Bu-lat-lat (boo-lat-lat) verb: to search, probe, investigate, inquire; to unearth facts Issue No. 45 December 23 - 29, 2001 Quezon City, Philippines |
The World Bank released its “Globalization, Growth and Poverty” report in early December 2001. Amidst mounting crisis and protest, the Bank has tried to mobilize data and analysis in support of globalization. But the attempt to hold and consolidate ideological ground only shows how little of it the globalists have to stand on. BY SONNY AFRICA Bulatlat.com
The
meat of the World Bank (WB) report, "Globalization, Growth and
Poverty," is a number-crunching exercise to establish how being "more
globalized" would improve a country's per capita income, life expectancy,
and schooling levels. This
seemingly gives final affirmation of the correctness of the favorite line of
reasoning of pro-globalizers: liberal trade policies lead to increased
trade levels that lead to development (in terms of per capita income,
growth, employment, poverty reduction, etc.). The simplicity of the argument
gives it much power -- if only the reality were that simple. The
results of the number-crunching are indisputable to the extent that they are
mathematical calculations performed on a data set. But serious methodological
limitations mean that the conclusions drawn by the WB far exceed what the data
support. Even
on its own terms the report and its policy conclusions are problematic. Allow
the devil to quote scripture. First, the report itself notes: "It is
difficult to establish a link between openness and growth in a rigorous
manner." (Box 1.1, p. 37) There is also backhanded acknowledgement of the
absence of such a link when the report says, "Whether there is a causal
connection from opening up trade to faster growth is not the issue." (p.
36) In short, even the WB much-revered by globalists is cautious about linking
trade policies/levels to the growth dimension of development. But
the report even goes further when it acknowledges the uncertain causal link
between trade policies and trade levels. In referring to the structure of the
sampling it said: "We label the top third 'more globalized' without in any
sense implying that they adopted pro-trade policies. The rise in trade [levels]
may have been due to other policies or even to pure chance."
(p. 34) Elsewhere it says: "Policy change was not exclusively or
even primarily focused on trade" (p. 35) and "The outcome of increased
integration into the world economy need not be due to changes in trade
policy" (p.36). So
even if we assume that trade levels are good in themselves -- which they're not
-- liberalized trade policies don't even automatically bring that about. In
itself these breaks in the simplistic (but appallingly widespread) pro-globalist
argument should deflate the unwarranted enthusiasm of so many for trade
liberalization. But the methodological limitations of the WB exercise and others
like it go far deeper. Misinterpreting
reality
First,
the WB study measures the degree of "globalization" according to the
increase in the ratio of exports to GDP in the 1977-97 period (i.e. the bigger
the increase, the more globalized). This kind of categorization seriously
obscures countries' widely differing policy approaches and the varying levels of
development they started off with. All
the results establish is a correlation between trade levels, per capita income
growth and schooling (I didn't see any actual data on life expectancy) which
isn't equivalent to a causal link. A causal chain would be established, rather,
by investigating what set of policy measures results in what set of development
outcomes, and then over what period of time. This
more careful consideration of the range of factors involved and how they really
relate with each other is absolutely necessary. However the WB, far from
providing such a nuanced analysis, simplifies a complex argument just to
propagate its ideological line. Take
the examples of China and India. Their current performance is attributed by
globalists to their liberalization policies in the past decade. The reality of
these two countries -- which by the way take up two-thirds of the sample of the
population-weighted "more globalized" countries and so greatly
influence the aggregate results -- is very different from what rabid globalizers
make it out to be. The
increase in China's growth started in the late 1970s, long before any
liberalization: average GDP growth in 1979-1985 was 9.9% (China Statistical
Yearbook). This compares very favorably with the average GDP growth of 9.7% in
1989-1995 (China Statistical Yearbook). Yet, horror of horrors for free
marketers, state procurement of grain increased from 15.7% of domestic grain
production in 1978 to 23.9% in 1988. Planned (quota) steel production was still
30% of total output in 1990, albeit down from 52% in 1981. China
went through decades of Socialist construction since 1949. As a result of this
it had a substantial industrial and agricultural base by the time it started
with trade and investment liberalization, selectively in the late 1980s and more
aggressively in the 1990s. China could not have performed the way it did in
recent years if this domestic economic base had not first been built. Furthermore,
China has only been partly liberalizing and has retained its planning mechanisms
and state direction; plan prices and quotas are still in widespread use. China
has also been growing rapidly even if FDI accounts for barely 10% of domestic
investment. It
is a similar situation with India. Annual real GDP growth picked up
significantly long before the trade reforms of the early 1990s; it averaged 5.9%
in 1980-1990 compared to the 3.7% in 1950-80 (IMF). And yet average tariffs in
the 1980s were actually higher than in the lower-growth 1970s (WB). Growth
picked up further to an annual average of 6.2% in 1990-2000. Domestic
industrial base
Yet
in India electricity is still generated and distributed according to plans and
internal customs barriers apply to goods traveling across state borders. And, as
with China, a domestic industrial base of sorts was also built over time using
protectionist instruments. That these were in many cases used badly counts
against the government implementing them, not the instruments themselves. Insistent
globalists may invoke the counterfactual: that their growth would have been even
faster if they'd "globalized" earlier. But invoked arbitrarily, this
kind of reasoning is akin to questioning data -- little more than a desperate
last stand. An argument would have to be presented that avoids self-serving
circularity. Anyway there's always the counter-counterfactual: growth would have
been even faster if they hadn't globalized at all! The
China and India cases are not presented as absolutes, nor as models to follow
strictly. There are serious developmental limitations to both countries. But the
least their experience shows is that their economic performance can't be
attributed to the unfettered operation of free markets as impelled by fanatical
trade and investment liberalization. Another
example is the Philippines itself. It is increasingly "globalized":
Trade jumped to 101.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1996-2000 from 60.9%
in 1986-90; exports alone leapt to 45.7% of GDP from 29.1%. Foreign investments
increased 166% between the two periods, from US$ 2.58 billion in 1986-90 to US$
6.86 billion in 1996-2000. Yet
development performance has been dismal despite this (indeed, for the Left the
dismal record is precisely because of this). Per capita GDP is as low as it was
in the 1980s even as inequality has been worsening. The trend of high
unemployment rates is nowhere near being reversed and is as high as during the
crisis-ridden 1980s. Who, in truth, has really gained from all this "globalizing?" The
WB report particularly cites nine countries as notable "globalizers."
Of these, China and India however are clearly not of the globalist mold. They
also cited the "well-known reformers"
Philippines, Argentina and Mexico -- but surely the dismal development
record of at least these three countries should make one question the proclaimed
virtues of so-called globalization. Look at where Argentina is now – in
economic chaos and under a state of siege. Confused
about “globalization”
It's
of the utmost importance to define the issue properly. Blinded by ideology,
free-marketeers conflate two distinct questions in asking "Should countries
globalize?"
One
question is: Should countries "globalize," as in adopt policies of
trade and investment liberalization? The
usual answer is, "Yes, as fast and as extensively as possible."
Competitive forces are invoked as a magic bullet of sorts. But that is misguided
and anti-developmental: a certain level of industrial and agricultural
development has to FIRST be achieved. Such levels of development are attained by
a broad and deep range of non-market mechanisms including radical wealth and
asset reforms, protectionism and government support. For
one thing, this conditions what kind of exports there are. There's a world of
difference between US exports by a US manufacturer integrated into the US
economy and "Philippine" exports which really just come from
import-intensive pseudo-manufacturers in export enclaves. Surely
"Made in the Philippines" should mean something far more than
"Made by Intel in an Ecozone enclave in the Philippines?" And yet over
2/3 of world trade is intra-TNC trade (UNCTAD)- if these aren't genuinely
"third world" TNCs, then it's safe to presume that the gains from
trade accrue to first world TNCs. The
WB report obscures this when it says peculiar things like, "Low-income
countries are now competing head-on with high-income countries while previously
they specialized in primary commodities." (p.24) The
other question is: Should countries "globalize," as in increase the
levels of trade and investment? The usual answer is, "Yes, as soon as
possible and at all costs." Again, this is misguided and
anti-developmental. There are certainly gains to be had for a country from
increasing trade (ex. expanded markets, access to production inputs) and
investment (ex. capital augmentation, technology transfer). But
trade and investment should happen on terms beneficial to the country. Yet so
many countries have been like the Philippines whose governments have been
bizarrely fixated on increasing exports and investments immediately and at
whatever cost, without regard for the startling conditions of agricultural and
industrial backwardness. Some notable failures resulting from this are so-called
"export industries" which are so import- and foreign
investment-dependent that they are barely integrated into the domestic economy
-- with correspondingly meagre domestic benefit. The
flip-side of the ever-broader incentives given to foreign investors are ever
more potential benefits lost. After decades of attracting foreign investors,
where's the genuine technology transfer? Where's the domestic industrial base
that creates jobs? Yet how much has been foregone in terms of revenue and
foreign exchange? But the government's orientation is to give ever more generous
incentives -- i.e. to attract investors at all costs. A
dangerous obsession
Consider
how dangerous this obsession is. It is strange for instance that the Philippine
government is so eager to gear the country towards even more
pseudo-manufacturing of IT goods and to bank on IT services considering the
global IT bust. With so many countries doing the same thing -- not least being
China, India, Mexico and Brazil -- all that will happen is a race to the bottom.
Countries will compete for IT investments and business on the basis of ever
cheaper labor and ever greater investment incentives, leaving host countries
with ever less benefits and the likes of Texas Instruments and Microsoft
laughing all the way to the bank. There are some 4 million jobless Filipinos...
how many jobs does the government think IT will really provide? Anyway,
the point about not relying on market mechanisms to develop domestic economies
is borne out by the experience of virtually ALL currently advanced countries, of
the NICs (especially Korea and Taiwan), and even of those bandied about as the
"new globalizers" such as China, India and Vietnam. The
challenge to globalization fanatics is straightforward: to provide a historical
account of a country that has developed its agriculture and industry under a
liberalized trade and investment regime (i.e. with neither a protectionist nor
Socialist approach lurking in the background).
(Bulatlat.com) We want to know what you think of this article.
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