Macapagal-Arroyo’s
‘Silent War’ Vs the Left
What Drives Macapagal-Arroyo’s “Silent
War”?
Last of three parts
The issue of political
murders is tied to the issue of regime survival.
BY BOBBY TUAZON
Bulatlat
The recent directive
of Macapagal-Arroyo to the justice department and Philippine National
Police (PNP) to solve at least 10 political killings in 10 weeks is
obviously just for show. The PNP is not only involved in
counter-insurgency itself but its own Task Force Usig, which is charged
with investigating the political crimes, according to a recent
international fact-finding mission of Dutch and Belgian judges and
lawyers, “has not proven to be an independent body…the PNP has a poor
record as far as the effective investigation of the killings is concerned
and is mistrusted by the Philippine people.”
Macapagal-Arroyo
condemned “in the harshest possible terms” political killings but only
after praising Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, who has been accused by human
rights and militant groups of masterminding political killings in regions
where he was assigned. She also has taken no heed to clamors for the
formation of an impartial truth commission to look into the political
murders. A highly independent probe will likely unearth the whole truth
and the trail of blood might yet be traced to the doors of the presidency
itself. This is a danger zone for the regime.
All these, meanwhile,
continue to give the Macapagal-Arroyo regime the latitude to keep the
counter-insurgency-terrorism campaign on track that could also mean
continued political killings and a culture of impunity.
Macapagal-Arroyo’s
“end game strategy” – now cut to two years – is expected to fail to wipe
out the Leftist rebellion for not even she or her generals know the answer
on how to solve this 37-year-long “lingering problem.” Assuming that death
squads are the main instrument for ending the armed rebellion, then the
spate of killings will need to be at a high level targeting the tens of
thousands of activists and a claimed mass constituency of millions. The
armed Left has sustained 37 years of guerrilla war and survived repression
campaigns equal to – if not more atrocious than – that mounted by
Macapagal-Arroyo’s security forces today.
Pragmatic rulers,
including Ramos, have admitted that it will take more than military
solutions to solve it and this means perhaps having the political will to
pursue meaningful socio-economic reforms. Presidents are not actually
driven by long-term visions: They exist simply based on short-term goals –
or narrow political interests.
This paper shares the
theory that the graft-ridden AFP in particular its top hierarchy is
motivated by the need to justify its whopping budget which includes its
“modernization” program and for this it needs to keep its membership in
combat mode. Career generals need to show a record of performance for
promotion and post-retirement benefits. An active counter-insurgency,
especially if it is integrated with the global “war on terror”, will
continue to draw full U.S. and other foreign military assistance.
Political leverage
However, Macapagal-Arroyo’s
short-term military approach is apparently tied to a political leverage.
Former government chief peace negotiator, Silvestre Bello III, recently
spilled the beans somewhat when he said that the current internal security
plan aims to force the NDFP back to the negotiating table where the GRP
panel can talk “from a position of strength.” It is likely therefore that
the “terror” tack of the AFP’s end-game strategy (specifically the killing
of civilians, as alleged) could escalate further in two years assuming
that it can be used as a political blackmail to force the NDFP forces to
capitulate.
This dirty ploy
addresses the U.S. opposition to negotiating with the Left and its
preference for keeping the military ante in order to force the NDFP to
surrender. This is likely the reason why the Macapagal-Arroyo government
conspired with the U.S. to include the CPP-NPA and the NDFP’s senior
political consultant, Jose Maria Sison, in the state department’s list of
“foreign terrorist organizations” even as diplomatic efforts were also
made with European and other governments to do the same. Thereafter, the
government panel pressed the NDFP side to accept a fast-track formula for
the talks, which was essentially a blueprint for surrender. Both tactics
provoked the NDFP to protest leading eventually to the collapse of the
peace talks in Oslo. The government responded with the unilateral
suspension of JASIG followed, coincidentally, by the escalation of
political killings.
In the end, whether
the Macapagal-Arroyo regime can indeed force the Left to surrender is not
the end-result she’s eyeing. What matters is that the present hard-line
strategy against the Left – and the role that the AFP takes – will go a
long way toward ensuring continued U.S. support that can be coursed
through an AFP that remains on the side of its commander-in-chief.
Macapagal-Arroyo has pledged fatter budgets for the graft-ridden AFP and
even fatter salaries for its generals.
For that, after all,
is what matters most for Macapagal-Arroyo at the moment. Having lost the
constitutional legitimacy to govern, and faced with continuing prospects
of impeachment, coup threats and a worsening political crisis – not to
mention the total breakdown of law under her rule - the presumptive
president must hang on to the apron of the U.S., and its powerbroker in
the Philippines, the AFP. Just like in the Marcos years, constitutional
illegitimacy and the weakening of political institutions have led to the
worsening of human rights violations.
Indeed, the issue of
political murders is tied to the survival of the regime. Bulatlat
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