Southeast Asia and the Philippines:
The Second Front in the U.S. ‘War on Terror’
(First of three parts)

Southeast Asia caught greater attention from the U.S. after the latter launched its “war on terror” in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks.  Southeast Asia, most especially the Philippines, provided U.S. Pres. George W. Bush with a venue to project the “global war on terror”. And Philippine Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo offered the U.S. with a “less complicated” venue.

By Benjie Oliveros
Fellow, Center for Anti-Imperialist Studies
Posted by Bulatlat

U.S. military presence has been traditionally heavy in the Northeast.  U.S. bases in Japan and Korea are the biggest in Asia.  It is described as the “critical component of U.S. deterrent and rapid response strategy in Asia.”[1]

But Southeast Asia caught greater attention from the U.S. after the latter launched its “war on terror” in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks.  Southeast Asia, most especially the Philippines, provided U.S. Pres. George W. Bush with a venue to project the “global war on terror”. And Philippine Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo offered the U.S. with a “less complicated” venue.

On September 12, Philippine President Arroyo wrote U.S. President Bush, “We extend whatever support we can muster…We will help in whatever way we can to strengthen the global effort to crush those responsible for this barbaric act.”  When U.S. President Bush declared, on September 20, the protracted and borderless “war on terror”, President Arroyo, on September 26, wholeheartedly and unqualifiedly offered Philippine airspace for over flight by U.S. warplanes, and the country’s airfields and naval facilities for the transit, staging and refueling of U.S. planes and warships.

In the course of President Arroyo’s visit to the U.S. in November 2001, she agreed to launch Operation Balikatan (Shoulder to shoulder), joint military exercises of U.S. and Filipino forces, in Basilan on January, 2002 and to push for an access agreement later announced as the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement. In exchange, the U.S. sent her home with $92.3 million in military equipment, including two C-130 military transport plane, a naval patrol boat, Huey helicopters and 30,000 M-16 rifles plus ammunition. 

Agence Presse-France called the Balikatan joint exercises as the “Southeast Asian Phase of the U.S. campaign on terrorism.”[2]  Aside from the U.S. military build-up in the Middle East, the Philippines, through Balikatan, has seen the second biggest U.S. military deployment since Afghanistan.[3]

U.S. interests in Southeast Asia

The Southeast Asian region is strategically located.  To the north of the region is Korea, China, and Japan. The U.S. has been in a constant state of war footing against North Korea since after World War II.  China is considered as a major political and military rival to the U.S. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review reflects the U.S.’ assessment of China. It states, “Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U.S. and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies.”

Japan, while being a major U.S. ally is likewise an economic competitor. 

Militarily, Southeast Asia is an important transit point for U.S. troops if war breaks out in Korea or China.  Second, it may be used as launching site for U.S. “mobile expeditionary operations” not only in the southeast but also in other parts of Asia and the Middle East.

To the east is the Indian sub-continent and the oil-rich Middle East.  To the south is Australia, another major U.S. ally. The sea lanes of the region are critical to the movement of U.S. forces from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

A high proportion of the trade of Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Australia passes through the straits of Malacca, Sumba, or Lomboc or the straits of East Timor.[4]

Aside from its geopolitical importance, Southeast Asia is home to 500 million people and a wealth of natural resources.  Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation and the biggest Muslim country. 

From 1993-97, the region was second only to Japan in terms of U.S. exports to the Pacific rim.[5] It is also an important destination for U.S. investments, surpassing Japan and Brazil by 1997.[6]

The region is also a source of natural gas and oil.  The largest deposits of oil and gas in Asia could lie in the region. Gas and oil exploration activities are in full swing.

Brunei is a net energy exporter.  It exports 141,000 bpd of oil and 287 bcf of natural gas.  It has 1.4 billion barrels of oil reserves and produces 191.000 bbl/d of oil and 22,000 bbl/d of liquid gas.[7] 

Indonesia and Malaysia are also exporting oil at 431,500 bpd and 230,200 bpd respectively. Malaysia has oil reserves of 3.1  billion bbl and 2.124 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves.[8] Indonesia has 4.6 bbl oil reserves and 2.557 trillion cubic meters of gas. Thailand has 583 million bbl of oil and 377.7 billion cubic meters of gas.

The Philippines is estimated to have 106.8 billion cubic meters of proven natural gas reserves and 152 million bbl of oil reserves. The Malampaya offshore field, the largest natural gas development in Philippine history, was discovered off Palawan by Shell Philippines Exploration. Many other oil and gas corporations have investments in the country.

Oil and gas explorations are also taking place in Vietnam and Myanmar.

U.S. strategy for Southeast Asia can be summed up in the following statement from the March 2006 National Security Strategy paper of the U.S., “The U.S. is a Pacific nation, with extensive interests throughout East and Southeast Asia. The region’s stability and prosperity depend on our sustained engagement: maintaining robust partnerships supported by a forward defense posture supporting economic integration through expanded trade and investment and promoting democracy and human rights.”

“Terrorism” in the region

 After it invaded Afghanistan, the U.S. set its sights to Southeast Asia.  Aside from being eagerly welcomed by a most loyal puppet in President Arroyo, the region provided the U.S. with a convenient excuse to export its “war on terror.”  For one, Southeast Asia is home to a substantial population of Muslims and a number of Muslim-based movements.

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim nation.  The Philippines and Thailand have predominantly Muslim areas in its southern parts. Islam is one of the major religions of Malaysia.

But studies commissioned by the U.S. government would show that Muslim movements in the region are hardly an international threat.  Linkages between them are relatively weak and most of these movements focused of domestic issues such as promotion and adoption of Islamic law and independence from their respective governments.[9] 

The two largest Muslim political parties in Indonesia pursued a largely secular political agenda. 

In the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf is generally regarded as a bandit group.  It was created by the Philippine military for the purpose of discrediting the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The Abu Sayyaf’s connections with the military was confirmed when on June 2, 2001, 35 Abu Sayyaf rebels, thought to include the leadership, were trapped by Philippine government forces in Lamitan, on Basilan island.  But they were able to escape.  Suspicions were rife that they were allowed to escape after releasing a millionaire construction magnate in return for ransom. Then Army Chief of Staff General Diomedio Villanueva has since been accused of accepting some of the money as a bribe to pull back troops, and President Arroyo of covering up the event under pressure from the army.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Moro National Liberation Front both have armies.  They are fighting for an independent Islamic state in Mindanao but are willing to settle for some degree of autonomy from the central government.

Following a visit by former U.S. State Secretary Colin Powell to the Philippines in 2002, the U.S. included the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA) and Prof. Jose Maria Sison, consultant to the negotiating panel of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) in peace negotiations with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, in its list of “terrorists.” While the CPP-NPA-NDFP has not used terror tactics in its 37 year armed revolution against the Philippine government, it nevertheless is a major concern for the U.S. The CPP-NPA-NDFP, like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC, has been included as targets in the U.S. “global war on terror” although its concern at this historical juncture is to wage a war of national liberation.

In southern Thailand, there is a separatist element in the resistance to assimilation of the ethnic Malay majority in four of the country’s southern provinces.

Only Jemaah Islamiyah, reportedly based in Indonesia, is said to have a regional agenda of establishing an Pan Islamic state in Southeast Asia. 

 But Islamist groups, including those participating in mainstream politics, represent a very small minority of Muslims in Southeast Asia. In the June 1999 parliamentary elections in Indonesia, the self-defined Islamist parties - the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintan) and PK (Partai Keadilan) and others that advocated for the establishment of an Islamic state received less than six percent of the votes. Within this minority, an even smaller minority advocates violence. [10]

In Malaysia, Parti Islam se-Malaysia, which also advocates for an Islamic state, won only 27 seats in the 193-seat parliament, during the November 1999 elections. It also controls only two of Malaysia’s thirteen states.

Official reports, including that of the Congressional Research Service, claims that the radicalization of Islamist movements in the region started in the early 1990s and that Al Qaeda began establishing a network in the region in the mid-1990s.  It also claims that extensive links between Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah have been established. And that the Bali bombing, supposedly carried out by Jemaah Islamiyah presented evidence of this link and a shift in Al Qaeda tactics to “soft targets.”

But the International Crisis Group (ICG), a conflict resolution group headed by Gareth Evans, a former Australian foreign minister, said that there is scant evidence linking Al Qaeda with Indonesian radicals.[11] It also revealed that Abu Bakar Baasyir, alleged leader of Jemaah Islamiyah who was arrested for the Bali bombing, is the founder of the “Ngruki network”, a loose group of Indonesians advocating for the establishment of an Islamic state. Baasyir, said the ICG, lived in exile after the Darul Islam movement was suppressed in the 1980s but has returned to Indonesia after the downfall of Suharto. His activities, upon his return, was to advocate for an Islamic state and a vague idea for a revived caliphate, which is not even illegal. 

The ICG report accused the Philippine government of planting explosives on an Indonesian radical, Agus Dwikarna, who was arrested in March, 2003 to give credence to reports of alleged links between Indonesian radicals and the Al Qaeda.

It concluded that Indonesia is not a hotbed of terrorism, implicitly rejecting Washington's suggestion that Southeast Asia is the "second front" in the war.[12]

Data and information from both official and independent studies reveal that there is no real terrorist threat in Southeast Asia.  Nor are there definitive links between these groups and the Al Qaeda network, purportedly the target of U.S. operations.    

There does exist a movement opposed to U.S. imperialist interest, the CPP-NPA-NDFP.  But it does not employ terrorist methods and is not a threat to the American people.

U.S.-Philippine joint exercises towards establishing a forward operating base

Consistent to being a most loyal puppet, President Arroyo provided the U.S. with a venue for projecting its military power in the region; a transit point, refuelling station and staging area for its “mobile, expeditionary operations;” and training ground for the troops of both countries in “interoperability” or joint operations for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. 

Immediately after U.S. President Bush and Philippine President Arroyo agreed on the conduct of joint military exercises in November 2001, the U.S. lost no time.  From January to July 31, 2002 Balikatan 02-01 was conducted involving 1,200 U.S. troops including 150 special forces.  It also involved 300 Navy engineers for civic action.[13] Another 2,665 U.S. troops arrived in Central Luzon in April for Balikatan 02-2 (boosting the number of US troops in the country to more than 3,800, the highest number since the bases closed in 1992)[14].

It was also the longest joint military exercise in the history of U.S.-Philippine relations and the first to take place in a combat zone.[15] It is also called as the flagship initiative of U.S. counter terrorism policy in the region.[16]

In February 2003, another 1,700 U.S. troops were sent to the Philippines for joint exercises.  In 2004, around 1,000 U.S. troops were involved in major joint exercises. There were 18 joint exercises in 2004.  

But aside from these big joint exercises, the U.S. conducted “frequent lower-level training exercises with specialized Filipino counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces.” These low level exercises involved no more than 100 U.S. Special Forces at any one time.

These low level exercises were so frequent that human rights and people’s organizations in Mindanao, in southern Philippines, reported that when combined with humanitarian and civic assistance operations involving U.S. naval troops and SeaBees (Construction Battalions), there has been a continuing presence of U.S. troops in the country since 2002.

The rotation of U.S. troops in and out of the country is such that the U.S. is able to establish what the U.S. State Department calls as “permanent-temporary presence” in the country.[17]

U.S. troops are in the Philippines and the region not simply to fight "terrorist groups" but to enhance U.S. military control over territory in the South China Sea.[18]

The U.S. could not have chosen a better venue for projecting its military power and to use as transit point, refueling station and staging area for its “mobile, expeditionary operations.” The Philippines is at the gateway of the region and is nearest to Guam and Hawaii, the base of the U.S. Pacific Command. A study by RAND corporation also shows that the Philippines is in a key location within the South China Sea and with large airfields that can be used by U.S. Air Force expeditions. 

The former U.S. military bases in the country were extensively used as transit point, refuelling station, and staging area in the U.S. wars of aggression in Korea and Vietnam. The Philippines was also used as a rest and recreation stop for U.S. troops involved in these wars.

There are also enough agreements between the U.S. and Philippine governments to enable the former to operate in the country.  The gain achieved by the Filipino people in rejecting the continued stay of U.S. military bases in the country beyond 2002 was gradually eroded as subsequent agreements were signed by both governments. 

The Visiting Forces Agreement was signed in 1999 to allow U.S. troops to stay in the country during joint military exercises for indefinite periods of time. It also grants them immunity from criminal prosecution for acts committed while “on duty”.      

The Mutual Logistics Support Agreement which was passed as an executive agreement, in November 2002,  to avert protests allows the U.S. to construct storage and repair facilities and use of the country’s ports, training ranges, and other facilities to support its wars of aggression not only in Southeast Asia but the whole of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.    

Training and Interoperability

Using local proxy armies has always been part of the strategy of the U.S. But in order to project U.S. military hegemony and extend its presence all around the globe, including areas where U.S. forces did not traditionally operate, it is relying more on its proxy forces or puppet armies.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) projects that the U.S. should be able to conduct two simultaneous conventional wars while maintaining small forward deployed forces conducting special forces operations. These two types of operations are defined as direct (visible) and indirect (clandestine) approaches.  With the former, the U.S. will work with multinational forces.  With clandestine operations, the U.S. will work with puppet armies. According to the QDR, “Building and leveraging partner capacity will be an absolutely essential part of this approach and the employment of surrogates will be a necessary method for achieving many goals.” Thus, the emphasis on training and joint exercises.

And the U.S. has not chosen a better surrogate army in the region than the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).  Invoking the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the Philippine government sent AFP troops to fight in Korea and in Vietnam. This agreement also justifies Philippine involvement in Iraq where it sent a small contingent. 

Through the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, the U.S. is able to control the AFP by providing it with training, equipment, weapons, and supplies.  And with the creation of the Defense Policy Board in 2002, the U.S. would control the policies and decisions of the Philippine Department of National Defense, which has command over the AFP. Another mechanism called the Security Engagement Board was created in March 24, 2006 purportedly to serve as the mechanism for consultation and planning of measures and arrangements focused on addressing non-traditional security concerns such as international terrorism, transnational crime, maritime safety and security, natural and man-made disasters, and the threat of a pandemic outbreak that arise from non-state actors and transcend national borders.

The AFP is currently implementing a five-year Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) program under the supervision of the U.S. Pacific Command.  This program was an offshoot of a Joint Defense Assessment conducted by U.S. defense “experts” that looked into the capabilities of the AFP in combating “terrorism.” It was a three-year assessment that was completed in 2003. This program is aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the AFP in line with the U.S. thrust of strengthening its surrogate armies.  More importantly, with “significant American involvement in monitoring its implementation,”[19] the PDR gave the U.S. strategic and tactical control over the planning and operations of the AFP.

The joint exercises and other trainings conducted by the U.S. are also aimed at improving the capacity of the U.S. and Philippine armed forces to conduct joint operations under the former’s command and direction; improve the capability of the AFP in waging wars against the perceived enemies of the U.S. and its local puppets; and contribute to the combat experience of U.S. troops, another objective of the 2006 QDR.

Right from the start of the U.S. “global war on terror” and the planning for Balikatan 2002, President Bush had already offered that U.S. troops be sent for combat patrols in Mindanao.  If not for the opposition of people’s organizations and former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, the U.S. would have had its way. But an international fact finding mission conducted in Basilan in 2002 confirmed earlier reports that U.S. troops were engaged in a fire fight with Abu Sayyaf forces in June. The mission report revealed that an American soldier in a raiding unit with a specific combat mission to arrest an Abu Sayyaf suspect had shot that suspect in the leg.    

In early 2003, the U.S. proposed that the joint exercises be moved to Jolo and that the role of its troops be upgraded to enable them to engage the Abu Sayyaf.[20]  But again protests by people’s organizations forced the U.S. and Philippine governments to officially shelf the planned shift. 

As if to make the direct involvement of U.S. troops palatable, Mindanao was rocked by a series of bombings in 2003. Bombs exploded at the airport and Sasa Wharf in Davao City and in Koronadal City.  A total of 47 people were killed and 208 wounded.  The Philippine government was quick to claim that the bombings were the handiwork of terrorists.  

But a group junior officers of the AFP who holed themselves up at Makati in July 2003 as a sign of protest revealed that some of them were commanded to do the bombings by senior military officers.  They also reported that right before the bombings then Philippine Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes and Brig. Gen. Victor Corpuz, who was then chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), were in Davao. 

Another incident seems to have pointed to the involvement of the U.S. in the bombing.  In May 2002, a bomb exploded in a hotel room in Davao.  The victim and handler of the bomb, an American by the name of Michael Meiring was spirited out of the country three days later by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation even before investigations started. There were suspicions that Meiring was a CIA agent.  Meiring referred to himself as a CIA agent but always clarified that he meant “Christ in Action.”  

Other bombing incidents occurred in 2004 and 2005 killing 147 and 10 people respectively and wounding 200 others.       

In July 2005, U.S. and Filipino troops reportedly launched a joint combat operation in pursuit of Abu Sayyaf leader Khadaffy Janjalani.  When human rights and people’s organizations protested against this blatant form of U.S. intervention, a U.S. military official denied this but acknowledged that U.S. Special Forces and Navy SEALS were working in the area with Filipino soldiers supplying communications and intelligence support.  U.S. Navy P3 Orion aircraft were reportedly used for intelligence operations.[21]   

Why then is the U.S. so keen in joining Filipino troops in combat operations against the Abu Sayyaf when the latter is hardly a threat to the Philippine government much less the U.S.? 

The planning and conduct of Balikatan joint exercises, or more precisely joint operations, is consistent with how the U.S. is trying to shape its armed forces and military capabilities.  These are contained in the major the shifts in thrusts identified by the 2006 QDR.  Among the shifts in capabilities the U.S. aims to develop in its forces are:

• from static defense, garrison forces - to mobile, expeditionary operations

• from under-resourced stand-by forces - to fully-equipped and fully-manned combat forces

• from battle-ready forces - to battle hardened forces

• from large institutional forces - to more powerful operational capability

• from major conventional combat operations - to multiple, irregular asymmetric operations

•  from the U.S. military performing tasks - to focus on building partner capabilities

These training exercises and the continuing presence of U.S. troops in Mindanao also enable it to gain a foothold in resource-rich Mindanao. To further strengthen its stake in Mindanao, the U.S. is actively involved in the peace talks between the government and the MILF. In addition, between 2001-2005, the U.S. Agency for International Development provided $220 million, or 60 percent of its total assistance to the Philippines, to Mindanao.[22] For 2006-2007, the U.S. is preparing an increased assistance package to Mindanao in anticipation of the signing of a peace accord between the Arroyo government and the MILF.   

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