COMMENTARY
Misuari’s
‘Republik’
The
government’s failure to implement its peace agreement with the MNLF has given
Misuari and his men an excuse to again rise up in arms, announcing their
intention to establish a “Bangsamoro Republik.” Fresh from its battle with
Estrada’s forces, will the politically hobbled Arroyo administration take
Misuari on?
By
PATRICIO P. DIAZ
Events have
been flying fast. Early this week, the Estrada-inspired attack on Malacañang.
Before the weekend, the Moro National Liberation Front national congress in
Cabatangan, Zamboanga City, announced it would establish the “Bangsamoro
Republik” with chairman Nur Misuari as president.
In passing a
resolution to establish the Bangsamoro Republik, the 2,000 MNLF delegates
reverted to their original demand for independence. In effect, the MNLF
unilaterally abrogated its agreement with the Philippine government in 1996 for
the establishment of Muslim Autonomy according to the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.
The
Bangsamoro Republik has not been proclaimed. The resolution to establish it will
still be submitted to the United Nations, according to the MNLF spokesman and
senior adviser Rev. Absalom G. Cerveza, invoking its right to self-determination
-- a right guaranteed under the UN Charter.
Surprise
The
resolution to abandon autonomy was a surprise. While the implementation of the
1996 GRP-MNLF Final Agreement, especially the enactment of the law amending
Republic Act 6734 (the law that created the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao), had not been smooth-sailing, the review of the agreement had been set
as reported last May 2, apparently the first day of the Bangsamoro National
Congress.
Cerveza said
that the Congress was called to discuss a new timeframe for the implementation
of the Final Peace Agreement and to adopt a position in the forthcoming meeting
of the government, the MNLF and the Organization of Islamic Conference to review
the Final Peace Agreement.
From the
socio-economic viewpoint, the government, with the assistance of international
agencies, has been implementing programs for the benefit of MNLF members and
their families. MNLF beneficiaries, as reported in media, have been appreciative
of the programs.
However,
reviewing events since September 2, 1996, when the Final Peace Agreement was
signed, the MNLF reversion from autonomy to independence is not a surprise.
Every time Misuari felt discontented with the implementation of the peace
agreement, he would threaten to declare independence.
Who To
Blame?
That the
Final Peace Agreement has not been fully implemented, three years beyond the
agreed time-frame ending in October 1998, can easily be blamed on the Philippine
government, particularly Congress. The amendatory law, essential to full
implementation, could have been enacted and submitted to a plebiscite in 1998
then the election in the new Muslim Autonomy held early in 1999.
But Congress
had reasons of its own in not enacting the amendatory law. Unfortunately, the
MNLF saw in the failure government insincerity and, eventually, the
implementation was overtaken and complicated by the chaotic Mindanao policy, if
any, by the Estrada administration.
Yet, it
could be doubted that the timely enactment of the amendatory law could have
satisfied the MNLF. Within two years of the signing of the agreement, Misuari
wanted the plebiscite deferred and the transition phase of the Muslim Autonomy
extended to 10 years. He repeatedly demanded this with the support of the OIC.
Evidently,
while the MNLF conveniently blamed the government for the delay in the
implementation of the agreement, it really did not want an early implementation
not until it could show enough development to convince all the 14 provinces and
their component cities to join the expanded Muslim Autonomy.
Revelation?
We believe
Cerveza’s expression of surprise at the decision of the 2,000 delegates
virtually abrogating the Final Peace Agreement. However, Cerveza could just be
hiding a rift in the MNLF leadership. There
was a report that Misuari had confirmed he had been “retired” by a faction
of the MNLF. If true, then Misuari was not in control of the Bangsamoro National
Congress.
The
resolution to establish the Bangsamoro Republik confirmed the existence of the
MNLF faction that had opposed the 1996 Final Peace Agreement.
The same faction must have been discontented with how Misuari distributed
the benefits from the government and the foreign benefactors.
The failure
of the government to fully implement fully the agreement on schedule has become
a unifying factor of the MNLF as well as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Misuari has invited the MILF to join the MNLF bid for independence through the
UN.
Looking
Ahead
Misuari’s
invitation to the MILF to join its independence bid is an assertion of the MNLF
leadership “as the sole and legitimate representative of the Bangsamoro people
to the OIC.” Will the MILF abandon its negotiation with the government and its
chance of wresting that leadership from the MNLF?
Certainly,
the MNLF surprise move has put the government on the defensive. The MNLF as well
as the OIC will use the resolution as leverage in the forthcoming tripartite
meeting to review the Final Peace Agreement.
Should the
MILF accept the MNLF invitation and abandon its negotiation with the government,
the Bangsamoro bid for independence will be a big headache for the Macapagal-Arroyo
government.
But that bid
through the United Nations, with the support of the OIC countries, will not be a
walkover. Besides the government opposing the move, the 70 percent Christians in
the 14 provinces and component cities will surely reject it.
In a sense,
the MNLF bid for independence is a miscalculated move. The Christians and other
non-MNLF who are inclined toward Muslim Autonomy will be turned off. The move
will solidify the Christians and other non-MNLF population.
What is to
be feared and prevented is the eruption of Muslim-Christian armed confrontation.
Independence is a very sensitive Muslim-Christian issue.
The memories of the 1969-1971 confrontations are too frightening to
recall. The MNLF has again bared its teeth. Does it really mean to bite this
time?