Enrile's Revised Edsa History
The instinct for nothing
else than survival and self-aggrandizement is in fact what unites the
generals of the military and police with the alleged, current president of
the Republic. That makes for the worst possible alliance of all.
By the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (Cenpeg)
Posted by Bulatlat
Juan Ponce Enrile is at least 80 years old, which is why it is tempting to
blame the uncertainties of memory for his most recent statement on the
1986 People Power revolt.
Now an administration voice in the Senate, having bolted the opposition a
month or so ago, the former Marcos Defense Minister said recently over
national television that former President Corazon Aquino should disabuse
herself of the thought that she can help oust Gloria Macapagal Arroyo from
the Presidency.
It's the military that put Aquino in power in 1986, said Enrile, and the
military too that put Arroyo in Malacañang in 2001. Ergo, it's the
military, not Aquino, not civil society, and not the citizenry, that will
resolve the present crisis, and it just so happens that the military and
police—at least the generals closest to her heart and purse strings—are
supporting Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
The myth of the military as king-maker and pivot of political events is
what Enrile and such like-minded bureaucrats like Angelo Reyes would like
to foster. But it is exactly that, a myth.
Both Enrile's premise and his conclusion are wrong. If he were honest
Enrile would acknowledge it. He was after all with then Constabulary
Chief Fidel Ramos when some two million Filipinos braved Marcos' guns at
EDSA during the February 22-25 People Power revolt to save his and Ramos'
hides.
Facts
of the matter
The facts of the
matter are simple enough even for simpletons to remember. Enrile and Ramos
were involved in a coup plot against Marcos. Because of their and their
bully boys' ineptness, Marcos and his cousin General Fabian Ver discovered
the plot. Certain to be arrested, with their retinue of bodyguards headed
by one Gregorio Honasan both withdrew to Camps Aguinaldo and Crame. Called
out by Jaime Cardinal Sin, millions of Filipinos rushed to EDSA to
surround the camps into which the former Marcos henchmen had crawled like
cornered rats, thus protecting them from the tender mercies of their
former boss and patron.
The factions of the military loyal to Ramos and Enrile did not protect the
citizens; the citizens protected them, Enrile, and Ramos. It would have
taken Marcos and then Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fabian Ver only one tank
and a fighter plane to bomb Camps Crame and Aguinaldo, as well as Ramos,
Enrile and Honasan into oblivion. What prevented Marcos from ordering
such a strike was the presence of those millions of Filipinos on EDSA. In
destroying Ramos and Enrile and their motley military company, he would
have also killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of civilians in the process.
Internationally that would have been a public relations disaster, and
Marcos, who never lost his fear of either world opinion or U.S. government
disapproval, knew it.
In 1986 Enrile himself knew a good thing when he saw it. Given Corazon
Aquino's massive support among the population, he and Ramos acknowledged
her as the legally elected president of the Philippines. Neither he nor
Ramos nor their military cohorts "made" Aquino President—the people did.
Though he did not enrich them as much as Marcos did, Joseph Estrada too
enjoyed the support of most of the generals of the military and the
police— until these worthies saw the people massed at EDSA, and forthwith
withdrew their support from Estrada. In fact that was their condition for
supporting EDSA II in 2001: that there be at least a million people
demanding the ouster of Estrada.
Enrile and those who now imagine that something else other than the
people's rising against Marcos and Estrada in 1986 and 2001 put Aquino and
Arroyo in Malacañang will have the hard facts to contend with. And the
hard facts in 1986 as well as in 2001 are too clear for even those who
want to muddy them to obscure. The people in their millions wanted two
presidents out of Malacañang in 1986 and 2001. In 1986 they supported the
military mutineers led by Enrile and Ramos; in 2001 the military shifted
its allegiance from Estrada the minute they saw the millions massed at
EDSA.
Two
points
Two points need to be
made here. The first is that in 1986 the Enrile-Ramos military clique
embraced Aquino because she had massive citizen support, while in 2001,
Angelo Reyes and company changed allegiances the minute they saw the
millions massed at EDSA.
The second point is that the Philippine military—and one may throw the
police in with it—is the most unreliable of allies. One can truly rely
only on the principled. But as the entire country has seen in recent
years, that is a trait from which the military leadership has been exempt
since the Armed Forces were established by the United States at the turn
of the century to hunt down the remnants of the Katipunan.
What this means is that Enrile's current patron, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
may have the declared support of the military and the police. But that
support is as weak as a new-born baby because premised on her remaining
firmly in control, and capable of providing them the worldly goods they
covet.
Military and police support is thus certain to melt like a snowball in
Hell once a million Filipinos mass at EDSA or elsewhere in the country,
quite simply because, even more than among the putrid traditional
politicians in Congress and in the provincial capitols and municipal halls
all over the country Mrs. Arroyo counts among her allies, opportunism is
the one trait these institutions share by virtue of tradition, training,
habit, and ideology.
The leaders of these institutions have in fact raised lack of principle
and looking out for themselves to the level of a fine art. One has only
to recall the 1986 image of a sweating General Prospero Olivas, then chief
of the brutal Metropolitan Command of the thankfully defunct Philippine
Constabulary, referring to Corazon Aquino as "my President" once he
realized that the Marcos he had served so well for 14 years was losing
his grip on power. Or, for that matter, that of Angelo Reyes in 2001
saluting Estrada one day and then declaring his withdrawal of support the
next.
And let us not forget Enrile and Ramos themselves, who were both
beneficiaries of martial law, but who in 1986 turned against the hand that
fed them in a dispute over the spoils.
The instinct for nothing else than survival and self-aggrandizement is in
fact what unites the generals of the military and police with the alleged,
current president of the Republic. That makes for the worst possible
alliance of all, in which one can easily abandon the other for no other
reason than convenience and gain. If Enrile and company think that
military support is that crucial to Arroyo's survival, they need to study
recent history—but they need to study it without those revisions that they
may find comforting because they're so patently false. CENPEG / Posted
by Bulatlat
Sept. 12, 2005
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