U.S. troops are suspected of having been involved in the April 30 bombings of Barangays Buansa and Cagay in Indanan, Sulu. The suspicion stems from the use of so-called smart bombs in the attack, which has forced some 360 families to evacuate to nearby barangays.
BY ALEXANDER MARTIN REMOLLINO
Bulatlat
Vol. VIII, No. 13, May 4-10, 2008
U.S. troops are suspected of having been involved in the April 30 bombings of Barangays (vilages) Buansa and Cagay in Indanan, Sulu. The suspicion stems from the use of so-called smart bombs in the attack, which has forced some 360 families to evacuate to nearby barangays.
Brgy. Buansa is where the camp of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) state chairman Khaid Ajibun is located.
The bombing took place at around 1 a.m. and lasted until about 6 p.m. on April 30. After sunrise, ground troops stepped in and were engaged by MNLF fighters. The soldiers withdrew from the ground but continued the bombing until dusk.
The bombing has caused some 360 families from Brgy. Cagay to evacuate to Sitios (sub-villages) Talatak and Jariya in Brgy. Andihi, Indanan.
Concerned Citizens of Sulu convener and former Jolo Councilor Temogen “Cocoy” Tulawie, citing reports from civilians interviewed by his group said that the attacking troops used an OV-10 bomber, which may have dropped the bombs, and an 81mm mortar.
“Based on reports we have received from civilians who were in the area at the time of the bombing, the bombs used appear to be smart bombs, since they produce light before exploding,” Tulawie told Bulatlat in an interview.
“The AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) does not use that kind of explosive,” Tulawie added.
Also reports reaching Bulatlat from a Kodao Productions team covering the incident revealed that aside from the bombings, the area was also shelled, using howitzer cannons, prior to attack of ground troops.
U. S. troops
Tulawie said the use of smart bombs in the attack suggests the involvement of U.S. troops.
This is not the first time that U.S. troops have been suspected of involvement in military operations in Sulu.
U.S. troops were present during a Feb. 4 attack in Brgy. Ipil, Maimbung which killed eight non-combatants – including a soldier on vacation. Soldiers from the Army’s Light Reaction Company (LRC) – a unit composed of Philippine soldiers who had received training from U.S. troops during the RP-U.S. joint military exercises –and the Navy’s Special Weapons Group (Swag) attacked Brgy. Ipil during early morning on that day.
Killed in the attack were Marisa Payian, 4; Wedme Lahim, 9; Alnalyn Lahim, 15; Sulayman Hakob, 17; Kirah Lahim, 45; Eldisim Lahim, 43; Narcia Abon, 24 – all civilians. Also killed was Pfc. Ibnul Wahid of the Army’s 6th Infantry Division, who was then on vacation.
One of the witnesses, Wahid’s wife Sandrawina, was taken into a Navy boat – where she saw four U.S. soldiers.
When an encounter between the AFP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) broke out in Brgy. Buansa in early 2007, U.S. troops who were a few kilometers away were seen running toward the direction of the gunfire. They were carrying their guns.
Military spokespersons said the attack in early 2007 was brought about by reports that members of the ASG were in the MNLF camp. The MNLF – with which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) signed a Final Peace Agreement in 1996 – has repeatedly denied that it coddles ASG members.
During that same period, U.S. troops were busy with a road construction project in Brgy. Bato-Bato, Indanan. At that time, the area was the center of Philippine military operations in Sulu.
The presence of U.S. troops in Sulu started in 2004 and has been continuous since then.
U.S. troops would have entered Sulu as early as February 2003. The AFP and the U.S. Armed Forces had both announced that the Balikatan military exercises for that year would be held in Sulu.
This provoked a wave of protest from the people of Sulu, who had not yet forgotten what has come to be known as the Bud Dajo Massacre.
The Bud Dajo massacre, which took place in 1906, is described in some history texts as the “First Battle of Bud Dajo.” It was an operation against Moro fighters resisting the American occupation.
The description of the incident as a “battle,” however, is disputed considering the sheer mismatch in firepower between U.S. forces and the Moro resistance fighters. The 790 U.S. troops who assaulted Bud Dajo used naval cannons against the 800-1,000 Moro resistance fighters who were mostly armed only with melee weapons.
In the end, only six of the hundreds of Moro resistance fighters holding Bud Dajo as a stronghold survived, while there were 15-20 casualties among the U.S. troops.
The announcement in February 2003 that the year’s Balikatan military exercises would be held in Sulu summoned bitter memories of the Bud Dajo Massacre and led to protest actions where thousands of Sulu residents participated.
The next year, however, U.S. troops came up with ingenious ways to find their way into Sulu – coming in small groups and bringing relief goods. This “neutralized” the residents’ resistance to their presence.
JSOTF-P
The U.S. troops in Sulu are part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). Based on several news items from the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), the JSOTF-P are in Sulu to train the AFP’s Southern Command (Southcom) and to conduct civic actions.
However, an article written by Command Sgt. Maj. William Eckert of the JSOTF-P, “Defeating the Idea: Unconventional Warfare in Southern Philippines,” hints that there is more to the task force’s work than training AFP troops and embarking on “humanitarian actions.” Wrote Eckert:
“Working in close coordination with the U.S. Embassy, JSOTF-P uses Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces to conduct deliberate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in very focused areas, and based on collection plans, to perform tasks to prepare the environment and obtain critical information requirements. The information is used to determine the capabilities, intentions and activities of threat groups that exist within the local population and to focus U.S. forces – and the AFP – on providing security to the local populace. It is truly a joint operation, in which Navy SEALs and SOF aviators work with their AFP counterparts to enhance the AFP’s capacities.”
Provocation
The AFP has not issued a statement on the April 30 attack, except to say that the operation was against the bandit Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the terrorist Jemayah Islamiyah (JI).
Tulawie, however, disputes this. “We talked with the barangay captains in the area and we know that there are no ASG or JI in that area; that area is MNLF territory,” he said.
Tulawie said he sees the attack as a “provocation” on the part of the military. The attack took place a few days after MNLF founding chairman Nur Misuari was granted bail by the Makati City Regional Trial Court.
The MNLF traces its origins to a massacre of between 28 and 64 Moro fighters recruited by the government in 1968 for a scheme to occupy Sabah, an island near Mindanao to which the Philippines has a historic claim.
Sabah ended up in the hands of the Malaysian government during the presidency of Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965). His successor Ferdinand Marcos conceived a scheme involving the recruitment of Moro fighters to occupy the island.
The recruits were summarily executed by their military superiors in 1968, in what is now known as the infamous Jabidah Massacre.
The Jabidah Massacre triggered widespread outrage among the Moros and led to the formation of the MNLF that same year. The MNLF waged an armed revolutionary struggle against the GRP for an independent Muslim state in Mindanao.
The Marcos government, weighed down by the costs of the Mindanao war, negotiated for peace and signed an agreement with the MNLF in Tripoli, Libya in the mid-1970s. The pact involved the grant of autonomy to the Mindanao Muslims.
Negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF went on and off until 1996, when the two parties signed a Final Peace Agreement which created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as a concession to the group.
Sulu is one of six provinces presently comprising the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM): the others are Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, and Shariff Kabunsuan. The ARMM originally included only Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, and Maguindanao.
In October 2001, hostilities broke out anew between the GRP and the MNLF. The military was in hot pursuit of Abu Sayyaf bandits who had abducted tourists in Sipadan, Malaysia. At one point, the military had announced the defeat of an “Abu Sayyaf” contingent in Talipao, Sulu.
The MNLF, however, said that it was its guerrillas, not ASG bandits, who were killed by the military.
The massacre in Talipao led the MNLF, just five years after signing a peace agreement with the government, to once more take up arms. MNLF founding chairman Nur Misuari, a former political science professor at the University of the Philippines (UP) who was then ARMM governor, said the Talipao Massacre was a “violation” of the 1996 Peace Agreement.
Misuari, who was then in Malaysia, ended up being arrested and subsequently detained in a military camp in Sta. Rosa, Laguna (38 kms south of Manila) and charged with rebellion. He was placed under house arrest in New Manila, Quezon City in 2007, while still facing rebellion charges. Misuari ran for ARMM governor in May 2007, but lost amid allegations of cheating.
Since 2001, there has been sporadic fighting between the AFP and the MNLF.
On April 25, Misuari was granted bail on his rebellion case.
While rebellion is a non-bailable offense, bail is granted in cases where the court deems the evidence against the accused to be weak.
The attack on Barangays Buansa and Cagay – in which U.S. troops are suspected of being involved – occurred a few days after Misuari was granted bail. Tulawie sees this as a “provocation” on the part of the military. “It seems that it was intended to show that the AFP is not happy with Misuari’s temporary release,” he said. Bulatlat