Revisiting the 1996 Peace Pact
Hopes are high that a
proposal to review the implementation of the 1996 peace accord between the
Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) could
result in the attainment of peace in Mindanao.
But with more losses than gains from the peace pact for the past decade,
and with the government’s mishandling of the peace situation in Mindanao,
just and lasting peace in Mindanao may still be as elusive as before.
BY JHONG DELA CRUZ
Bulatlat
In their joint
communiqué, the government and the 57-nation Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) urged to review the peace agreement with the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) following a three-day fact finding
mission in Mindanao from May 18 to
21.
The OIC mission urged
the parties to conduct a review of the implementation and status of the
peace agreement and facilitate its full execution.
The government and
OIC recommended the holding of a high level tripartite meeting in Jeddah
in July; mounting anew efforts to bring the peace in Mindanao with the
support of the OIC and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB); resolve the
case against MILF Chairman Nur Misuari; sustain the “breakthrough” peace
and unity in Sulu and in Mindanao; convergence of the gains of GRP-MNLF
peace agreement and GRP-MILF cooperation; and that the Philippines to
continue seeking an observer status in the OIC.
Teresita “Ging”
Deles, former presidential adviser on the peace process, said that the
move was long overdue. She also cited the government’s peace accord with
the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) which needs “closure” before
it reaches its 20th year by September.
Hit or miss
Deles said that
concerned agencies like the Office of President Adviser on the Peace
Process (OPAPP) relied on a “hit or miss” approach to address economic
concerns of those beneficiaries, mainly combatants and their commanders,
because the peace agreement did not provide a detailed implementation of
socio-economic development programs and projects.
Economic development
was under Phase I of the agreement, where a Special Zone of Peace and
Development (SZOPAD) shall be put in place to cover 15 provinces, namely
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North
Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur,
Davao del Sur, South Cotabato. Sarangani, Palawan,
including nine cities of Cotabato.
The agreement
projected that by 1998, the areas shall have been the focus of development
efforts by pouring in public and private investments to entice economic
activities and thereby uplift the conditions of the people.
The economic zone
shall be under the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD).
Deles noted, however, that with vague territorial delineation, the
agreement only prospered in areas where the MNLF is strong, particularly
in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and some parts of Lanao.
MNLF would claim
later on that parties were, “lost in the euphoria of the new found peace,
nobody noticed that in implementing Executive Order No. 371 signed in
October 1996 the stipulated control and/or regulatory powers of the SPCPD
was not provided.”
The government was
set to immediately hold peace talks with MILF, without due participation
of the SPCPD, which proved detrimental to peace and development efforts in
SZOPAD. MNLF perceived the government’s “divide and rule” tactic that came
into play in the succeeding talks with MILF.
On the other hand,
Deles said that what needs to be revisited is a more detailed
socio-economic plan mainly on livelihood and education. Women for
instance, were excluded from holding funds because they do not belong to
the state command or to the combatant groups. “The combatant group, in its
structure, might not be the best way to deliver socio-economic benefits,”
Deles stressed.
Dysfunctional
Findings by the OIC-led
mission in May showed that the 1996 peace agreement has become
“dysfunctional, leading to increased tension in the region and to the
outbreak of fighting in various areas particularly in Sulu.”
The OIC further noted
that the tension was incensed by the arrest and detention of MNLF Chairman
Nur Misuari beginning 2001 at Camp Sta. Rosa in Laguna. Misuari became
governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) until 2000 and
was taken into custody by the government on rebellion charges amid
allegations that he led the hostile attacks to disrupt the ARMM elections
in 2001.
According to the MNLF,
the deteriorating peace and order condition in the area, the all-out war
policy against the MILF rebels during the Estrada regime and unabated
terrorist activities of elements such as the Abu Sayyaf Group rendered the
SPCPD “irrelevant.”
Phase one also
involved setting up joint regional security machinery, through the
integration of 5,750 MNLF members into the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the joining of the MNLF elements with the Philippine National
Police (PNP).
Opportunity
Events leading to
OIC’s pitch for a July closure of the 1996 peace pact could not go wrong,
says Prof. Julkipli Wadi of the University of the Philippines in Quezon
City. “We can draw two assumptions [from this development], it is
conspiratorial on one hand and rational on the other.”
He said Arroyo’s most
recent Saudi state visit, “practically changed her perception of the
influential OIC member nation.” The PNP’s relaxation of Misuari’s
detention also indicated the closure prospect, he said.
However, Wadi warned
the “closure” of the 1996 peace pact, and the signing for a “comprehensive
compact” between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),
may hit a snag after MILF expressed alarm over the initiative’s bid to
“converge” some gains between the two separate peace accords.
Not likely
Early on, the
government is bullish it can firm up ties with MILF within the year, upon
the closure discussion on the implementation of the 1996 peace pact in
July.
Mohagher Iqbal, chief
of MILF’s peace panel, estimated about 85 percent of the parties’ agenda
have been finished, with only two major issues left concerning ancestral
domain and securing political settlement after the signing of the peace
agreement.
“It is quite remote
at this time,” he told Bulatlat, noting that the MILF is taking
careful steps after three accords signed by MNLF and the government – the
1976 Tripoli Agreement, the 1986 Jeddah Accord and the 1996 final peace
agreement – brought no “substantial gains” for the Bangsamoro.
The peace panels of
the MILF and the government have recently finished the 12th
round of their exploratory talks last May in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia,
talking about the ancestral domain agenda involving the determination and
delimitation of areas to be placed under a prospective Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE).
Leadership factor
“The question now is
whether the government is capable of leading the two peace talks,” Wadi
said. Arroyo’s mishandling of the peace agreement lies in her dependence
on the government’s security advisers on the Mindanao situation, which has
weakened the administration’s capacity to lead the two peace talks, he
said.
The government’s
stake is the most suspicious of all in undertaking both peace deals, said
Wadi noting that the Arroyo’s administration has been exhausted by the
long-standing ouster campaign and its Charter Change prospect to escape
upcoming impeachment proceedings.
Deles said in a
revised Constitution, hitches may impact the full implementation of the
agreements, since new setting parameters will bound the accords. “There
are many things that are happening outside the table…it’s impossible that
the peace talks could be insulated from all these,” she said.
“The spate of
killings, the ascendancy of militarist thinking, naming enemies of the
state as fair game to be killed, even if these are outside MILF concerns,
will affect the peace process. You cannot have flourishing peace talks on
one side and killings on the other.”
“A peace process does
not stop when it has been signed, if it will take another ten and twenty
years to implement, a deeper level of frustration across the Bangsamoro
people will make it very hard to sustain any gains from the agreements,”
she said.
Failures of the past
agreements have shed a different light for MILF leaders, said Iqbal who
related them to “bad omen” for the rest of the Bangsamoro.
“At this point, it is
very difficult to answer whether genuine peace now can be achieved, it’s
been 30 years since the 1976 Tripoli agreement, the mother of all
agreements, but no significant change has happened,” he said. Bulatlat
BACK TO
TOP ■
PRINTER-FRIENDLY VERSION ■
COMMENT
© 2006 Bulatlat
■
Alipato Publications
Permission is granted to reprint or redistribute this article, provided
its author/s and Bulatlat are properly credited and notified.