This story
was taken from Bulatlat, the Philippines's alternative weekly
newsmagazine (www.bulatlat.com, www.bulatlat.net, www.bulatlat.org).
Vol. V, No. 38, October 30-November 5,, 2005
Half the World Hit by
US Unilateral Sanctions
by
Someshwar Singh Geneva, 21 Dec 99 -- More
than half of the world's population in 75 countries is subject to unilateral
coercive economic measures or 'sanctions' by one country alone - the United
States of America - according to a recent report by the United Nations.
The report, "Unilateral
economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against
developing countries" (A/54/486), was considered by the UN General Assembly as
part of the macroeconomic policy questions related to trade and development. The
issue is to receive greater focus by the United Nations in the coming years,
particularly by its human rights arm. It is in response to
General Assembly resolution 52/181 of 18 December 1997, that the report was
prepared. In that resolution, the Assembly, inter alia, expressed grave concern
that the use of unilateral coercive economic measures, particularly, adversely
affected the economy and development efforts of developing countries and had a
general negative impact on international economic cooperation and on worldwide
efforts to move towards a non-discriminatory and open multilateral trading
system. In the same resolution, the
General Assembly urged the international community to adopt urgent and effective
measures to eliminate the use of unilateral coercive economic measures against
developing countries that were not authorized by relevant organs of the United
Nations or were inconsistent with the principles of international law as set
forth in the Charter of the United Nations, and that contravened the basic
principles of the multilateral trading system. The Assembly reaffirmed
that no State might use or encourage the use of unilateral economic, political
or any other type of measure to coerce another State in order to obtain from it
the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights. In addition to replies
received from 13 States on the subject (including from the United States), the
report also contains a gist of the views of internationally renowned think-tanks
on the subject. An ad hoc expert group meeting was convened by the Department of
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. The members of the expert
group participating in their personal capacities were: Claude Bruderlein
(Switzerland); David Cortright (United States); Margaret P. Doxey (Canada/United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); Kimberly Ann Elliott (United
States); Helga Hoffmann (Brazil); Randhir B. Jain (India); Hasan-Askari Rizvi
(Pakistan); Nicolaas J. Schrijver (Netherlands); and Geedreck Uswatte-Aratchi
(Sri Lanka). The group had before it
five working papers presented to the meeting: "Coercive economic measures: the
risks and costs of unilateralism" by Margaret P. Doxey; "The use of coercive
economic measures: an international law perspective" by Nicolaas J. Schrijver;
"Making sanctions smarter? The effects of financial sanctions" by Kimberly Ann
Elliott; "Targeting financial sanctions: a review of the Interlaken process" by
Claude Bruderlein; and "Bombs, carrots, and sticks: the role of economic
sanctions and incentives in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction" by David Cortright The expert group noted the
low level of effectiveness of unilateral coercive economic measures which are
often counter-productive in bringing about the desired policy changes, may
entail unwelcome political risks and excessive economic costs, give rise to
serious humanitarian and ethical concerns, run counter to development goals and
limit the scope for diplomacy, positive economic measures and international
cooperation in general. In particular, the group
expressed its deep concern about the potential and actual adverse effects of
unilateral coercive economic measures on developing countries and the structure
of international relations, especially in the area of trade and development.
Therefore, the group
concluded that, in a general sense, the use of unilateral economic measures as a
means of political and economic coercion, especially the practice of secondary
boycotts against third-party States, should be strongly discouraged. The group agreed that the
unilateral imposition of coercive economic measures is inconsistent with core
principles and norms of international economic law, such as (a) freedom of
international trade, investment and navigation; (b) non-discrimination,
including the so-called most-favoured nation (MFN) clause and the concept of
national or equal treatment; and (c) sovereignty over natural resources and the
right to regulate foreign investment and economic activities. It was duly noted that
those principles are subject to a number of restrictions, exceptions and
waivers, some of which may be invoked in a self-governing fashion, primarily for
the protection of national essential security interest. Nevertheless, the group
felt that unilateral measures of coercion are increasingly at odds with the
evolving principles and rules of international economic and social cooperation
that are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and the constituent
treaties of multilateral trade and financial institutions, such as the World
Trade Organization, and that seek to provide, inter alia, mechanisms and
procedures for collective policy review and dispute settlement. In particular, the group
expressed its deep concern about the extraterritorial jurisdiction and
third-party effects of certain unilateral measures of economic and political
coercion against developing countries (namely, the 1996 United States
legislation on sanctions against Cuba, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) and shared the view that such measures were
irreconcilable with basic norms and principles of international law and
inconsistent with the objectives of the multilateral trading system. To minimizing the adverse
effects of coercive economic measures on the general population, particularly
its most vulnerable groups, the expert group reviewed the current unilateral and
multilateral approaches. These options include: (a)
sparing use of unilateral coercive economic measures; (b) choosing non-coercive
measures of a symbolic or persuasive nature (for example, a wide range of
diplomatic, political and cultural measures can serve to convey a message of
disapproval rather than attempt to force a change in policy by disrupting the
economy); (c) mandatory humanitarian exemptions from trade embargoes or
comprehensive sanctions regimes with regard to export of food, medicine and
other essential humanitarian goods; (d) employment of smart or targeted
sanctions which are designed to penalize directly those individuals or policy
makers who are responsible for an objectionable action; and (e) combining
sanctions with incentives or inducements for cooperation and compliance.
The group observed that
among various improvements and alternatives, the concept of smart sanctions has
recently attracted the widest attention, at both the national and international
levels. The rationale behind this approach is twofold: (a) to target the
effects, as much as possible, on the political, military or economic elites
responsible for objectionable policies or criminal individuals, thus enhancing
the effectiveness of sanctions; and (b) to spare the innocent victims who have
no control over policy or power to change it, thus making sanctions less blunt.
Smart sanctions include
targeted financial measures, particularly asset freezes, visa-based restrictions
on international travel, and participation bans. Under the heading of smart
sanctions, reference is also made to selective trade sanctions that may involve
restrictions on those particular products or services (for example, weaponry and
luxury items) that are more likely to affect the targeted elites or criminal
entities rather than the general population. Particular attention was
paid to the issue of targeting financial sanctions and their effects. There is
evidence to suggest that financial sanctions may be relatively more effective
than trade embargoes., the experts contend. In the most comprehensive
empirical analysis of economic sanctions to date, financial sanctions were found
relatively more likely to contribute to the achievement of foreign policy goals
than either financial sanctions imposed in conjunction with trade controls or
trade sanctions employed alone. In general, financial
sanctions are perceived as measures of greater effectiveness because they are
relatively easier to enforce by senders, harder to evade by targets and often
spur market-reinforcing effects. However, unilateral financial sanctions will be
less effective than similar multilateral measures. Targeting financial stocks
(for example, overseas government-owned or private assets) is relatively easier
than focusing on financial flows, especially those from private sources. In
principle, money is fungible and the problem with targeting financial flows is
that the more targeted the sanctions are, the easier they will be to evade.
The expert group reviewed
the potential effects of various types of financial sanctions on the target
country from the perspective of their targetability (that is to say, making them
not only more effective, but also less blunt). It was concluded that narrowly
targeted financial sanctions, such as freezing the overseas assets of
individuals from the target country, would have the fewest and lowest collateral
impacts on the general population, but are often difficult to implement and may
be relatively easy to evade, especially with political constraints impeding the
ability of the sender Government to act quickly. Moreover, the effects of
such measures may be limited or diminish over time if the targeted individuals
can successfully hide their assets or have unrestrained access to economic
resources within their country or new financial flows from abroad. Nevertheless,
financial sanctions narrowly targeted against individuals have been used
unilaterally to address, inter alia, such issues as drug trafficking and
terrorism. On the other hand, broad
restrictions on international lending and foreign investment can cause
significant economic disruption and social hardship in the target country and
are therefore not necessarily more humane than trade embargoes. The impact on
the target will be harder to evade and will be reinforced by market perceptions
and mechanisms. However, targeting these measures more precisely is also likely
to make them easier to evade. The ability to evade targeted financial sanctions
tends to increase with income in the target country and the degree of
sophistication of its financial markets. Outside comprehensive sanctions
regimes, restrictions on private financial flows have been relatively rare.
Although broad financial sanctions may have potentially high costs to creditor
countries, they are likely to entail lower enforcement burdens than broad trade
embargoes. The most commonly used
financial sanctions affect government programmes or official flows, including
economic and military assistance, trade credits and political risk insurance.
From the sender's perspective, this type of financial sanction is relatively
low-cost and difficult to evade. Although the utility of this tool decreases as
aid flows decline, the denial of aid from traditional donors may produce rather
harmful effects on low-income and least developed countries which have little
access to private financial markets. For humanitarian reasons, it is essential
that food aid and concessional multilateral lending be consistently exempted.
However, restrictions on economic aid, other than humanitarian assistance, may
have limited effects on the population of target countries with corrupt
Governments. The expert group welcomed
the Interlaken process on the targeting of multilateral financial sanctions,
sponsored by the Swiss Government, with a view to improving the effectiveness of
such measures as well as minimizing the negative humanitarian impact often
experienced by large segments of civilian population as a result of
comprehensive sanctions regimes. Based on a growing sense of
individual responsibility and accountability for internationally wrongful or
criminal acts, the main objective of the Interlaken process has been to
elaborate on the specific requirements of targeted financial measures as a tool
for exerting pressure directly on the target country's decision makers and
supporters by localizing and freezing their wealth (that is to say, financial
assets and transactions) on the world financial markets. Although serious technical,
legal and administrative difficulties remain in this area, important progress
has been made on formulating draft policies that would control the movement of
assets and link national and international institutions in enforcing such
controls. Most importantly, the Interlaken process has established a foundation
for an informal cooperation mechanism, with the participation of Governments,
the financial sector and academic think-tanks and experts, to facilitate the
implementation of targeted financial sanctions, the report notes. The Commission on Human
Rights, in its resolution 1999/21 of 23 April 1999 on human rights and
unilateral coercive measures (see E/1999/23 (Part I), chap. II, sect. A), urged
all States to refrain from adopting or implementing unilateral measures not in
accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in
particular those of a coercive nature with extraterritorial effects, which
created obstacles to trade relations among States, thus impeding the full
realization of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and other international human rights instruments, in particular the right of
individuals and peoples to development. The Commission also
rejected the application of such measures as tools for political or economic
pressure against any country, particularly against developing countries, because
of their negative effects on the realization of all human rights of vast sectors
of their populations, inter alia, children, women, the elderly, and disabled and
ill people; reaffirmed, in that context, the right of all peoples to
self-determination, by virtue of which they freely determined their political
status and freely pursued their economic, social and cultural development; and
also reaffirmed that essential goods such as food and medicines should not be
used as tools for political coercion, and that under no circumstances should
people be deprived of their own means of subsistence and development.
In the opinion of the
United States, "there needs to be a foreign policy tool for situations in the
middle, when diplomacy has been inadequate, but force is not yet appropriate.
This is the place of sanctions, including economic sanctions. It is important
that the international community keep this potentially valuable tool at its
disposal. If sanctions are unavailable for whatever reason, nations may feel
they have no choice but to give in to intolerable threats, or proceed to force.
Therefore, all States should recognize that, in principle, sanctions are
legitimate." The United States agrees
that multilateral sanctions are preferable. "Nevertheless, there will come times
when a nation must be prepared to act unilaterally if important national
interests or core values are at issue and if attempts to build multilateral
sanctions have been unsuccessful. Consequently, the United States reserves the
right to use sanctions unilaterally when necessary. There will continue to be
times when global responsibility will require effective sanctions. For that
reason, all States should concur that such measures are legitimate." In the opinion of Cuba, to
agree that a country, however powerful, may use force in order to compel one or
more other countries, by means of economic measures, to do its bidding will lead
to chaos in international relations and will detract from the World Trade
Organization as a global trade regulatory agency and as a framework for
resolving trade disputes through established multilateral procedures.
Cuba pointed out that
unilateralism by the United States was not directed against Cuba alone. "During
the past 80 years, such sanctions have been imposed on various countries on 120
occasions, 104 of them since the Second World War. According to information
provided by the President of the United States' own closest advisers, such
unilateral measures were used against 75 countries accounting for 52% of the
world's population during 1998." Interestingly, the member
States of European Union abstained in the vote on General Assembly resolution
52/181. But, it is the view of EU that economic measures must be in keeping with
the principles of international law, as laid down in the Charter of the United
Nations, and with the broadest interpretation of the principles of the
multilateral trading system set up by the World Trade Organization. "Unilateral coercive
economic measures that violate international law must not be taken against any
member of the international community notwithstanding the level of development,"
in the EU's view. "In addition, EU makes a distinction between measures imposed
unilaterally by individual States and those that are undertaken with full
authority of the Security Council and in conformity with the Charter of the
United Nations." (SUNS4578) The above article first
appeared in the South-North Development Monitor (SUNS) of which Chakravarthi
Raghavan is the Chief Editor. [c] 1999, SUNS - All rights
reserved. May not be reproduced, reprinted or posted to any system or service
without specific permission from SUNS. This limitation includes incorporation
into a database, distribution via Usenet News, bulletin board systems, mailing
lists, print media or broadcast. For information about reproduction or
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suns@igc.org > © 2005 Bulatlat
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South-North Development Monitor -
Third World Network
Dec. 1999