Analysis
Did the Americans Dump Angelo Reyes?

Angelo Reyes was determined to keep his post as defense secretary despite an increasing public clamor for his resignation. But when demoralization in the AFP turned into disillusionment, and disillusionment into a mass defection of paramilitary men and regular soldiers to the armed Left, it was time for the embattled defense chief to be dumped. Did the Americans have a hand in his forced resignation?

By Bobby Tuazon
Bulatlat.com

Angelo Reyes was one defense secretary the U.S. government trusted.

Reyes was a former Armed Forces chief who, under the Estrada administration, commanded an all-out war against both the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and New People’s Army (NPA) guerrillas whose rebelliousness was an obstruction to America’s economic and political interests in the country. In the historic January 2001 People Power II uprising spearheaded by militant groups, he responded to the “distress call” of the U.S. embassy by siding with Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and abandoning Joseph Estrada, the president who had appointed him AFP chief. But, as he would explain later, he marched to the Edsa Shrine – the gravitational center of the people’s uprising – in order to prevent the Left from “taking over the government.”

Photo by Aubrey SC Makilan

Reyes’s takeover as defense secretary under Macapagal-Arroyo was timely, as far as the U.S. Pentagon officials are concerned. George W. Bush, Jr. who had just assumed the U.S. presidency, sought to renew America’s stake in the Philippines at a time when “old Asia hands” in both the state and defense departments were eyeing to solidify American hegemony in the region. When later Bush launched his “war without borders” crusade against terrorism, Reyes was ready to be equal to the task expected of him.

It was the defense secretary’s policy recommendation that Macapagal-Arroyo brought to Washington when she met Bush in November 2001 to discuss military partnership with the U.S. not only in the “war on terror” but also in the local counter-insurgency campaign. Reyes’s recommendation called for asking for large U.S. military and economic aid in exchange for stronger Philippine commitments to support Washington’s military exercises and the installation of “temporary-permanent” military facilities in the country. In the same talks, both sides also agreed to tag the National Democratic Front (NDF) and its leaders as a “terrorist” thus qualifying the latter to be reinstated in the U.S. state department’s “FTOs” (foreign terrorist organizations).

U.S. support was increased this year when, in a meeting between the U.S. and Philippine presidents, Bush upgraded the country’s status as a “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA). It was a gift not only for Macapagal-Arroyo but also for Reyes.

Strongest voice

Satisfied with the Philippine government commitments, Bush lauded Macapagal-Arroyo for being the region’s strongest voice in support of the U.S. global war. But the manner by which the defense commitments were made in secrecy and without consulting Congress was assailed as not only unconstitutional but as a mechanism for extracting U.S. endorsement for Macapagal-Arroyo’s presidential bid in the May 2004 elections.

The Macapagal-Arroyo administration used U.S. support in launching a “strong republic” that is founded on waging the all-out war against the armed struggles of the MILF and NPA and against the civil liberties of the people under the guise of “anti-terrorism” bills a la USA Patriot Act. In all this, Reyes became the key person in not only overseeing the anti-terror campaign that resulted in countless human rights violations but also as the chief liaison between Washington and Manila. The war was practically run under the auspices of the Pentagon: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld formed the Defense Policy Board for US-Philippine defense partnership where both he and Reyes sit as co-chairmen. Reyes was also instrumental in seeing through Washington’s no-peace talks, all-out war policy with the NDF.

So confident was Reyes that he was being proactive in promoting America’s long-term military expectations and in his role as Pentagon’s surrogate defense chief, that reports speculated he was the U.S.’ reserved force as a possible presidential replacement. He tried conducting a low-profile campaign as a presidential contender even if, as political pundits said, his own personality would not even qualify for a mayoralty post.

Corruption charges

But it looked like his astronomical aspirations loomed larger than his own qualifications – and credibility. The all-out war that he spearheaded and his blind adherence to the American security policies were an ineffective shield to charges of corruption, of masterminding bombings and his sheer indifference to soldiers’ grievances. In his own headquarters at Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City, the talk is that Reyes had been acting like a recluse, “micro-managing” the AFP and was invisible to the rank-and-file employees.

When junior officers mounted a mutiny on July 27, Reyes’s ambitions fell like a deck of cards. High-level corruption and inept leadership in the defense-military establishment became charges that were not simply thrown against Reyes – they assumed institutional dimensions that struck at the very core of not only the military bureaucracy but the entire state power as well.

At first, the embattled defense secretary tried to stonewall against what looked like an unstoppable clamor for his resignation and was prepared to sail through the storm of allegations and investigations held no less by three probe bodies. But the situation proved to be too hot for Reyes to handle, considering reports that certain influential groups were preparing documented charges of corruption against him.

The longer he stayed as defense chief however became in its own terms a matter of “national security”: reports from the provinces revealed that paramilitary units including Army regulars have defected to the NPA and that more desertions were being anticipated. The reports of mass defection aggravate the current state of demoralization and disillusionment in the AFP on account of the issues raised by the Oakwood mutineers.

Since the Marcos years, the stability of the presidential office depended so much on the support of the AFP; the civilian bureaucracy was militarized and the military, having amassed power, began to assume the role of a powerbroker. Under Macapagal-Arroyo, Reyes was practically calling the shots particularly on foreign policy, internal security and peace talks. With Reyes embattled and coup jitters wracking the AFP, the presidency became threatened.

These recent developments appear to have become untenable to a government that is expected by the U.S. to put its own house in order so that it can successfully wage its anti-terror and anti-insurgency campaign for which Washington had pledged both economic and military aid. The fractiousness in the AFP spawned by Reyes’s intransigence has been fast developing at a time when U.S. President Bush is preparing to visit the Philippines (in October) where military aid and defense cooperation will top the agenda. The U.S. is known to give or withhold military assistance to its allies in the developing world depending on how useful the recipient country is in promoting America’s economic and geopolitical priorities.

Certainly, the U.S. cannot support its own surrogate army – the AFP - if it is disabling its own capability to fight the local government’s – and America’s – own foes. And certainly, it cannot endorse a president courtesy of a visit in Manila if she cannot rein in the AFP.

Precedents

And there is enough evidence for this. In 1984, Ferdinand Marcos who had become a liability to the U.S. came under Washington pressure to institute “political, economic and military reforms.” The reforms were meant to prepare the ground for Marcos’s replacement by a “third force” who was to be installed as his successor and as a means of undercutting the growing influence of the Left. Aside from the fact that Marcos’s stay in power became actually a boon to the Left, he also tried to play the “Soviet card”: he tried to woo USSR’s support for his continued stay in power by offering base locations for the Soviet navy. It was a mistake for the wily dictator to do and the Americans made sure he is out of power in due time.

The Americans again intervened in the series of coup attempts mounted against President Corazon Aquino during the late 1980s. They backed Aquino - not so much because they believed the woman president represented the “democratic force” against the coup plotters but because these acts of military adventurism were rendering the AFP incapable of waging the “total war” policy against the leftist guerrillas.

In the January 2001 People Power II uprising, the U.S. embassy withdrew its support for the disgraced Estrada and made sure Angelo Reyes, who was then AFP chief, would back the assumption into power of Macapagal-Arroyo. 

The U.S. may have untangled in Reyes a thorn in order to secure its security interests in the Philippines as well as in the region. The next question is, will Macapagal-Arroyo - who has assumed the defense post in a concurrent capacity - or the new defense chief weather the storm that continues to batter the AFP? Will the Reyes resignation bring in the reforms that are being sought to weed out corruption and improve the AFP’s fighting form? Bulatlat.com

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