FFM Kananga Killings



Fact finding mission

- Establish facts and gather relevant information on the November 15, 2010 incident in Kananga, Leyte
 - Gather testimonies and observations from the people involved in the incident
 - Identify possible parties and individuals responsible for the incident
- Interact with the survivors and families of victims in Leyte and render moral and other possible support
- Recommend appropriate measures to find closure and justice for the victims of the tragedy



• Leonard Co, Sofronio Cortez and Julius Borromeo











































Key observations

- The direction of bullet marks on the trees were all from the vantage point on the ridge and had a downwards direction.
- Tree No. 4 was hit three times and the large tree where RG hid had six bullet marks on it.
- Direction of fire was mainly concentrated on LC, RG, SC, PB, JB
- We did not observe any "return" fire bullet marks on the trees from the ground looking to the ridge nor from any other side except from the vantage position.

Key observations

- The only consistent explanation for these key observations would be that the military was positioned on top of the ridge and firing towards LC and company. There was no indication of any crossfire.
- The failure of the military unit involved to provide immediate medical attention and hospital treatment to Julius Borromeo prolonged his agony and ultimately led to his death. The military waited at least one hour after they approached RG, et.al. before bringing down the bodies and the survivor despite repeated requests of RG and then-alive JB.

Coordination between EDC and AFP

 Supposing that the military indeed had intelligence information that there were NPA sightings on November 12 and that this was communicated to the EDC, what were the precautions taken to inform LC and his team who was already in the LGPF complex since November 9? Likewise, was the military informed of the team's activities prior to the day of the incident?

Recommendations

- The 19th IB should release the names of the members of the squad and platoon, including their commanding officers, that shot LC and company. The firearms of these officers and enlisted men should be secured and surrendered to the proper authorities.
- Those who were connected at any and all levels of the military command with regard to the shooting of LC and his companions should be investigated and appropriate charges filed against them.
- The liability of the military personnel who failed to give JB immediate medical attention and evacuate him to a hospital should also be fully investigated and appropriate charges filed against them.

Recommendations

- The EDC should make public its security team's spot report. They should clarify the protocols for their communications and coordination with the military especially that there are still other activities [similar to what LC's team was doing] that the EDC are conducting. The EDC should also clarify the extent of their work area and where they would be responsible for the security of their own personnel. The EDC, the 19th IB and the PNP should make documents that would further shed light to the incident.
- We are concerned with the security and safety of the two witnesses. We call on groups and institutions to make available and provide sanctuary for the survivors and their families in order for them to carry out their role in bringing justice and closure to this incident.

Safety of the survivors

 The team is concerned with the safety of the survivors and their families. During the wake of JB, the victim's family was visited by men asking rudely for the whereabouts of PB. There were also motorcycle-riding men who tailed some of the team members who visited the communities where the families of the victims and survivors lived.