Bu-lat-lat (boo-lat-lat) verb: to search, probe, investigate, inquire; to unearth facts Issue No. 42 December 2 - 8, 2001 Quezon City, Philippines |
Democratic Space Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism By
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU)
The American Civil Liberties Union is a non-partisan, non-profit organization consisting of nearly 300,000 members dedicated to protecting the principles of freedom and equality set forth in the Constitution and in our civil rights laws. On
September 11, thousands of Americans were brutally murdered in an audacious,
coordinated attack. Our main office is only blocks away from the twin towers and
our colleagues joined the terrified crowd rushing north from lower Manhattan. We
recognize that the Department of Justice has a profound duty to prosecute the
perpetrators and to try to protect the public against other attacks. We
appreciate that this is a daunting task and that thousands of well-meaning
people at the Department of Justice are working hard to accomplish this goal. The
ACLU has supported many of the efforts now underway to promote security, such as
recent initiatives to toughen airport security. However, we remain convinced
that the government need not sacrifice civil liberties to protect the public. We
can be both safe and free. This
statement outlines how the conduct of the Department of Justice over the last
ten weeks has undermined our most cherished rights, blunted the tools of
accountability, and threatened the balance of power between the various branches
of government. From
the outset, the Attorney General and other spokespersons for the Department of
Justice have signaled that they would not erode civil liberties in response to
the September 11 attacks. Unfortunately, the actions of the Department of
Justice and of other agencies acting in concert suggest otherwise. The Attorney
General and the Administration have detained more than a thousand people without
providing information to the media or public, written new regulations allowing
for the recording of privileged conversations between attorneys and clients,
proposed military tribunals without constitutional protections, and expanded the
government's ability to withhold information from the public. We are deeply
troubled by these actions. We hope that today's hearing is a step in the
direction of Congress taking responsibility for its role in overseeing the
Executive Branch and protecting our democratic government. Military
Tribunals "We
will not yield in our determination to protect the constitutional rights of
individuals. Very frankly, those who attack the United States would attack the
constitutional rights as well as the safety of individuals. We're going to do
everything we can to harmonize the constitutional rights of individuals with
every legal capacity we can muster to also protect the safety and security of
individuals. It's with this in mind that we would evaluate any potential changes
in the law." Attorney General Ashcroft, Press Briefing, September 18, 2001 On
November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a "Military Order" providing
for potentially indefinite detention of any non-citizen accused of terrorism,
and permitting trial of such defendants in a military commission with no
provision for judicial review. These
tribunals will not be governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and do
not contain the protections provided by the UCMJ. The order was issued without a
formal declaration of war or any authorization by the Congress for the
establishment of military tribunals. It circumvents the basic statutory
requirement - at the heart of the compromise that was the USA Patriot Act --
that non-citizens suspected of terrorism must be charged with a crime or
immigration violation within seven days of being taken into custody, and that
such detainees will have full access to the federal courts. The
President's Military Order is unjustified and dangerous. It permits the United
States criminal justice system to be swept aside merely on the President's
finding that he has "reason to believe" that a non-citizen may be
involved in terrorism. It makes no difference whether those charged are captured
abroad on the field of battle or at home by federal or state police. It makes no
difference whether the individual is a visitor or a long-term legal resident.
Finally while the order applies in terms only to non-citizens, the precedents on
which the President relies make no such distinction, thereby permitting the
order to be extended to cover United States citizens at the stroke of a pen. The
President does not have unchecked war power by virtue of his authority as
Commander-in-Chief. Rather, he shares these powers with Congress. "The
whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, vested in
congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this
inquiry." Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801). This is true
whether Congress authorizes "general hostilities" by declaring war, or
"partial hostilities" by authorizing the use of force in a military
action short of war, as it has done here. Id. The
Administration claims authority to establish military tribunals from the World
War II-era precedent involving the trial of eight accused saboteurs, who landed
on United States territory in 1942, shortly after the United States declared war
on Germany. Their trial by military commission was upheld by the Supreme Court.
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). But unlike President Bush, President
Roosevelt relied on the authority Congress had given him by its formal
declaration of war. Id at 25-26. Roosevelt also relied on specific statutory
authority permitting trials of enemy spies by military commission. This
authority has since been repealed. The
scope of the President's Order is breathtakingly broad. It applies to any
individual whom the President determines he has "reason to believe" is
(1) a member of Al Qaeda, (2) is in any way involved in "acts of
international terrorism" -- a term which is not defined by the order -- or
(3) has "knowingly harbored" either of the above. If the term
"acts of international terrorism" is defined by reference to any of
several definitions of terrorism in the United States Code, as expanded under
the USA Patriot Act, the universe of potential defendants could sweep in not
only those who are directly involved in or knowingly support violent activity,
but also many others on the basis of otherwise lawful, non-violent political
activities and associations. The
Attorney General has sought to justify the order on the grounds that it applies
only to non-citizens, whom he erroneously (and alarmingly) claims not to have
any constitutional rights. The Supreme Court made clear just this past summer
that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent." Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2500 (2001)
(emphasis supplied). If
United States courts can hear terrorism cases, and there has been no showing
that they cannot, this severely undercuts the argument for military tribunals.
Military tribunals, other than ordinary courts-martial, are adopted as a last
resort to ensure justice when the civil courts cannot function, not as a method
of avoiding available forums for justice by undercutting basic constitutional
rights. Military tribunals are used against "certain classes of offense
which in war would go unpunished in the absence of a provisional forum for the
trial of the offenders." Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348 n.8 (1952)
(emphasis supplied). Likewise, President Lincoln regarded military justice as
permissible only if justified by military necessity, and refused demands to
create military courts except where made necessary because of the inability of
the regular courts to act. The
Military Order also fails to respect the careful limits that the Constitution
has placed on the use of military courts even in times of declared war. They are
not a substitute for civil justice generally, but may be applied only to
"unlawful enemy belligerents," a class which is far narrower than the
universe of all persons who could be accused of terrorism crimes, particularly
after the broadening of the definitions of terrorism in recent anti-terrorism
legislation. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the order utterly fails to account for the
evolution of both international law and American constitutional law since World
War II, when military commissions were last extensively used. It does not
guarantee due process for the accused and could permit trials that our own
government has said are fundamentally unfair and violate basic international
standards when such trials are held in other countries. If Congress chooses to
authorize military tribunals for a limited class of accused terrorist war
criminals, it is imperative that such standards apply. Detentions
"I'm
deeply concerned about the civil liberties of all Americans. I'm especially
concerned about the civil liberties of Arab Americans and Middle Eastern
Americans who are patriotic citizens, who lament and regret this loss, perhaps
as keenly or more keenly than any, and whose commitment to the strict
enforcement and pursuit of these networks of terror that inflict this kind of
injury is as strong as any." Attorney General Ashcroft remarks following
his tour of the Pentagon, September 19, 2001. The
Department of Justice has launched what appears to be the most extensive program
of preventative detention since the internment of over 100,000 Japanese and
German-Americans during WWII. By the admission of the Department of Justice,
over 1,200 people have been detained in connection with the September 11
attacks. According to media accounts of the detentions, approximately 1 percent
or 2 percent of those detained in connection with the attacks are actually
suspected of having any involvement at all. The rest are being held on the basis
of unrelated immigration violations, minor crimes (usually under state law), and
as material witnesses under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3144. It appears that the vast
majority of the people being detained in connection with this investigation are
being detained on pretexts: they have committed a minor offense that gives law
enforcement or immigration authorities the power to detain them even though they
would not under normal circumstances be detained for such conduct. By all
accounts, virtually all of the detainees are Muslims or Arabs, and most are
non-citizens. An
extraordinary wall of silence surrounds this preventative detention campaign.
The public, though it has a right to know, has not been informed of even the
most basic information such as who has been detained, why, for how long, and
where the detentions have occurred. The Department of Justice has refused to
release specific information about the detainees. For
these reasons, the ACLU wrote to the Attorney General asking him for information
about the detainees. There was no response to that letter. We posed similar
questions to the Director of the FBI, Robert Meuller, at two meetings during the
month of October. We posed similar questions to Commissioner Ziglar of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service on October 30. When all those requests
for information failed, we filed, along with other organizations, a request
under the Freedom of Information Act. Our requests have not been satisfactorily
answered and we are considering further legal action. This wall of silence
undermines public confidence in the investigation and raises questions about the
fairness of the process and the safety of those detained. Persons
detained on immigration charges are of particular concern because their access
to legal counsel is limited. Unlike defendants in criminal cases or persons held
as material witnesses, those who face immigration charges are not entitled to
counsel at government expense if they cannot afford an attorney. In New York,
the immigration detainees are reportedly given a list of pro bono attorneys in
the area. However, there is no guarantee that the attorneys listed are qualified
to represent persons under these circumstances, nor is there any guarantee the
detained person will have success contacting an attorney. In some cases,
detainees are allowed only one telephone call a week to find an attorney.
Predictably, many of those who are questioned are questioned without an
attorney. Another area of concern that is just coming to light is the fact that
the Depart of Justice is planning on questioning 5000 men based solely on
national origin. This constitutes blatant racial profiling, as some police
departments have recognized. Eavesdropping
on Attorney-Client Communications "I
want to assure you that in our effort to make sure that law enforcement can gain
the intelligence that it needs in order to protect America, we are also mindful
of our responsibility to protect the rights and privacy of Americans."
General Ashcroft, Press Briefing with FBI Director Robert Mueller, September 17,
2001. To
add to the concerns about the detainees, the Justice Department, unilaterally,
without judicial oversight, and without meaningful standards, has issued rules
that give it the power to decide when to eavesdrop on the confidential
attorney-client conversations of a person whom the Justice Department itself may
be seeking to prosecute. This regulation, implemented without the usual
opportunity for prior public comment, is an unprecedented frontal assault on the
attorney-client privilege and the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution. It is especially disturbing that these provisions for monitoring
confidential attorney-client communications apply not only to convicted
prisoners in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, but to all persons in the
custody of the Department of Justice, including pretrial detainees who have not
yet been convicted of crime and are presumed innocent, as well as material
witnesses and immigration detainees, who are not accused of any crime. 28 C.F.R.
§ 501.3(f) (proposed amendment). The
rule disregards long-standing Supreme Court precedent that protects the
attorney-client relationship. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance
of the need for attorneys to communicate openly with their clients and has
grounded this principle in both the long-standing attorney-client privilege as
well as the Sixth Amendment right to adequate counsel. Regarding the
attorney-client privilege, the Court wrote: The
attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law. Its purpose is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.
Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S. Ct. 677, 682 (1981). Indeed, so
well-established is this privilege, and so compelling the societal interest in
unobstructed communication between clients and their attorneys, that the Supreme
Court has held that the privilege survives even after the client's death.
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2088 (1998). Regarding
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel the Court wrote: "[T]he Sixth
Amendment's assistance-of-counsel guarantee can be meaningfully implemented only
if a criminal defendant knows that his communications with his attorney are
private and that his lawful preparations for trial are secure against intrusion
by the government, his adversary in the criminal proceeding." Weatherford
v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n. 4, 97 S. Ct. 837, 843 n. 4, 51 L.Ed.2d 30
(1977). It is noteworthy that the Court took this quotation from the Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae indicating that even the government recognizes
the importance of private communications. The
new rule gives the government the power to eavesdrop on a conversation between a
detained person and his attorney any time the Attorney General finds that there
is "reasonable suspicion" that a person in DOJ custody "may"
use communications with attorneys or their agents "to further or facilitate
acts of terrorism." The Attorney General makes the determination as to what
constitutes "reasonable suspicion" without any provision for judicial
review. The rule purports to provide safeguards such as "notice" that
recording is taking place and the establishment of a "privilege team"
within the Department of Justice that has the responsibility to review
attorney-client communications, then seek judicial approval before giving the
information to the prosecuting attorney (unless the team alleges an imminent
threat of terrorism, in which case judicial review is unnecessary). This
"privilege team" is not an adequate solution to safeguard the
attorney-client relationship. Under the proposed regulation, the determination
of what constitutes "properly privileged materials" is made not by a
neutral and disinterested judge, but unilaterally by the Justice Department
itself. It will therefore be impossible for prisoners and their counsel to know
in advance what portions of their intercepted communications the Justice
Department will ultimately deem to be "properly privileged materials."
This uncertainty renders the privilege meaningless. "[I]f the purpose of
the attorney?client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be
able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions
will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain
but results in widely varying applications ..., is little better than no
privilege at all." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393, 101 S. Ct. at 684. Although
promulgated in the name of preventing terrorism, the DOJ rule goes beyond
intercepting potential "terrorist communications" between a lawyer and
client. The Attorney General can authorize eavesdropping on all of a detainee's
attorney-client communications, even when the detained person has been convicted
of no crime and is merely planning his defense with his attorney, or has been
detained on immigration charges and is not accused of any crime at all. Lastly,
this rule is unnecessary because current law already allows the government to
seek a court order to record attorney client conversations if it has probable
cause to believe that the attorney, with his client, is planning a serious crime
such as terrorism. Like
so many other post-September 11 proposals, this rule is an attempt to vest with
the Department of Justice, instead of the courts, the power to determine when
communications between a lawyer and her client should be stripped of their
privileged status. It is particularly disturbing to note that the standard for
the Attorney General to authorize eavesdropping on conversations between
attorneys and clients, reasonable suspicion, is less stringent than the standard
of proof necessary to obtain an ordinary search warrant or a wiretap warrant,
which is probable cause. Secrecy
"As
we do in each and every law enforcement mission we undertake, we are conducting
this effort with the total commitment to protect the rights and privacy of all
Americans and the constitutional protections we hold dear." Attorney
General Ashcroft, testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, September 24,
2001 Americans
have experienced the loss of privacy and the increase of secrecy take place with
dizzying speed since September 11. Department of Justice regulations and
Executive Orders have covered government operations with a shroud of secrecy. Freedom
of Information Act and Presidential Records Attorney
General John Ashcroft has issued a new statement of policy that encourages
federal agencies to resist Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests whenever
they have legal grounds to do so. The new statement supersedes a 1993 memorandum
from Attorney General Janet Reno, which promoted disclosure of government
information through the FOIA unless it was "reasonably foreseeable that
disclosure would be harmful." The
Ashcroft policy rejects this "foreseeable harm" standard. Instead, the
Justice Department instructs agencies to withhold information whenever there is
a "sound legal basis" for doing so. "When you carefully consider
FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or in part," the
Attorney General advised, "you can be assured that the Department of
Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound legal
basis...." It is noteworthy that Attorney General Ashcroft has committed to
having DOJ defend the suppression of public access -- rather than forcing the
agency to provide its own defense if challenged in court. As
with many of the Bush Administration's new restrictions on public information,
the new policy is only peripherally related to the fight against terrorism.
Rather, it appears to exploit current circumstances to advance a predisposition
toward official secrecy. At the same time that the government is acquiring more
legal authority to obtain private information about people it is also cutting
back on sharing the information that it has obtained, making it more difficult
for individuals to learn what kind of files their government is keeping on them.
Another
example of Administration secrecy is an Executive Order, issued November 1, that
gives President Bush-- as well as former presidents -- the right to veto
requests to open any presidential records. Even if a former president wants his
records to be released, the executive order permits Bush to exercise executive
privilege to prevent their release. The order also gives President Bush, and
former presidents, an indefinite amount of time to ponder any requests. Bush's
executive order openly violates the Presidential Records Act passed by Congress
in 1978. In
defending the executive order, the White House has argued that these new
restrictions balance public access with "national security concerns."
This argument is specious given that national security documents are already
shielded from public scrutiny. The
Presidential Records Act was designed to shift power over presidential records
to the government and ultimately to the citizens. This shifts the power back. Role
of Judiciary "The
Justice Department will never waiver in our defense of the Constitution nor
relent our defense of civil rights." Attorney General Ashcroft, testifying
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, September 25, 2001 Instead
of enlisting the help of the judiciary in the fight against terrorism, the
Department seems intent on writing the judiciary out of the picture altogether.
The President's executive order establishing military tribunals represents the
ultimate form of court-stripping -- literally removing Article III courts from
the picture with no provision for judicial review of the tribunal's actions. The
Attorney General's lawyer-client eavesdropping order likewise writes judges out
of their Constitutional role in deciding wheather there is probable cause to
strip communications of their privileged status. Conclusion The
Justice Department's actions have antecedents stretching back to the earliest
days of the Republic. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, criminal restrictions
on speech during World War I, the internment of Japanese-Americans following the
attack on Pearl Harbor, and the blacklists and domestic spying of the Cold War
are all instances in which the government was granted (or assumed) summary
powers in a moment of crisis, to the inevitable regret of later generations. The
diminution of liberty that accompanied these episodes was later understood as an
overreaction to frightening circumstances; each is now viewed as a shameful
passage in the nation's history. After the immediate danger passed, it was
recognized that the government had possessed ample powers to address the threats
at hand; the new tools were unnecessary at best and dangerous at worst. Despite
Attorney General Ashcroft's promises to uphold the Constitution and protect
civil liberties, his actions belie his rhetoric. Our democracy is in real danger
if any one branch of the government becomes too powerful. From establishing
military tribunals without Congressional approval to expanding wiretapping
authority while limiting judicial oversight, this Administration is
demonstrating its disregard for the other two branches of government. The
precarious balance of powers is becoming dangerously tilted toward an excess of
Executive Branch power. We are heartened that the Senate is taking the lead in reclaiming the Congressional role of overseeing the new police powers and hope this will be an ongoing practice. While all of the country is focused on waging the war against terrorism we ask Congress to make sure that the war on terrorism does not become a war on democracy. We want to know what you think of this article.
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