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RAGING DEBATES IN MINDANAO
MILF-MNLF 'Unity' Misleading; ARMM Plebiscite An Exercise in Futility

(First of two parts)

A plebiscite will be held in southern Philippines on Aug. 14 on the matter of expanding the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and on the basis of the new autonomy law (RA 9054) which was enacted by Congress and signed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The author holds that the plebiscite will again be a futile political exercise because it is not supported by both the MNLF and MILF as well as by official resolutions of the powerful Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The crux of the opposition is that RA 9054 violates both the Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement. Fr. Eliseo R. Mercado, Jr. ,OMI, explains why both RA 9054 and the coming plebiscites are ‘unilateral impositions’ by the GRP on the Moro people.

By Fr. Eliseo R. Mercado Jr. OMI
Bulatlat.com

Yes, there is a real split between Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) chairman Nur Misuari and a group of top MNLF leaders who now call themselves as Executive Council of the 15. Prominent leaders of the so-called council are Hatimil Hassan (Basilan - MNLF vice chair), Parouk Hussin (Tausug - MNLF Foreign Minister), Muslimin Sema (Maguindanao - MNLF secretary general and elected mayor of Cotabato City), Lt. Gen. Cong Sahrin (Tausug - MNLF head of the Joint Monitoring Committee), and Yusof Jikiri (Tausug - MNLF chief of staff and elected governor of Sulu). The position of Jikiri is "changing"!

The council "retired" Misuari and gave him the title "chairman emeritus." On the other hand, Chairman Nur expelled all the people he now labels as "traitors" from both the MNLF and the ARMM. The "retirement" move of the council and the subsequent reaction by Nur have only further widened the split. Both camps are now courting the support of the state commanders and the MNLF rank and file.

At this stage of the struggle of the MNLF, Chairman Misuari has all the advantage. He is the governor of the ARMM, chair of the SPCPD (he has since been removed from this position - Ed.), and he has the support of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) secretary general and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the council enjoys the full support of Indonesia, Malaysia and Libya. It is also perceived that the council enjoys the support of senior government officials through Hussin who is Presidential Adviser on Muslim Mindanao. Both camps claim the support of the field commanders. The state commanders who do not support Misuari were also removed.

The controversy rages. One big advantage of Nur is the fact that a council is no match to a person in the Filipino culture, much more so in the Bangsamoro culture. No one gives loyalty or dies for a committee or Council! Nur for years is the human face of the Bangsamoro struggle. He may be a nightmare" as an administrator/manager, but definitely the man is a charismatic leader and a charismatic revolutionary!

On the plebiscite

The plebiscite as mandated by law - Republic Act 9054 amending RA 6734 or the ARMM Organic Act - further exacerbates the split in the MNLF. Nur and his MNLF have strongly objected to the holding of the plebiscite for the following reasons:

First, RA 9054 is a violation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the GRP and the MNLF. The MNLF has no participation in the crafting of the law. It is a unilateral act and an imposition of the GRP on the MNLF and the peoples of the SZOPAD.

Second, RA 9054 is not the "legislation" of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement as agreed upon by the GRP and the MNLF. As a matter of fact, the Philippine Congress needs only to legislate the peace agreement and let the people decide to approve or disapprove the same in the plebiscite.

Third, Congress has no authority (though it believes to be sovereign, in legislation) to mangle, select provisions or do anything outside the commitment of the GRP that includes the Executive and the Legislative as contained in the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. The Senate and the House were both represented in the negotiation of the agreement. The authority is only to reject or accept the agreement by the people in a plebiscite. This is the constitutional process contemplated and agreed upon in Jakarta and Tripoli.

Fourth, RA 9054 does not reflect in toto the peace agreement. This fact is a violation both in letter and spirit of the Tripoli Agreement as well as the 1996 agreement.

This is the position of the MNLF. Being a participant to the Jakarta talks and a witness both to the initialing and signing of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, I believe that the MNLF position is justified and has strong basis in fact.

Congress' responsibility

The GRP has the responsibility to legislate the Final Peace Agreement in toto, both in letter and spirit. This is not an ordinary exercise of legislative power of Congress but rather the extraordinary power of Congress to work with the MNLF to deliver the GRP commitment in legislating a law that is faithful to the Final Peace Agreement both in letter and spirit.

The commitment of both the GRP and the MNLF is on the agreement that the same law will be submitted to the sovereign people of the concerned areas for ratification or non-ratification. This is the constitutional process contemplated both in the Tripoli as well as in the Jakarta agreements. On this basis, the MNLF holds that the law, RA 9054, is alien to its matrix - that is, the Tripoli Agreement - and its definitive interpretation in detail as contained in the Jakarta accord signed in Manila on Sept. 2, 1996.

I personally believe that the GRP has violated its commitment as to its responsibility in the process of legislating the said law. The so-called public hearing is the civil society's participation and is required in any legislation, but the partnership with the MNLF in legislating an amendatory law to RA 6734 that shall incorporate in toto the 1996 Final Peace Agreement has not been understood by Congress and thus it has violated the internationally-recognized agreement in the exercise of what Congress believes its sovereign prerogative.

In many ways, this sovereignty is compromised a bit when GRP entered into the Tripoli and Jakarta agreements in the same way as the MNLF also compromised its position by accepting the constitutional processes of plebiscite in drawing the geography and coverage of autonomy in Southern Philippines.

No plebiscite role

Yes, the MNLF rejects RA 9054 and, consequently, the holding of the plebiscite. It will not recognize both the law and any result of the plebiscite on the premise that both are violative of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement.

So the Plebiscite is a very contentious issue that confronts not only the peoples of Southern Philippines but also jeopardizes the relationship between the GRP and the MNLF. In fact, the law and the plebiscite may bring us back to square one. If this happens, it would be a tragedy because a settlement had already been negotiated in a peaceful manner. What should have remained as a challenge to the protagonists is the crafting of an autonomy law that is mutually acceptable to the protagonists with the people as the final arbiter in a plebiscite called for the purpose of ratification.

The law has been tampered with and believed to be bogus thus the plebiscite is also bogus and rendered inutile. Oh, what an expensive and extravagant expenditure for nothing.

Council of 15

The Council of 15 has not given its official position on the plebiscite on Aug. 14. Mus Sema, prior to his departure for Kuala Lumpur, was quoted in the local media to have said that he is for the postponement of the plebiscite. The MNLF prior to the split has come out with official stand on RA 9054. The entire leadership as well as the entire rank and file of the MNLF believes that the new Law is violative of the 1996 Peace Agreement. Will this consensus change for the Council of 15 when it is courting the support of GRP to recognize it instead of Nur's MNLF?

Leaders of the Council of 15 believe that the GRP's responsibility is to see the completion of the 1996 agreement through mutual consultation among the protagonists (GRP and MNLF) under the auspices of the Committee of 8 representing the OIC. The Council of 15 wants to be GRP's new partner in the implementation of the 1996 agreement. They believe that the ambassadors of Malaysia, Indonesia and Libya support the Council of 15.

On the other hand, the powerful Saudi Arabia believes that both the GRP and the Council of 15 should not remove outright Nur Misuari! Saudi Arabia believes in moving by phases and ensuring that Nur is not set aside but given an exalted position on account of his stature and his being the symbol of the Bangsamoro struggle. In short, there should be an acceptable alternative leadership formula to resolve what presently divides the MNLF and an acceptable alternative, also, to the holding of the plebiscite.

The MILF, on the other hand, is not making any position on the plebiscite since it is not a party to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the GRP and the MNLF. The peace talks between the GRP and the MILF is a separate and distinct peace process from the GRP and MNLF talks that produced the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. The MILF will not play any part in the plebiscite!

MILF position

MILF's Al haj Murad Ebrahim, prior to his departure to KL, was also quoted in the media that he does not see any rationale for the plebiscite. Pressed on the real position of the MILF vis-à-vis the plebiscite, the MILF officially states that they will not participate in the plebiscite.

To get the score right, the MNLF is boycotting the plebiscite; the MILF is also boycotting the plebiscite, though for a different reason. The Council of 15 has not officially made its stand post split, and the OIC resolutions stand -- that is, to hold the plebiscite only after substantial development projects have actually taken place on the ground, then possibly a referendum in 2001 and elections in 2003.

What will the GRP garner in conducting the Plebiscite? People say that the GRP has everything to lose and nothing to gain in the said exercise. Soon the GRP has to make a decision.

It has already been told officially through the talks between Vice President Teofisto Guingona and Nur Misuari that only Comelec can stop the exercises on the ground that it is not prepared, it has not conducted the necessary requirements for referendum - that is,, enough information and dissemination to make intelligence choice! The other possibility is to get a temporary restraining order from the Supreme Court. But who will initiate these moves?

Will you get Comelec to own up to its unpreparedness to conduct the said exercise? And will they admit to the lack of compliance to the requirements in the conduct an intelligible plebiscite? Aha! This is the crux of the matter that confronts the GRP and the MNLF while the peoples in the Southern Philippines are beginning to be divided along ethnic and religious lines! Oh, what a tragedy!

MNLF-MILF Unity

In their banner news last Aug 4, national papers reported about the unity arrived at KL between the MILF and the MNLF representatives. The TV coverage of the so-called unity conference said that it was "initialed" by Hatimil Hasan (vice chair of the MNLF and a leading member of the Council of 15) and Murad Ibrahim, Al Hajj (MILF vice chair for military affairs and the head of the MILF negotiating panel). The "initialing" was witnessed by Malaysia's defense minister and the leading members of the Council of 15 and the MILF delegation at the KL talks.

The unity that was reported is a real misnomer. The "agreement" between the MILF and the Council of 15 is simply to form a Bangsamoro Solidarity Conference that shall be the forum in the discussion of the issues affecting the Bangsamoro people. It also hopes that the newly-established Bangsamoro Solidarity Conference shall gain recognition by the OIC.

The same solidarity conference recognizes and respects the distinct identity of each. The Council of 15 remains steadfast in its commitment to the 1996 Final Peace Accord. The MILF, on the other hand, is currently negotiating with the GRP on a formula of self-determination that is acceptable to the Bangsamoro people. While the MILF recognizes the fact of the 1996 agreement between the GRP and the MNLF, it is not bound by it or will it participate in the scheduled Plebiscite. In short, the MILF has nothing to do with the legislation called RA 9054, the conduct of the plebiscite and the results of the said plebiscite.

The MILF is now focused on its ongoing peace talks with the GRP. In particular, both panels are hard pressed on the details of the KL framework and the Tripoli memorandum as agreed upon by the representatives of the GRP and the MILF. The most contentious issues are the disposition of the MILF camps that were overrun by government troops during all-out war declared by former President Estrada against the MILF from April to July 2000.

Equally contentious is the desire of the GRP to put outright at the beginning of the talks the parameters of the Philippine Constitution and the territorial integrity of the Republic. These parameters are not acceptable to the MILF at the beginning of the talks.

(Conclusion: New ARMM Law Full of Holes, Violates 1996 Peace Agreement)

*(Editor's note: This two-part article form the author's discussion papers posted on an online discussion group and is published here with permission. The author is the president of the Notre Dame University in Cotabato City. He was also part of the GRP-MNLF peace agreement in 1996 and chairman of the Independent Fact-Finding Committee and the Quick Reaction Team that oversaw the implementation of the GRP-MILF ceasefire.) Bulatlat.com

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