Bu-lat-lat (boo-lat-lat) verb: to search, probe, investigate, inquire; to unearth facts Issue No. 41 November 25 - December 1, 2001 Quezon City, Philippines |
On
the Ramos-Misuari Deal By
Prof. Jose Maria Sison Chairman,
International Network for Philippine Studies July
11, 1996 It
is understandable that the overwhelming majority of the Filipino people, who
find themselves in a zone of peace and development in the 14 provinces and 9
cities under the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD)
and who do not belong to the Moro community, are outraged by Ramos' failure to
consult them beforehand about the SPCPD and by the built-in dominance of MNLF
representatives within the SPCPD. Those
outraged throw the following questions at the Ramos regime: ·
Why
should the MNLF chairman be the chairman of the five-member SPCPD Executive
Committee and form the majority with two other MNLF representatives and why
should the MNLF be the one recommending to Ramos for his approval the two other
members who are to represent the Christians and the Lumads? ·
Why
should the MNLF chairman be the presiding officer of the 81-member Consultative
Assembly and form the majority with 44 other MNLF representatives and why should
the officials of ARMM, provincial governors, city mayors and representatives of
NGOs and POs comprise the minority in the assembly? There
are those who demagogically drum up the fear that the SPCPD is the MNLF
provisional government in disguise, that it will be in charge of regional
security forces and that it is going to be the dispenser of mountains of money
from the Manila government. Some of the reactionary critics of the SPCPD (like
Lobregat) are actually collaborating with the Ramos regime to raise an anti-SPCPD
hysteria in order to cut down the concessions being dangled to Nur Misuari. The
truth of the matter is that the points of consensus in the 8th GRP-MNLF Mixed
Committee Meeting with the Participation of the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC) Ministerial Committee of Six, signed in Davao City on June 23,
1996, spell out inter alia the following humiliating terms for the MNLF and the
BMA: ·
In
phase 1 of the Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, the SPCPD and the
Consultative Assembly are established to run for three years from 1996 to 1999.
Their powers and functions are derivative and extension of the powers of the
presidential office of Ramos. Their operational funds also come from the funds
of the Office of the President. In brief, the SPCPD and the assembly are mere
factotums of Ramos. While the SPCPD is a presidential peace and development
agency, the local government units and ARMM remain intact as
politico-administrative organs. ·
In
phase 2 the ARMM Organic Act may be amended or repealed by Congress. The new act
of Congress is submitted to a plebiscite and the provinces and cities choose
either to join or not the autonomous region in 1998. Upon the establishment of
the Regular Autonomous Regional Government, expectedly in the four provinces and
two cities now covered by the ARMM plus possibly one more province carved out
from some municipalities, the MNLF shall dismantle the Bangsa Moro Army and hire
out a portion of it to the Regional Command of the Philippine National Police
(also given the fancy name of Special Regional
Security Forces). In brief, Nur Misuari becomes a Conrado Balweg. Quite
a number of the critics of Ramos seem not to understand that he has succeeded
through his executive secretary, Ruben Torres, to coax Nur Misuari into a
blatant and complete capitulation and blatant betrayal of the Moro people s
struggle for national self-determination under the fleeting guise of becoming
the taskmaster of the SPCPD and with the bait of 20 billion pesos which is
merely a promise. The
latest report is that Nur Misuari has already become a registered voter under
the Comelec and is aiming to run for a position in the ARMM in September. Nur
Misuari's betrayal of the Moro people s struggle for national self-determination
started with the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, whose first provision binds the MNLF
within the framework of Philippine sovereignty and territory as defined by the
Manila government. Since
1976, Nur Misuari has in principle accepted autonomy within the oppressive and
exploitative framework of the Manila government and has in fact entered into a
series of prolonged ceasefire agreements with the Marcos, Aquino and Ramos
regimes. He has actually diverted the MNLF and BMA from armed struggle and has
occasionally made unfriendly statements towards the revolutionary forces,
instead of forging an alliance with them. At
the same time, he has always entrapped himself in claiming too many Mindanao
provinces, including those where the non-Moro people are in the majority and far
beyond the current four provinces of ARMM where the Moro people are in the
majority. He has long run counter to the demographic facts and has come to
depend on Ramos power of appointment for the temporary illusion of being the
prospective regional chieftain of 14 provinces and 9 cities. Several
states belonging to the OIC, which are pro-US and on which Nur Misuari has long
depended, have long deterred him from seeking alliance with the revolutionary
forces and have finall pressed upon
him to surrender completely to the Ramos regime. The US is very much behind the
Ramos-Misuari deal, especially because the US is interested in bases and in the
oil resources in the Moro areas. After
getting the signature of Nur Misuari on the aforementioned points of consensus,
Ramos may choose to either proceed or not with the SPCPD scheme because he has
already put the MNLF leader or even the entire MNLF in a position of total
discredit among the Moro people. The final round of talks in Djakarta is still
to come in order to put in detail the points of consensus reached in the June
21-23 talks. Ramos
will proceed to swing a deal with Nur Misuari until the Bangsa Moro Army is
dismantled. A portion of this will be assimilated by the Philippine National
Police for attacking the revolutionary forces of the Filipino people, including
the Moros, or possibly for igniting bloody Christian-Muslim communal and
religious conflicts that can be used to rationalize martial rule. The
Ramos-Misuari agreement is no solution but is an aggravation of the problems in
Mindanao. It does not allow any autonomy that is satisfactory to the Moro
community and is stirring up unrest in Moro, non-Moro and mixed communities.
Many people, including Muslims and non-Muslims, have already issued warnings
that they will resist any attempt of the Manila government to impose Nur Misuari
on them. The
US-Ramos regime can gloat over its success in causing the complete capitulation
of Nur Misuari. But the basic problems of the Filipino people, including the
Moro people, remain unsolved. The Filipino people, including the Moros, and
their revolutionary forces are more determined than ever to unite and fight for
national liberation and democracy against the US-Ramos regime and the entire
ruling system of national oppression and exploitation.
Bulatlat.com We want to know what you think of this article.
|