, millions of dollars in so-called civic and humanitarian projects are being implemented. The USAID is the main mechanism for these apart from joint military exercise-related components. Total USAID assistance – for development projects as well as policy reforms – increased from an average of US$45.7 million annually in 1994-2000 to US$49.1 million in 2001 then an average of US$84.5 million in 2002-2003 (see Table 2).
|
Fiscal Year |
TOTAL |
Of which to Mindanao |
|
1991 |
324,345 |
n/a |
|
1992 |
198,958 |
n/a |
|
1993 |
81,706 |
n/a |
|
1994 |
45,213 |
n/a |
|
1995 |
48,233 |
n/a |
|
1996 |
49,283 |
n/a |
|
1997 |
53,293 |
n/a |
|
1998 |
49,439 |
n/a |
|
1999 |
39,467 |
n/a |
|
2000 |
34,700 |
n/a |
|
2001 |
49,050 |
18,900 |
|
2002 |
83,000 |
47,400 |
|
2003 |
86,000 |
41,900 |
The distribution of this assistance makes the most sense if seen in the larger context of U.S. foreign policy in the Philippines.
Mindanao is a particular area of focus for being strategically important by its proximity to Indonesia and to critical chokepoints in the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar through which over 40 percent of Japanese, Australian and ASEAN trade transits.[34] The bulk of USAID assistance for the Philippines goes to Mindanao through its Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) program covering a wide range of socio-economic, infrastructure, education, governance, policy reform and conflict resolution projects in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In the last three years, 50 percent of USAID assistance has been allotted for Mindanao.
The Balikatan “exercises” beginning with the 6-month campaign in the first half of 2002 against the bandit ASG in Southern Mindanao are also illustrative of the underlying intent of these infrastructure and so-called civic and humanitarian programs. For the U.S., “the road that circled Basilan was repaired to support US/AFP tactical mobility”; meanwhile, the programs which included new water wells, school building and hospital repairs, and medical missions “acted as force multipliers for U.S. and AFP operations because the programs separated the citizens of Basilan from supporting the terrorist threat.”[35]
The U.S. has also committed an additional US$30 million for “post-conflict rehabilitation” contingent on the signing of a final peace accord in a repeat of similarly US-supported “reintegration” programs for former Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants.[36]
The US also provides economic-related “assistance” allegedly as rewards for staunch Philippine support but really directly in support of its economic interests. These are apart from the project-based aid in the service of its propaganda objectives. This sort of assistance is double-edged without exception.
US agricultural and industrial interests are the main beneficiaries of: food aid under PL480 (mainly rice) or Section 416 (non-fat dry milk); sovereign loan guarantee coverage of energy (PNOC, Napocor), water (MWSS), transport (MLRT Phase II) and telecommunication (Sun Cellular/Digitel) sector debt; and policy-making “technical assistance” and lobbying programs like the multi-year and multi-million dollar USAID-funded AGILE and Sustainable Energy Development programs.[37]
Even the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme through which the Philippines exports between US$650 million-US$1 billion worth of selected goods (mainly agricultural items and garments/textiles) at zero-duty into the US market cannot be considered inoffensive. It is important to note that the US makes this discretionary GSP-based access conditional, in the first instance, on the Philippine government implementing wide-ranging market-oriented policies. It can also be noted that US agri-transnationals exporting fruit and fruit juices from the Philippines are among the main gainers.
The
resulting ties to the US are apparent: the Philippines is the 19th
largest export market for US goods and the 20th largest supplier of
US imports.[38]
These aggregates however conceal the nuances of neocolonial import-export
trade. In 2002, Philippine exports to the US were some US$11.0 billion and
imports from the US were some US$7.3 billion. Yet around 65 percent of these
so-called Philippine exports to the US were of semiconductors
and computer accessories merely assembled locally in export processing
zones; on the other hand, around 75 percent of imports were of semiconductors, electric apparatus, computer accessories,
and telecommunications and energy equipment. The Philippines is the top ASEAN
purchaser of US agricultural, forestry and fisheries products while the US, in
turn, is the country’s largest foreign investor (US$4.1 billion cumulatively,
1973-2002).
To reiterate, so-called US military and economic “aid” to the Philippines in exchange for its support overwhelmingly serve US imperialist ambitions and needs more than anything else. The GRP line that the country and the people gain from its puppetry is furthest from the truth. The illusory gains from GRP support of the US conquest of Iraq via economic opportunities from reconstruction is a case study of sorts that affirms this.
The Philippine government, not long after the American invasion of Iraq and in the face of widespread public opposition to support for US imperialist ambitions, made a big deal out of supposed benefits Filipinos will reap from post-conquest reconstruction efforts. The gains bandied about were primarily in the provision of cheap skilled labor and, distantly secondarily, increased trade and investment relations with Iraq. Vulture-like, the Philippines needed only to wait for the dust to settle before feeding on economic opportunities created in the wake of widespread devastation.
As early as the end of April 2003, Macapagal-Arroyo sent Roberto Romulo, former foreign secretary and head of the newly-created Philippine Public-Private Sector Partnership for the Reconstruction and Development of Iraq (PPPSPRDI), to Washington to talk with US officials about opportunities for the Philippines in the reconstruction of Iraq.[39] Optimistically, he said that: “We realize that, as a part of the Coalition of the Willing, we will have some preferential treatment.”[40]
At the time it was estimated that the reconstruction of Iraq could cost US$100 billion dollars over five years and Philippine officials said that Filipino workers could find jobs working on infrastructure projects. It was argued that these opportunities justified the sending of a 500-person humanitarian contingent to Iraq at GRP expense of some PhP600 million over six months.[41] Secretary Romulo said in May that 30,000 Filipino workers could find reconstruction-related jobs.[42] The late foreign secretary Blas Ople meanwhile declared that “we are [conservatively] hoping to find work for at least 100,000 Filipinos in post-war Iraq.”[43]
There are basically two direct areas of involvement by the Philippines in the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq: 1) the humanitarian contingent and governance/democracy-building efforts; and 2) subcontracted Filipino labor and other business opportunities. Because of very limited government resources the first is, in the overall scheme of Iraq and notwithstanding some propaganda value for the US, really insignificant. To date, the second, or the projected economic gains from such contributions, have yet to materialize.
The so-called humanitarian contingent was finally sent to Iraq in August 2003 amid much controversy. The original 500-person team of military soldiers, police, medical workers and engineers offered by Pres. Arroyo was gradually scaled down as controversy mounted and as it became clear that the US would not be footing the bill. As of May, the proposed 175-person contingent consisted of 50 military engineers (AFP), 25 police personnel (PNP), 60 doctors and nurses (DOH), 39 social workers (DSWD), and a DFA officer familiar with Iraq and the surrounding region; the projected budget was PhP141 million for a six-month stay.[44]
By August 2003 the team grew to 178 persons with the addition of 6 soldiers and police and reduction of medical and social workers. However in October, during the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Malaysia, Macapagal-Arroyo pledged to the head of the puppet Iraq Governing Council, Ayad Alawi that the Philippines would “increase the size of our presence there to a total of 500.”[45] In November, Ople also announced the extension of the contingent’s stay for another six months after their current stint ends in February.[46]
These are not substantial commitments. There are around 145,000 US and British troops in Iraq of which about 130,000 are American and about 12,000 are British. There are an additional 16,000 foreign troops from 29 other countries; about 30,000 non-US troops are or will soon be on the ground in Iraq.[47]
The Philippines is also providing extremely small-scale technical assistance in governance/democracy-building efforts. Among others this has included PNP officers joining in training members of the Iraqi police force and having a team of Iraqis come to the Philippines for a seminar on democracy organized by the Department of Interior and Local Government’s (DILG) Local Government Academy.
The government argues that these contributions, especially coming on top of the gushing support of the US “war on terror,” will translate into benefits for the Filipino people. However not only are the potential gains greatly exaggerated but even these are diminished, almost to nothingness, by the particular status of the Philippines as a servile neocolonial puppet with an extremely backward economy.
The original estimated reconstruction and rehabilitation cost of US$100 billion over five years has been adjusted following a United Nations/World Bank (UN/WB) Joint Iraq Needs Assessment prepared for the Madrid International Donor’s Conference for Iraq in October 2003.
Iraq’s overall reconstruction needs are vast resulting from a combination of two wars and over a decade of crippling economic sanctions, both instigated by US imperialism. The country’s infrastructure, environment and social services are extremely degraded affecting the Iraqi people the worst. The assessment estimates the overall stock of reconstruction needs to be some US$36 billion over 2004-2007 covering 14 priority sectors (see Table 3). This is aside from an additional US$20 billion separately identified by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in other sectors – especially oil and security – not identified by the joint assessment (see Table 4).
Table 3: UN/World Bank Cumulative Iraq
Reconstruction Needs
by Sector on a Commitment Basis, 2004, 2005-2007 (in US$ million)
|
Sector |
2004 |
2005-
2007 |
TOTAL |
|
Infrastructure |
5,836 |
18,368 |
24,204 |
|
Transport
& Telecommunications |
1,043 |
2,366 |
3,409 |
|
Water,
Sanitation, Solid Waste |
1,881 |
4,961 |
6,842 |
|
Electricity |
2,377 |
9,745 |
12,122 |
|
Urban
Management |
110 |
303 |
413 |
|
Housing
& Land Management |
425 |
993 |
1,418 |
|
Health, Education,
Employment |
1,880 |
5,310 |
7,190 |
|
Education:
Primary, Secondary & Higher |
1,005 |
3,800 |
4,805 |
|
Health |
500 |
1,100 |
1,600 |
|
Employment |
375 |
410 |
785 |
|
Agriculture and Water
Resources |
1,230 |
1,797 |
3,027 |
|
Investment
in Agriculture |
1,230 |
1,797 |
3,027 |
|
Private Sector Development |
145 |
476 |
621 |
|
State-Owned
Enterprises |
30 |
170 |
200 |
|
Financial
Sector |
71 |
10 |
81 |
|
Investment
Climate |
44 |
296 |
340 |
|
Local Administration, Rule
of Law & Civil Society |
101 |
212 |
313 |
|
Mine Action |
80 |
154 |
234 |
|
TOTAL |
9,272 |
26,317 |
35,589 |
Table 4: CPA Estimated Needs in Sectors Not Covered
by the UN/WB Needs Assessment,
2004, 2005-2007 (in US$ million)
|
Sector |
2004 |
2005-
2007 |
TOTAL |
|
Oil |
2,000 |
6,000 |
8,000 |
|
Security
and Police |
5,000 |
0 |
5,000 |
|
Environment |
500 |
3,000 |
3,500 |
|
Culture |
140 |
800 |
940 |
|
Human Rights |
200 |
600 |
800 |
|
Science & Technology |
100 |
300 |
400 |
|
Religious Affairs |
100 |
200 |
300 |
|
Youth & Sport |
100 |
200 |
300 |
|
Foreign
Affairs |
100 |
100 |
200 |
|
TOTAL |
8,240 |
11,200 |
19,440 |
The identified needs total some US$55.0 billion – US$17.5 billion of which is for 2004 – to be financed by external donor financing, Iraqi government oil and tax revenues, and private domestic and international investors. Thirty-eight (38) countries pledged loans and grants at the Madrid conference totaling up to as much as US$35.9 billion, not yet including humanitarian assistance (US$115.2 million), export credits and guarantees (US$666.32 million), and in-kind assistance (see Table 5) – conspicuously absent from the list of pledging countries are Germany, France and Russia.[48] The remaining 35 out of the total 73 countries in attendance, the Philippines among them, were there scouting for economic opportunities but lacking the resources to make their presence felt.
|
Donor |
2004 |
2005-2007 |
Unspecified |
Total |
|
Countries |
569.59 |
758.62 |
25,118.50 |
26,446.71 |
|
United States |
0.00 |
0.00 |
18,649.00 |
18,649.00 |
|
Japan |
0.00 |
0.00 |
4,914.00 |
4,914.00 |
|
EC + EU
Member States |
614.83 |
369.04 |
272.54 |
1,256.41 |
|
Others |
45.24 |
20.54 |
1,282.96 |
1,627.3 |
|
International
Financial Institutions |
1,350.00 |
4,200.00 - 7,900.00 |
0.00 |
5,550.00 - 9,250.00 |
|
IMF |
850.00 |
1,700.00 - 3,400.00 |
0.00 |
2,550.00 - 4,250.00 |
|
World Bank |
500.00 |
2,500.00 - 4,500.00 |
0.00 |
3,000.00 - 5,000.00 |
|
TOTAL |
2,155.21 |
4,958.62 - 8,658.62 |
25,118.50 |
32,232.33 - 35,932.33 |
|
Of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
Grants |
685.21 |
303.62 |
21,282.88 |
22,271.71 |
|
Loans |
1,470.00 |
4,655.00 - 8,355.00 |
3,500.00 |
9,625.00 - 13,325.00 |
|
Unspecified |
0.00 |
0.00 |
335.62 |
335.6 |
|
TOTAL |
2,155.21 |
4,958.62 - 8,658.62 |
25,118.50 |
32,232.33 - 35,932.33 |
Iraqi oil revenues were about US$3.5 billion through the end of 2003.[49] The target level of 2.3 million barrels/day, after subtracting 0.5 million for domestic consumption, is expected to generate between US$18.5 billion and US$23 billion annually, depending on the price of oil.[50] All proceeds from the sale of Iraqi oil and natural gas are to be placed into the Development Fund for Iraq endorsed by unanimously-adopted Resolution 1483 of the UN Security Council last May, advised by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and controlled by the US.[51]
If this is the universe of needs and opportunities, the Philippine share will in large part likely be narrowed to how much of this is accounted for by its US imperialist patron. The US pledged US$20.3 billion at the donors’ conference, or some 58 percent of total pledges made, subject to Congressional approval; the US Congress subsequently approved US$18.7 billion in grants toward security and reconstruction needs (see also Table 6).[52] The USAID, US Army Corps of Engineers, and the US Department of Commerce are the primary federal agencies administering reconstruction contracts.
Table 6: Funds for Iraq Reconstruction, FY2004
Supplemental Appropriation,
(partial, in US$ million)
|
Sector |
Amount |
|
Electricity
infrastructure rehabilitation |
5,560
|
|
Water and sewage systems |
4,332
|
|
Security and law
enforcement |
3,243
|
|
Energy infrastructure |
1,890
|
|
Justice and civil society
and democracy |
1,320
|
|
Hospitals and clinics |
800
|
|
Transportation and
telecommunications Infrastructure |
500
|
|
Education, jobs training,
and private sector initiatives |
453
|
|
Housing,
roads, and bridges |
370
|
|
TOTAL |
18,468 |
But really the only thing the Philippines has to offer towards reconstruction is its cheap overseas Filipino labor. There is virtually no possibility of any substantial trading and investment opportunities,.things reserved for more advance economies with more to offer. The government hopes to come into the cheap labor picture through subcontracts from US firms. Last June 2003, Iraq reconstruction task force head Sec. Romulo said the government was lobbying 14 US firms selected by Washington to get US$1.7 billion in rebuilding contracts in Iraq.[53] The firms, he claimed, “[would outsource] up to 70 per cent of their manpower needs, preferably to countries who were part of the ‘coalition of the willing.’” In January this year, the task force targeted 9 more firms, including some non-US firms.[54]
Philippine lobbying is strongest to Bechtel, the lead US corporation for Iraq reconstruction. Bechtel has so far been awarded some US$2.8 billion in contracts by USAID running from 2003 until December 2005 – US$1 billion last year and another US$1.8 billion in January 2004.[55] As much as 75 percent of the reconstruction work is supposedly to be subcontracted and, to date, over 10,000 companies from 100 countries have applied as suppliers and contractors to Bechtel. The government is fawningly pitching its favorite line that Filipino workers are “well-educated, low-cost and English-speaking.”[56]
The some 1.5 million Filipino workers in the Middle East tend towards public works and energy industry projects although the PPPSPRDI claims possibilities in catering, information technology, finance and accounting. Yet two reciprocal presidential state visits (in May and October 2003, respectively) and a visit by the head of the US Department of Commerce’s Iraq Reconstruction Task Force (in February 2004) later, the Philippines has yet to receive any offers.[57]
The Philippines’ prospects are conditioned by the considerable conflicting claims on limited economic opportunities – there are over 50 members of the coalition of the willing – and even the regime’s well-established puppetry – for what more encouragement need be given to those who have already so completely internalized their subservience. Certainly the negligible direct support the country offered during the Madrid donors’ conference affirms how little leverage the country has in cornering contracts even as a sub- or sub-subcontractor.
Iraq’s massive unemployment problem also matters greatly even as Philippine officials insist that Filipino workers have an edge in skills. It is estimated that unemployment and underemployment in Iraq is currently at about 50 percent of the labor force, not even counting some 500,000 Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries and perhaps up to 200,000 internal refugees.[58] Further unrest from impoverished and jobless Iraqis can only fuel the apparently robust Iraqi underground resistance to occupation forces. At the start of this year, thousands of furious jobless Iraqis already waged violent demonstrations in southern Iraq in which six people were killed and seven wounded.[59]
In short there is increasing pressure for contractors to hire Iraqi workers and managers as well as use local suppliers and incentives to this effect are apparently starting to be made.[60] In the end, Filipino overseas workers may get some thousands of skilled labor jobs in its traditional areas of strength (construction and energy) and some hundreds of jobs as medical, education and finance/accounting professionals.
The silliness of making so much out of supposed employment gains is worth highlighting. The cheap-labor-for-export economic development tack institutionalized by government reinforces the hollowing out of the domestic economy and has already resulted in making it unduly reliant on the vagaries of external labor markets.[61] And even assuming the grossly overstated new job opportunities of 30,000-100,000, these are piddling amounts compared to the official unemployment and underemployment rates of 3.9 million and 5.2 million, respectively, in 2003.[62] Moreover, this widespread systemic joblessness is even precisely due to the implementation of neoliberal economic policies so much of which are the result of US direction and influence through its myriad channels of imperialist influence, including so-called economic “aid.”
Through this all, the Philippine government apparently calculates that the political fallout from its gushing support for the US “war on terror” will be more than compensated by US military and economic aid. It is probably hoped that this will strengthen the reactionary state (particularly the AFP) against progressive forces (especially the Left). It is probably also hoped that enough resources will be pumped into the economy to avert its continuing decline.
But this military and economic aid is actually not even turning out to be all that spectacular in quantitative terms. US support is apparently carefully calibrated and balances the need to bolster the ruling regime against threats to its rule and the wastage from dissipating resources through a massively corrupt civilian and military bureaucracy. And the other side of the equation is mounting nationalist resistance, including armed struggles, against such shameless puppetry to the US and worsening crisis due to escalating neoliberal economic policies. Either way the puppet regime will get what it deserves. Posted by Bulatlat.com
[1] Office of the President, “PGMA's Letter to U.S. President George W. Bush regarding Terroristic Attack in the U.S.A.,” Sep. 12, 2001.
[2] Amb. Albert del Rosario, “Philippines and the United States: A New Partnership for Peace and Development,” Speech during the Grand Decisions Forum of the World Affairs Council at Hampton Roads, Virginia, January 31, 2004.
[3] No comparable site in Southeast Asia provides such proximity to the region’s flashpoints, air and naval facilities sufficient for even the largest-scale war mobilizations and a completely submissive government and its armed forces. The country’s sea lanes are also vital to the movement of US forces from the Western pacific to the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf as well as to international commerce, with over half a trillion dollars worth of trade passing through the South China Sea.
[4] The Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) identifies the biggest as including Balikatan, MARSURVEX (Maritime Surveillance Exercise), Balance Piston, PALAH (Pang-Lupa, Alon, Himpapawid), Teak Piston, MTWS (Marine Tactical Warfare Simulation), Flash Piston, SAGIP, Vector Balance Piston, HANDA, and CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness Training). Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), Operations Division Fact Sheet, March 21, 2003.
[5] USPACOM has 10 ACSAs in place (Philippines, Australia, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, New Zealand, Fiji, and Tonga) with eight other countries considered “ACSA-eligible (India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Brunei, Maldives, Madagascar, and Sri Lanka). Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, “Statement of the US Navy Commander-US Pacific Command Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” June 26, 2003.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Office of the President, “PGMA's Message reiterating the Philippine Government Support on the U.S. Action Against Terrorism,” October 8, 2001.
[8] Office of the President, “PGMA's Statement on the military strike initiated by the United States and its coalition partners against Iraq,” March 20, 2003.
[9] Office of the President, “PGMA's Statement on Iraq War,” April 9, 2003.
[10] Office of the President, “PGMA's Statement on Triumph of Iraqi People,” April 10, 2003.
[11] Thailand was designated a US “major non-NATO ally” right after the Philippines was and Singapore is host to a permanent US navy contingent as well as equipped with port facilities specifically for US carrier battle groups.
[12] Sheldon W. Simon, “President Bush Presses Antiterror Agenda in Southeast Asia,” Comparative Connections, 4th Quarter 2003: US-Southeast Asia Relations, Pacific Forum CSIS.
[13] Assistant of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, “Security Concerns in the Asia Pacific Region,” Speech to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces of United States, September 25, 2003.
[14] Consider for instance US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s remarks to the Nepalese government on the people’s war being fought in Nepal: “You have a Maoist insurgency that’s trying to overthrow the government, and this really is the kind of thing that we are fighting against throughout the world.” Secretary of State Colin Powell to Nepalese King Gyandera and Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in Kathmandu, Nepal, January 18, 2002.
[15] www.bulatlat.com, “US Counter-Terrorist in the GRP-NDFP Talks,” Volume 4, No. 2, February 8-14, 2004.
[16] Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, “Speech during the Command Conference on Anti-Terrorism,” Cebu City, March 27, 2003.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes, Statement during a morning radio interview with DZRH, May 23, 2003.
[20] JUSMAG chief (unnamed but so identified), “Joint U.S.–Philippines Military Cooperation,” Speech to the Republicans Abroad-Philippines at the Elks Club, Makati City, January 6, 2003.
[21] The White House (US) and the Office of the Press Secretary (Philippines), “Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines,” November 20, 2001.
[22] Fargo, “Statement of the US Navy Commander-US Pacific Command Before the House International Relations Committee…”
[23] FMF are loans and grants financing Philippine government purchases of military equipment from the US government or US companies. IMET involves US military training of Philippine personnel. EDA are old surplus equipment that the Pentagon gives away at little or no cost. Drawdowns are grants of current defense stock given by the US government. Human Rights Watch, “DANGEROUS DEALINGS: Changes to U.S. Military Assistance After September 11,” February 2002.
[24] Italics supplied. Fargo, “Statement of the US Navy Commander-US Pacific Command Before the House International Relations Committee…”
[25] The JDA process began in October 1999 when then Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado and his US counterpart, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, established a policy level dialogue on the Philippines’ defense programs. This led to a preliminary assessment in April 2000. US Embassy, “Press Release: Philippines Defense Reform (PDR),” January 22, 2004.
[26] These include the Mutual Defense Board (MDB), Pacific Area Special Operations Conference (PASOC), Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD), Helicopter Operations at Sea other than Aircraft Carrier (HOSTAC), Military Law and Operations Conference (MILOPS), Mine Counter Measure Seminar, Pacific Area Senior Logistician Seminar (PASOLS), Southeast Asia Peacekeeping Operations Symposium, Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) , National Guard Partnership program, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Naval Medical Research Unit 2 (NAMRU2), Pacific Senior Communications Meeting (PSCM). JUSMAG, Operations Division Fact Sheet, May 21, 2003.
[27] del Rosario, “Philippines and the United States…”
[28] Ibid.
[29] US Presidential News Desk, “RP-U.S. security alliance anchored on shared values of adherence to democracy, free enterprise,” October 17, 2003.
[30] The White House (US) and the Office of the Press Secretary (Philippines), “Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines,” October 18, 2003.
[31] Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Matthew P. Daley, “Increased Cooperation Needed To Combat Transnational Terrorism,” Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations’ Subcommittees on Asia and the Pacific, and on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, October 29, 2003.
[32] US Congressional Research Service (CRS), “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” CRS Report RL31672, November 18, 2003.
[33] Ibid.
[34] John H. Noer, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, National Defense University, 1996.
[35] Fargo, “Statement of the US Navy Commander-US Pacific Command Before the House International Relations Committee…”
[36] This has apparently already been earmarked by the US Congress. Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, Remarks before the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines (FOCAP), Manila Hotel, Manila, October 1, 2003.
[37] The USAID-funded US$41.2 million (1998-2005) Accelerating Growth, Investment, and Liberalization with Equity (AGILE) program installed itself in at least 11 key Philippine agencies and, with government technocrats, has crafted at least a dozen significant economic laws now for implementation including the controversial Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001 privatizing and liberalizing the power sector.
[38] US Embassy-Manila, “Philippine Economic Outlook 2003,” October 2003.
[39] Peter J. Cooper, “Interview with Roberto Romulo,” AME Info, May 7, 2003.
[40] ibid.
[41] Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), “Smaller RP Humanitarian Team To Iraq Gets Bipartisan Congressional Support,” Press Release No. 213, May 5, 2003.
[42] BusinessWeek, “Q&A with Roberto Romulo: A Philippine Foothold in Iraq,” May 28, 2003.
[43] DFA, “RP to help rebuild post-war Iraq- Ople,” Press Release, May 2003.
[44] Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Department of Health (DOH), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). DFA, “Smaller RP Humanitarian team…”
[45] Marichu Villanueva, “RP To Enlarge Contingent To Iraq,” Philippine Star, October 30, 2003.
[46] DFA, “RP Contingent In Iraq To Stay For Another Six Months– Ople,” Press Release No. 715-03, December 8, 2003.
[47] CRS, “Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance,” CRS Report RL31339, January 7, 2004.
[48] Donors can channel financial assistance to Iraq either Iraq bilaterally or through a multidonor trust fund facility for Iraq managed by the UN/WB. The following countries offered in-kind assistance: Bahrain, Chile, Egypt, Germany, Jordan, Latvia, Mexico, Poland, Philippines, Portugal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Vietnam. ReliefWeb, “Iraq: Tally shows pledges from Madrid October Donors' Conference total $32 billion,” News Release No:2004/171/MNA, December 4, 2003.
[49] Ibid.
[50] CRS, “FY2004 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism: Military Operations & Reconstruction Assistance,” CRS Report RL32090, October 15, 2003.
[51] Steve Kretzmann and Jim Vallette, “Plugging Iraq into Globalization,” CounterPunch, July 22, 2003.
[52] After Japan which pledged US$4.9 billion the next ten countries pledged only between US$50 and US$500 million, in descending order: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, United Arab Emirates, Korea, Canada, Qatar and Turkey. Ibid.
[53] The 14 firms awarded various contracts are: Bechtel Corp., Black and Veatch, Cargill, Creative Associates International, Flour Daniel, Halliburton, International Resource Group, KBR, Louis Berger, Parson Corp., Perini Corp, Research Triangle Institute, Stevedoring Services of America, and Washington Group International. Global News Wire-Asia/Africa Intelligence Wire, “Philippines Set To Gain Subcontracts From 14 US Firms In Iraq Reconstruction,” June 20, 2003.
[54] ABB Inc., Daewoo, Fluor Corporation, Foster Wheeler, Keppel Corporation, Minetech Corporation, Raytheon Company, Siemens and Turner Construction. PPPSPRDI, “Sub-Contractors Needed, Iraqi Reconstruction Pre-proposal Conference,” January 28, 2004.
[55] Bechtel, “U.S. Government’s Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program: Update,” www.bechtel.com, accessed March 7, 2004.
[56] Sheldon W. Simon, “Southeast Asia Solidifies Antiterrorism Support, Lobbies For Postwar Iraq Reconstruction,” Comparative Connections, 2nd Quarter 2003: US-Southeast Asia Relations, Pacific Forum CSIS.
[57] Assistant Secretary William Lash III, head of the US Department of Commerce's (DOC) Office for Market Access and Compliance, and concurrently head of the DOC's Iraq Reconstruction Task Force, visited Manila on February 2. US Embassy-Manila, “Asst. Secretary of Commerce Lash Welcomes RP Investment In Iraq, Urges Greater Compliance With IPR,” Press Release, February 4, 2004.
[58] United Nations/World Bank (UN/WB), Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, October 2003.
[59] Jennie Matthew, “US-led coalition unveils 50,000 job creation scheme for Iraq,” Agence France-Presse, January 19, 2004.
[60] Ibid.
[61] The Philippines is already the most overseas worker remittance-dependent country of any significant size in the world with the US$7.6 billion officially remitted yearly amounting to over 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Indian and Mexican workers send back slightly more but their economies are much larger so the equivalent figures are less than 2 percent of their GDP. Bayan Muna, “Philippines 2004: From Bad to Worse,” February 14, 2004.
[62] Ibid.