Bu-lat-lat (boo-lat-lat) verb: to search, probe, investigate, inquire; to unearth facts

Issue No. 41                         November 25 - December 1,  2001              Quezon City, Philippines







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On the Ramos-Misuari Deal

By Prof. Jose Maria Sison

Chairman, International Network for Philippine Studies

July 11, 1996 

It is understandable that the overwhelming majority of the Filipino people, who find themselves in a zone of peace and development in the 14 provinces and 9 cities under the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and who do not belong to the Moro community, are outraged by Ramos' failure to consult them beforehand about the SPCPD and by the built-in dominance of MNLF representatives within the SPCPD.

Those outraged throw the following questions at the Ramos regime:

·      Why should the MNLF chairman be the chairman of the five-member SPCPD Executive Committee and form the majority with two other MNLF representatives and why should the MNLF be the one recommending to Ramos for his approval the two other members who are to represent the Christians and the Lumads?

·      Why should the MNLF chairman be the presiding officer of the 81-member Consultative Assembly and form the majority with 44 other MNLF representatives and why should the officials of ARMM, provincial governors, city mayors and representatives of NGOs and POs comprise the minority in the assembly?

There are those who demagogically drum up the fear that the SPCPD is the MNLF provisional government in disguise, that it will be in charge of regional security forces and that it is going to be the dispenser of mountains of money from the Manila government. Some of the reactionary critics of the SPCPD (like Lobregat) are actually collaborating with the Ramos regime to raise an anti-SPCPD hysteria in order to cut down the concessions being dangled to Nur Misuari.

The truth of the matter is that the points of consensus in the 8th GRP-MNLF Mixed Committee Meeting with the Participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Ministerial Committee of Six, signed in Davao City on June 23, 1996, spell out inter alia the following humiliating terms for the MNLF and the BMA:

·      In phase 1 of the Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, the SPCPD and the Consultative Assembly are established to run for three years from 1996 to 1999. Their powers and functions are derivative and extension of the powers of the presidential office of Ramos. Their operational funds also come from the funds of the Office of the President. In brief, the SPCPD and the assembly are mere factotums of Ramos. While the SPCPD is a presidential peace and development agency, the local government units and ARMM remain intact as politico-administrative organs.

·      In phase 2 the ARMM Organic Act may be amended or repealed by Congress. The new act of Congress is submitted to a plebiscite and the provinces and cities choose either to join or not the autonomous region in 1998. Upon the establishment of the Regular Autonomous Regional Government, expectedly in the four provinces and two cities now covered by the ARMM plus possibly one more province carved out from some municipalities, the MNLF shall dismantle the Bangsa Moro Army and hire out a portion of it to the Regional Command of the Philippine National Police (also given the fancy name of Special Regional    Security Forces). In brief, Nur Misuari becomes a Conrado Balweg.

Quite a number of the critics of Ramos seem not to understand that he has succeeded through his executive secretary, Ruben Torres, to coax Nur Misuari into a blatant and complete capitulation and blatant betrayal of the Moro people s struggle for national self-determination under the fleeting guise of becoming the taskmaster of the SPCPD and with the bait of 20 billion pesos which is merely a promise.

The latest report is that Nur Misuari has already become a registered voter under the Comelec and is aiming to run for a position in the ARMM in September. Nur Misuari's betrayal of the Moro people s struggle for national self-determination started with the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, whose first provision binds the MNLF within the framework of Philippine sovereignty and territory as defined by the Manila government.

Since 1976, Nur Misuari has in principle accepted autonomy within the oppressive and exploitative framework of the Manila government and has in fact entered into a series of prolonged ceasefire agreements with the Marcos, Aquino and Ramos regimes. He has actually diverted the MNLF and BMA from armed struggle and has occasionally made unfriendly statements towards the revolutionary forces, instead of forging an alliance with them.

At the same time, he has always entrapped himself in claiming too many Mindanao provinces, including those where the non-Moro people are in the majority and far beyond the current four provinces of ARMM where the Moro people are in the majority. He has long run counter to the demographic facts and has come to depend on Ramos power of appointment for the temporary illusion of being the prospective regional chieftain of 14 provinces and 9 cities.

Several states belonging to the OIC, which are pro-US and on which Nur Misuari has long depended, have long deterred him from seeking alliance with the revolutionary forces and have finall  pressed upon him to surrender completely to the Ramos regime. The US is very much behind the Ramos-Misuari deal, especially because the US is interested in bases and in the oil resources in the Moro areas.

After getting the signature of Nur Misuari on the aforementioned points of consensus, Ramos may choose to either proceed or not with the SPCPD scheme because he has already put the MNLF leader or even the entire MNLF in a position of total discredit among the Moro people. The final round of talks in Djakarta is still to come in order to put in detail the points of consensus reached in the June 21-23 talks.

Ramos will proceed to swing a deal with Nur Misuari until the Bangsa Moro Army is dismantled. A portion of this will be assimilated by the Philippine National Police for attacking the revolutionary forces of the Filipino people, including the Moros, or possibly for igniting bloody Christian-Muslim communal and religious conflicts that can be used to rationalize martial rule.

The Ramos-Misuari agreement is no solution but is an aggravation of the problems in Mindanao. It does not allow any autonomy that is satisfactory to the Moro community and is stirring up unrest in Moro, non-Moro and mixed communities. Many people, including Muslims and non-Muslims, have already issued warnings that they will resist any attempt of the Manila government to impose Nur Misuari on them.

The US-Ramos regime can gloat over its success in causing the complete capitulation of Nur Misuari. But the basic problems of the Filipino people, including the Moro people, remain unsolved. The Filipino people, including the Moros, and their revolutionary forces are more determined than ever to unite and fight for national liberation and democracy against the US-Ramos regime and the entire ruling system of national oppression and exploitation.  Bulatlat.com


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