U.S. and Latin America: Overview for 2006,
Perspectives for 2007
The New Year does not
promise 'more of the same': it will start with a major US military
escalation in the Middle East but it will likely end with a greater
military debacle, ensuring deepening political crises and increased
economic instability both in the Middle East, the US and Latin America.
By James Petras
Posted by Bulatlat
Introduction: Escalation of Warfare
To understand
US-Latin American relations this year and its likely trajectory in 2007 it
is obligatory to consider three dimensions: 1) the global context of US-LA
relations; 2) internal dynamics of the US and 3) the real practical
political-economic consequences of the 2006 elections in Latin America.
US imperial policy
continues to pursue military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, to give
unconditional support to Israel's war against the elected Palestinian
Government and to threaten a direct or Israeli attack on Iran. In other
words, the prolonged, costly and inconclusive wars in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Lebanon and Palestine during 2006 will continue in 2007. Further military
escalation, includes increased US troops and spending for wars in the
Middle East; an extra $800 million USD in addition to the annual $3
billion USD for Israeli war plans against Lebanon, Palestine and
especially Iran. Those commentators who interpreted US policy via public
opinion polls, electoral processes (the victory of the Democrats),
advisory reports (Baker's Iraq Study Group) and casualty rates in Iraq,
and predicted a 'gradual' withdrawal, failed to understand the logic of
the White House's political strategy. For the Bush regime, the military
failures are a result of the application of insufficient power: what is
necessary, they argue, is greater numbers of soldiers and bigger military
budgets (BBC 12/16/06).
Polarization
Both in the United
States, Latin America and in the world at large, profound and deepening
divisions are driving policy and provoking increasing conflicts. The
lines of division in the United States on the fundamental questions of
confrontation or negotiation in the Middle East and Latin America cut
across the two major parties, and the liberal-conservative spectrum. On
the one side the White House, backed by pro-war Democrats, Republicans,
the Presidents of the Major Jewish Organizations, right-wing veteran
groups and neo-conservative intellectuals and the majority of the
corporate mass media. On the other side, minorities in the major parties
and mass media, the majority of public opinion, sectors of the active and
retired military officers, establishment intellectual and prominent
political critics of the Zionist lobby and war policies like Brzezinski,
James Carter, James Baker among others.
Similar divisions
appear with regard to Latin American policy. The White House, backed by
the Cuban (exile) lobby, the Pentagon and a minority of right-wing
ideologues and business groups favor forceful pressure and intervention
against Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia and support of illegitimate President
Calderon, the Santa Cruz separatists in Bolivia and other authoritarian
extremists in the region. In varying degrees of opposition, stand liberal
and conservative congress-members backed by agro-business exporters,
tourists agencies, a majority of public opinion and sectors of the State
Department headed by Undersecretary for Latin American Affairs, Shannon,
who support greater emphasis on diplomacy, negotiations and a 'two-track'
approach.
Within Latin America
similar profound divisions emerged in 2006 which will deepen in 2007. In
Mexico, the minority Calderon regime faces major opposition from the AMLO
coalition, Oaxaca popular assemblies, the trade unions and social
movements. As he proceeds to deepen the liberalization of the economy and
he militarizes the country to implement his program, the polarization will
deepen.
In Bolivia, rightwing
business and agro-business elites regrouped, taking advantage of Morales
conciliatory policies and incapacity to carry-out any major redistributive
policies (in land and income) – and have consolidated a power base in
Santa Cruz, which has forced Morales to retreat further in his reforms and
aroused mass popular discontent. Similar divisions have appeared in
Ecuador, between the peasants/Indians of the Andean region and the land
barons and bankers of the Coast. In Colombia the divisions between the
paramilitary forces allied to President Uribe and the popular civil
society organizations (and the guerrilla) have deepened (Boston Globe
December 14, 2006). In Venezuela the polarization between the Socialist
and social-liberal Chavistas(and their allies among the 'moderate'
opposition) will surface in 2007 as Chavez implements party and cabinet
changes in pursuit of a socialist agenda.
These internal
divisions in the US and Latin America are played out in an international
context which radicalizes the class and national confrontations.
International Context
Two world-historic
processes affect US policy toward Latin America: 1) the prolonged Middle
East wars and 2) the dynamic growth of the four Asian powers led by
China. The Middle Eastern/South Asian wars have severely overextended US
military forces, undermined domestic support for new wars and severely
strained the budget. These outcomes have weakened the US military
capacity for intervention in Latin America in support of a military coup,
or, even less, a direct military invasion. As a result the US
increasingly relies on domestic (Latin American) clients to defend its
interests (Calderon, Santa Cruz land/business barons, Garcia, Uribe).
Asia's (particularly
China and India) dynamic growth and demand for raw materials (iron, copper
and oil), food and agricultural products (like soya) has resulted in
greater competition with the US/EU for access to Latin American exporters
and suppliers, and increased prices and revenues for Latin American
treasuries (major trade and budget surpluses). Asia increases the
diversity of markets and investors for Latin American exporters. These
changes mean less dependence on external financing (especially the IMF)
and US markets which in turn means Washington has less political and
diplomatic leverage over Latin American regimes, even neo-liberal
governments like Lula, Bachelet, Kirchner and Vazquez.
Faced with a loss of
military capacity and a decline in economic leverage, Washington is moving
toward a 'compromise' between the White House's hard line militarists and
the State Department's market-driven 'negotiators'. The essence of the
compromise is to pursue a 'two-track policy': combining support for the
subversive opposition in countries where it is strong (Bolivia) with
negotiation in countries where it is weak (Venezuela). With regard to the
neo-liberal regimes, which have some degree of autonomy (Brazil, Chile and
Argentina), Washington will emphasize bilateral relations and try to
maximize economic opportunities while discouraging any concession to the
mass movements especially demands to reverse privatizations. The
two-track policy will be combined in the cases of Cuba and Venezuela: with
promises of dialogue and agreements conditional on major concessions in
diplomacy, property and investments combined with continued financial
support for agents of destabilization.
Latin America: Political Changes and US Response
The mild response of
the US to the regime changes resulting from the Latin American elections
of 2006 can easily be explained by the fact that they did not produce any
consequential socio-economic structural changes, at least for the
foreseeable future.
The clearest
demonstration of the marginal effects of 'center-left' electoral victories
is the case of the electoral victory of Lula who made it clear to even his
own most ardent intellectual supporters (Frei Betto, Emir Sader, Joao
Pedro Stedile) that he considered 'leftism an infantile disorder' (La
Jornada 12/14/2006), a remark much appreciated in business circles
throughout the hemisphere. No doubt Wall Street was pleased that the
Brazilian 'Workers Party' voted to double Congressional salaries from$6500
USD to $12000 USD per month (and doubling each Congress member's
individual monthly budget to $75,000 USD) while increasing the minimum
wage by $7 USD a month from $159 to $166USD (about 1.7% after inflation)
(Financial Times December 16-17, 2006). One out of five Brazilian
Congress members (many from Lula's coalition) are currently under
investigation for corruption. Wall Street speculators who also were
recently investigated for fraud and yet received huge year-end bonuses
would feel a real identity of condition with Brazilian lawmakers who
doubled their salaries, while awaiting criminal charges.
Contrary to White
House expectations, but much to its liking, Evo Morales' regime pursued
orthodox, austere fiscal policies aimed at budget surpluses, eschewed any
redistributive policies (virtually no land, mining or energy
expropriations). While Morales demobilized the social movements and
focused on endless legal procedures, the oligarchy regrouped, expanded its
power base in Santa Cruz and threatens to bring down the government.
While Washington's oligarchic Bolivian clients advanced toward power (La
Jornada December 16, 2006) Evo Morales continued his self-destructive
policies of symbolic radical populist rhetoric and greater concessions to
the elites. Washington has maintained a foot in both camps, providing
over $60 million dollars in foreign aid to Morales and untold millions to
the opposition in Santa Cruz organizing massive 'separatist'
demonstrations (HoyBolivia.com December 16, 2006).
Washington's
'soft-line' negotiators (Shannon) strengthened their position vis-a-vis
the White House's 'hard line' policy toward Venezuela by pointing to Hugo
Chavez' electoral victory (63% of the vote) as a reason for a
rapprochement (La Jornada, December 14, 2006). Shannon has advanced the
argument in Washington that a significant sector of the Chavez government
was open to a negotiated pact with involves freezing the status quo,
softening criticism of US imperial policies, consolidating oil and gas
agreements and blocking any steps toward socializing the economy.
Perspectives for 2007
The international
position of the US during 2007 will continue to deteriorate – the coming
massive military escalation in Iraq, the large-scale transfer of arms for
Israel to threaten or attack Iran, Syria, Hezbollah or Hamas (or all
simultaneously) – will not lessen the armed resistance in Iraq. A
US-backed Israeli attack on Iran will extend warfare throughout the Gulf
States including Saudi Arabia. On December 15, 2006, Bush presented the
Presidential Medal of Freedom to Israeli extremist, Natan Sharansky–
advocate for the genocidal 'transfer' of all Palestinians from 'Greater
Israel' – symbolizing the meeting of the minds of US imperial militarism
and Israeli brutal colonial expansionism. The total discarding of any new
diplomatic initiative (like the recommendations of Baker's Iraq Study
Group), is the result of the combined strength of the powerful pro-Israel
Lobby and the Bush-Cheney-Rice White House.
Washington,
overextended militarily in the Middle East, will follow its 'two-track'
policy in Latin America. The White House will support incumbent clients
(like Uribe, Calderon and Garcia); the State, Treasury and Commerce
Departments will engage in trade agreements with more 'autonomous'
neo-liberal regimes like Lula, Bachelet, Vazquez and Kirchner),
encouraging greater distance from Cuba and Venezuela and closer diplomatic
relations with the US. With regard to Bolivia, Washington will continue
to pressure Morales to make further concessions to the far-right
civic-oligarchic coalition based in Santa Cruz, allowing the local
business elite to 'carry the ball' for US imperial interests. In
Venezuela, the 'two track policy' will attempt to deepen the political
divisions in the Chavista movement, in order to block new Chavez
initiatives toward greater socialization and in order to promote new
political configuration of 'moderate oppositionists' and liberal Chavistas.
The weakest link in
Washington's projected strategy in Latin America is the re-emergence of
socio-political movements, like those which burst forth in the late 1990's
and first years of the new century: The MST in Brazil, the workers,
peasant and Indian movements in Bolivia and Ecuador and the mass uprising
in Oaxaca and electoral protests in Mexico are in the process of
re-grouping, none having suffered a historic defeat. All the major
popular movements retain their organizational structures and have
recovered their political independence. They will soon be capable of once
again engaging in major uprisings and political confrontations with the
oligarchies in power or with their shock troops in the streets.
The New Year does not
promise 'more of the same': it will start with a major US military
escalation in the Middle East but it will likely end with a greater
military debacle, ensuring deepening political crises and increased
economic instability both in the Middle East, the US and Latin America.
The weakening of the US political regime will open a window of opportunity
for a decisive break with the US Empire, providing that the re-emerging
social-political movements can overcome the obstacles posed by the new
political elites of ex-leftists and traditional oligarchs. Posted by
Bulatlat
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