ANALYSIS ON THE PRESIDENCY
2007: A Critical Year for Arroyo

The May election, if it does push through, opens the prospects of continuing the process of removing the President in various forms. A possible win by the opposition slate in the Senate and its candidates in the congressional race could lead to a third impeachment with greater chances of success. A massive fraud by the administration could trigger an extra-constitutional crisis that will revive calls for the President’s ouster.

By Bobby Tuazon
Bulatlat

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo may have weathered the turbulent 2006, but she’ll be needing more than the resources, short-term alliances and iron-fist measures that she used that year for what is in store for 2007.

At the start of last year, the broad coalition of diverse anti-Arroyo political forces that was galvanized by the unresolved issues of illegitimate presidency, betrayal of public trust and human rights violations was gearing up for a series of protests leading up to the two people power anniversaries. The embattled President used the occasion to mount a counter-offensive by declaring an emergency rule and ordering the arrest of leaders from the Left and military rebels to foil, so she claimed, an anti-government coup.

Macapagal-Arroyo’s state of emergency decree was eventually ruled as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (SC) and so were a couple other repressive decrees she had issued. But her own “first quarter storm” was swift and decisive and had the effect of, one, consolidating the administration camp and, two, mounting a loyalty check on and reining in the armed forces to concentrate on the brutal anti-insurgency campaign.

At that juncture, two favorable factors were on the side of the embattled President. She had the backing of close political allies led by former President Fidel V. Ramos, House Speaker Jose de Venecia and key local government leaders and their convergence of vested interests was based on the charter change agenda, which was basically a ploy to perpetuate Macapagal-Arroyo, its architects and main supporters in power. The basis of loyalty to the President by the top AFP and police generals gravitated around the fact that, themselves having been linked to the 2004 election fraud, they either had to join the President or sink together amid persistent calls for Macapagal-Arroyo’s removal.

It was this alliance of political opportunism that the embattled chief executive used in grappling with the second impeachment complaint filed against her when Congress resumed session in July. The allocation of generous development funds and other government resources and the whip wielded by De Venecia and his underlings in the lower House helped deliver the majority votes that prevented once again the threat of impeachment from taking off. The extra-judicial killings and other measures of political persecution that escalated during the year were meant to sow fear in the militant mass movement and undercut the mass mobilizations that were expected to snowball toward the removal of the President.

Push for charter change

Thwarting the second impeachment move successfully emboldened Macapagal-Arroyo and the ruling coalition even more to push for charter change. Their spin was that a shift to unicameral parliamentary system is the mantra for addressing the country’s ills. The real agenda was the postponement of the May 2007 election and longer terms of office for its promoters and supporters. The hideous agenda was to prevent a third impeachment against Macapagal-Arroyo. Overconfidence led to under-estimation: The Supreme Court (SC) ruled against the first track, “people’s initiative,” as unconstitutional; as for the second, constituent assembly or “con-ass”, people were all heated up to oppose charter change altogether, as they had in earlier attempts by Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada. The public outrage against charter change was directed against the pro-administration House members – as it was against Macapagal-Arroyo herself, too.

Toward the end of the year, leaders of the pro-Arroyo ruling coalition – battered and discredited - remained stuck to the charter change scheme. But time was not on their side as they began to ponder on the election prospects on whether they could keep their majority bloc in Congress or be pounced by the opposition camp this time.

However, the anti-Arroyo opposition camp is as diverse as it is unstable and a decisive win in the May 2007 election would remain elusive if they are unable to consolidate and match the resources, the control of the Comelec and the military-police support that the Arroyo forces are expected to use in order to keep the ruling coalition in power and, hence, save the presidency.

Just the same, the May election opens the prospects of continuing the stupendous process of removing the President in various forms. A possible win by the opposition slate in the Senate and its candidates in the congressional race could lead to a third impeachment with greater chances of success. A massive fraud by the administration could trigger an extra-constitutional crisis that will revive calls for the President’s ouster.

The broad anti-Arroyo coalition comprising diverse political forces that emerged since the May 2004 fraudulent polls has been sustained for more than two years. In some respects, it can be likened to the anti-Marcos dictatorship movement that gained unprecedented momentum late 1983 and led to the ouster of the strongman rule three years later and even to the oust-Estrada movement that concluded its struggle in just two years. The anti-Arroyo coalition however lacks the unifying and more crucial element on the matter of succession.

Seventh year

Macapagal-Arroyo, who rose to power on the crest of the second people power uprising in January 2001, is entering her seventh year in the presidency (third year as “elected” President) and she may yet hold the record as the longest-serving power holder after Ferdinand Marcos (1966-1986). She has clung to power despite opinion polls and a chorus of multi-sectoral voices pointing to her as the most unpopular President ever in the nation’s history.

She faces 2007 with a heavy baggage of unresolved issues related to the presidency. Ahead are more flashpoints ignited by unresolved extra-judicial killings and related atrocities: Concerns coming from foreign governments with regard to the human rights crisis that will affect development aid; more international denunciations as her government faces several complaints before the UN human rights mechanisms and tribunals. Her decision to surrender the custody of convicted rapist Marine Lance Cpl Daniel Smith to the U.S. government in betrayal of the country’s sovereignty and judicial process is expected to be used as another ground for a possible third impeachment this year.

Macapagal-Arroyo may have weathered the storms of 2006 but this doesn’t necessarily indicate a solid staying power. Part of her life support system – the ruling coalition – has suffered a debacle under the charter change scheme and it faces an uncertain outcome in the coming elections. That leaves the AFP and the U.S. government providing the support and if Macapagal-Arroyo proves to be valuable as far as eliminating the Left through, as claimed by critics, brutal political persecution under Oplan Bantay Laya II, then she is further ensured of staying in office. But, like any other support systems, the U.S. can always pull the plug and create the pressure points for a succession under a more reliable President, as they did with Ferdinand Marcos.

The AFP, on the other hand, remains torn by internal rifts fueled by questions of presidential legitimacy, corruption and other lingering issues. As a result, the possible withdrawal of military support from the President by significant segments of the military especially middle-ranking and junior officers remains a threat.

Without a popular support, the power base of the embattled President remains fragile and is forever dependent on the AFP and the U.S. Bulatlat

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