The
May 10 elections
Unique – But the Same
THE
May 10 elections had certain unique characteristics. Overall, however, they were no different from past Philippine
elections.
BY
LUIS V. TEODORO
POLITICAL ANALYST, CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT AND GOVERNANCE
Posted by Bulatlat.com
Monopoly
of the Elite
From
1947 to 1969 Philippine elections had been the monopoly of the Philippine elite,
whose political parties were basically committed to the same policies of
governance, but which differed from each other only in name and the
personalities that dominated them.
It
has even been argued that these parties do not have platforms, and therefore do
not consciously adopt policies once in power. This is a simplification.
Policies do exist. But, as
if carved in stone, they have basically remained the same.
For
over fifty years those policies have faithfully
followed the demands of international funding agencies and other
instrumentalities of US economic and financial interests through which the
neo-colonial status of the Philippines is perpetuated. Those policies have also
served to keep intact the dominant economic and social relations, such as the
feudal system of land tenancy, despite
tremendous pressures to address the poverty that is their consequence.
Given
those policies’ remaining in force no matter what the regime, Philippine
elections have basically been waged over who will wield power for the sake of
personal and familial interests, rather than over the adoption of alternative
programs of government.
Fraudulent
and violent since Marcos
Because
the economic spoils have been huge-- even gargantuan, as was the case of
Ferdinand Marcos, whose illegally acquired assets run into billions of dollars--
the contention for political power among the elite is often fierce.
From the very first post-“independence” elections in 1947, the
contest for power among the elite has been characterized by violence, fraud and
the corruption of the electorate.
All
Philippine elections that followed were similarly flawed, giving rise to such
descriptions of the process as “the politics of money,” “patronage
politics,” the dominance of “guns, goons and gold,” and more recently,
“traditional (trapo) politics.”
However,
the “reelection” of Ferdinand Marcos to a second term in 1969 was different
in that it marked one of the lowest points of the electoral process, the 1969
exercise being characterized by large-scale vote-buying, systematic fraud
through the corruption of the supposedly independent Commission on Elections,
collusion between the ruling group and other election officials, and wide-spread
violence among warring political dynasties including those allied with Marcos.
The May 10 elections is in the same category of difference in that it was
the worst since 1992.
Marcos
realized that the democratic façade of Philippine elections had become a
hindrance to his remaining in power beyond 1973, given the prohibition on more
than two presidential terms in the 1937 Constitution.
In addition, Marcos also faced increasing resistance to the corruption of
his rule from other elite factions, and even more importantly, from the people
themselves.
Martial
law: response to the growth of authentic democracy
In
1972 Marcos’ intention to remain in power was in danger of being thwarted
primarily by the growth of authentic democracy through the people’s
organizations that were demanding accountability from government as well as the
participation in policy and decision making of the
professionals, workers and peasants, urban poor and indigenous
communities who had been denied a voice in their own governance in the three
decades after “independence.”
The
declaration of martial law in 1972 was, among others, an attempt by the
bureaucrat-capitalist wing of the Philippine ruling elite to monopolize
political power at the expense of other elite sectors. But it was also intended
to quell the demands for the reform and democratization of Philippine society
from its dis-empowered sectors.
As
the leading representative of the bureaucrat-capitalist wing of the elite,
Marcos succeeded in keeping himself in power and in suppressing the demand for
democratization and social revolution only temporarily.
Progressive
strides
As
a result of the martial law experience, conditions in the aftermath of
People Power 1 in 1986 made it possible for progressives to participate
in the making of the 1987 Constitution. Because
of their efforts, that Constitution included attempts not only to create a
multi-party system, but also to prevent the return of authoritarian rule, among
other progressive and nationalist provisions.
The
ban on the President’s seeking a second term and his or her being limited to
one six-year term was obviously meant to prevent the president’s use of
government resources in campaigning for another term while providing him or her
enough time to implement his or her program of government. But it also serves
another purpose: that of preventing a president’s entrenching himself in power
long enough for him or her to remain in power permanently.
On
the other hand, a multi-party system rather than the so-called “two party
system” was thought to be an antidote to elite monopoly over political power.
Towards
this same end, and to encourage the development of program-based political
parties, the Constitution also mandated the party-list system of representation,
in which the parties of such under-represented sectors as labor, the peasantry,
women, the urban poor, indigenous communities, professionals, etc.—the sectors
that actually comprise the majority of the population--
rather than individuals
running by district would compete for 51 seats in the House of Representatives.
Despite
these efforts to encourage democratic representation and efficient governance,
however, the very first elections held under the auspices of the new
Constitution, those of 1987, were characterized by the return of
traditional politics and of many of its expert practitioners from the
traditional power elite.
This
was inevitable under the circumstances. The
so-called “EDSA revolution” was a “revolution” limited to the ouster of
Marcos and his cohorts, its leading lights having seen to it that it did not
develop into an authentic revolution, and that it remained focused on restoring
the power and privileges of the sectors of the elite Marcos had expelled from
the political system.
The
EDSA “revolution” thus lacked the social base that would have permitted the
vast majority to take power, since the social relations dominant in Philippine
society—such as the tenancy system, for example—were untouched due to the
failure of the Aquino presidency to
abolish it, despite the urging of
even US counter-insurgency experts who saw tenancy as the seed-bed of revolution
in the Philippines.
The
return to traditional elite politics
In
the elections that followed the Aquino transitional presidency as in those held
before the martial law period, the result was the widespread use of money and
influence, and even terrorism, by the political families including Marcos’
associates and kin.
During
the Ramos presidency these families gained added strength, to the extent of
permitting the return to the country of the Marcoses themselves. This led to the
election of Marcos’ heirs to Congress and to other positions including
governorships, even as his former associates, among them Eduardo Danding
Cojuangco, regained their economic power and political influence through
political parties supposedly established, ironically enough, in furtherance of
the multi-party system sanctioned by the 1987 Constitution. Joseph Estrada was
the front man of these Marcos heirs.
As
may be gleaned from this quick summary, the post-EDSA period was far from a
period of change, but was basically a period of restoration: of elections as a
means of choosing leaders, yes, but primarily of traditional, elite-based and
elite-monopolized politics through parties that offered no platforms of
governance and which were basically ad hoc groups built around dominant
personalities.
The
implementation of the party list system after 1996 did mean the eventual
election to Congress of program-based parties, but even that process invites
qualified exceptions, among them the fact that even the traditional parties and
sectors (for example, business and religious groups) that cannot be
characterized as under-represented have managed, together with
pseudo-progressive groups, to send their representatives to Congress.
May
10 Elections: complete restoration of neo-colonial politics
This
is the context in which the May 10 elections occurred. Despite near-universal
hopes for change and efforts by progressives to make it possible through their
participation in the parliamentary struggle to further political reform, May 10
could mark the completion of the process of restoration—which had accelerated
beginning 1992-- of the very same politics that had ruled it since the end of
the country’s status as a formal colony and the beginning of its neo-colonial
captivity in 1946.
The
paradox is that the most obvious difference May 10 had from past elections since
1992 in the end made it no different from elections since 1947, and in many ways
made it even worse. One way of
accounting for this is to realize that built into the political system is its
capacity to protect and perpetuate itself no matter what the circumstances, and
despite the best intentions of the progressive framers of the 1987 Constitution.
The
difference in the May 10 elections was first of all the existence of a situation
that very Constitution itself had sought to prevent: an incumbent president’s
running for office, and his or her inevitable use of government resources.
The consequence of this factor among other factors was the triumph of
money, of alliances of convenience, the use of public funds for private ends,
and over-all, the decline of the political system to its lowest point since
1972.
The
trapos call Philippine elections an exercise in democracy. But May 10 has
once more shown that they are no more than contentions among the a handful of
families of the traditional elite, the poor being so out of it except as
window-dressing.
The
practice of elite politics demands, in the first place, huge war chests running
into the billions on the part of those running for national office, and millions
even to run for councilor. Estimates that a “credible” national campaign for
president can be waged only with P3 to 10 billion in campaign funds are not
exaggerated. The result is the
exclusion of even millionaires, and certainly of the poor, from any opportunity
to run for office.
In
almost cynical recognition of the exclusionary rather than democratic character
of Philippine elections, a
candidate’s finances are the first thing the Commission on Elections looks
into to determine his or her capacity to wage a “credible” campaign.
The
second is “machinery”—a word that among others means one’s possession of
a “party” or “coalition,” a network of campaigners,
poll watchers on election day, etc.-- all of these being dependent on the
capacity of the candidate to spend billions.
In
Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo’s case, campaign funds and “machinery” also meant
whatever public funds she could get her hands on to further her campaign,
whether from PAGCOR or the Department of Agriculture, as well as the entire
government bureaucracy of over one million, from department secretaries down to
barangay chairs.
In
the provinces and even in certain parts of metro Manila, “machinery”
includes the retinue of thugs in one’s employ who can dispense both
largesse as well as threats, blows and bullets. When a candidate is said to have
“a machinery” what he or she may have could include—it usually does—the
means with which to buy or coerce the electorate, whose sole function in this
“democracy” is to renew every so often their rulers’ “democratic
mandate.”
The
May 10 elections not only demonstrated how true this still is, but went even
further, as may be seen in the unprecedented number of election-related deaths.
But
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s strategy was not limited to the use of billions of
pesos from various sources including the government.
It also included putting together alliances of convenience held together
only by the prospect of personal advantage.
Thus
did Arroyo include in her so-called “coalition” even the likes of John
Osmena and Miriam Defensor Santiago, on no other basis than her anticipation of
the votes these former “political enemies” of hers could bring to her
campaign.
At
various levels, the Arroyo campaign crisscrossed and virtually erased
party-lines, as groupings such as the Nationalist People’s Coalition hedged
their bets and spread their support among the major contending groups including
Arroyo’s-- in yet another demonstration of the essentially opportunist
character of the so-called “parties.”
Destruction
of the multi-party system
The
Arroyo strategy in fact proved once again that there are no political parties
among the elite in the Philippines, only groups held together by dominant
personalities. That strategy thus
completed the destruction of the so-called multi-party system, as she cobbled
together alliances based solely on the prospect of mutual advantage.
If Arroyo wins it will be on the ruins of that system.
It
is the absence of authentic
political parties—meaning groups contending for political power on the basis
of visions of an alternative future, platforms, and programs of
government—that has reduced Philippine elections to popularity contests in
which the most alluring in terms of looks, singing and dancing ability and
capacity to entertain the crowds wins.
This
has made inevitable the involvement and even candidacies in what should be a
serious matter of comedians, actors, singers and other personalities the mass
media have popularized. Indeed,
despite Arroyo’s disparaging remarks about actor Fernando Poe, Jr., she
herself made free use of celebrity endorsements as a necessary element in her
own campaign.
The
likely victory of Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo would be no more than another
triumph for traditional, elite politics. But it could also mean the end
of at least one consequence of that politics’ civic bankruptcy: the myth that
anyone made popular by the movies can be president, which in the present context
would represent an inch of progress.
As
things are now turning out, not even Fernando Poe Jr.’s kingship in Philippine
movies won’t make him president. For
that his supporters can blame Arroyo for having so expertly risen from third and
even fourth in the surveys to first by utilizing every conceivable means at her
disposal, including the release of political prisoners and finally getting the
government’s peace talks with the National Democratic Front somewhere, while
steadfastly supporting the United States in Iraq and elsewhere.
Into
the Arroyo witches’ brew of wild spending, alliances of convenience, and
celebrity endorsement, that by
themselves eroded Poe’s earlier lead over Arroyo, add the
disenfranchisement of millions of voters, the
possibility of wide-spread fraud, and
the partisanship of the police, the military and the Commission on Elections.
The result: an Arroyo “victory” through virtually the same overkill tactics
Ferdinand Marcos used to win a second term in 1969.
Arroyo
did not achieve this alone. In
further testimony to the bankruptcy of elite politics, the so-called opposition
failed to put up candidates no better than Poe and Panfilo Lacson.
Fernando Poe Jr.’s camp so believed in the myth of the dumb voter they
thought their candidate didn’t even have to campaign and would win points by
being, if not dumb, at least silent. Steadfast
in that belief, they were so confident in Poe’s winnability because of his
popularity as a movie star they wrote off a Poe-Lacson unity so early that that
effort was doomed from the start.
On
the other hand, Lacson suffered from a myth of a different sort, the myth that
says that the support of the Chinese Filipino community is enough, and that if
there’s anything the electorate loves, it’s blood, vengeance and human
rights shortcuts.
In
one more suggestion that Philippine elections are inevitably about
self-interest, however, the possibility has arisen that Lacson may have
persisted in running-- despite predictions that the division of the mainstream
opposition would result in an
Arroyo victory --because he has managed to wrest from Arroyo a promise to stop
any further government attempts to resurrect the Kurtatong Baleleng case.
Against
elite politics
In
the dreary landscape the elite politicians have sketched there is only one
bright spot, and that is the possible victory of a handful of reform candidates
at the local and provincial levels, and of some of the progressive party-list
groups. The partisanship of the police and the military in favor of
the dynasties and elite groups was evident in this area, for the first
time since the party-list system was put in place.
The
killing of the members of progressive party-list groups showed the capacity of
the dominant system to protect itself via its instruments of coercion is intact
and a barrier to any effort at reform.
The
progressive party-list groups’ offense against elite politics was fundamental
in that, as mandated by the Party List Act (Republic Act 7941)
they presented programs and platforms to the electorate rather than
personalities.
What’s
more, they also demonstrated, as per their
record in the past Philippine Congress, a capacity not only to check and hold
the administration accountable for its policies and actions on the basis of
principle, but to actually fill the gaps in the social services available to
their constituencies through their construction of health centers and school
rooms.
This
bright spot was dimmed by the killings, intimidation, harassment and threats
that before, during and after the elections the party-list groups had to absorb.
In
general and overwhelmingly, therefore, starting with the victory of Arroyo
through the usual, well- worn paths of patronage, opportunism, the use of public
funds and government facilities, and the partisanship of government agencies,
the May 10 elections were unique-- but only in the possibility that they may
have finally restored Philippine politics to what they were before 1972.
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