Bu-lat-lat (boo-lat-lat) verb: to search, probe, investigate, inquire; to unearth facts

Vol. VI, No. 46      Dec. 24 - 30, 2006      Quezon City, Philippines

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Propping up a Bankrupt, Illegitimate Regime
(Second of three parts)

U.S. support for the Arroyo regime has been steady even when President Arroyo was deeply enmeshed in a crisis and was almost ousted in 2005.  Its political support did not waiver even when President Arroyo declared a state of national emergency in February 2006. The support of the U.S. is one of the biggest factors that keeps the Arroyo regime in power.

BY BENJIE OLIVEROS
Posted by
Bulatlat

Because of President Arroyo’s puppetry, the Philippines was named a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. in 2003.  She advocated for support to the “war on terror” before the Non-Aligned Movement and is the point person of the U.S. for counterterrorism in the ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 

In exchange, the U.S. propped up the bankrupt, illegitimate Arroyo regime.

U.S. military assistance to the Philippines increased dramatically.  IBON Foundation computed that U.S. military assistance increased 1,111 percent from 2001 to 2002. This helped the Arroyo regime to strengthen the AFP and the PNP to suppress dissent and to buy the loyalty of both institutions. 

The figure is much more substantial when the other types of aid and assistance are included.  Below is a table provided by IBON Foundation showing the increases in U.S. aid and assistance to the Philippines.

Table. U.S. assistance to the Philippines
1990-2006 ($ million)

Year

Econ. aid

Change

Mil. Aid

Change

Total

Change

1990

351.2

-

142.8

-

494.00

-

1991

358.3

2.02%

195.5

36.90%

553.80

12.11%

1992

252.2

-29.61%

31.3

-83.99%

283.50

-48.81%

1993

124.0

-50.83%

17.5

-44.09%

141.50

-50.09%

1994

78.0

-37.10%

0.9

-94.86%

78.90

-44.24%

1995

52.4

-32.82%

1.2

33.33%

53.60

-32.07%

1996

56.4

7.63%

1.2

0.00%

57.60

7.46%

1997

40.4

-28.37%

1.3

8.33%

41.70

-27.60%

1998

71.3

76.49%

1.3

0.00%

72.60

74.10%

1999

74.5

4.49%

12.3

846.15%

86.80

19.56%

2000

77.3

3.76%

2.9

-76.42%

80.20

-7.60%

2001

93.5

20.96%

3.8

31.03%

97.30

21.32%

2002

73.22

-21.69%

46.03

1111.32%

119.25

22.56%

2003

98.22

34.14%

52.27

13.56%

150.49

26.20%

2004

71.66

-27.04%

24.58

-52.97%

96.24

-36.05%

2005 (est.)

91.98

28.36%

36.73

49.43%

128.71

33.74%

2006 (req.)

62.92

-31.59%

38.05

3.59%

100.97

-21.55%

Sources: US Department of State/Congressional Budget Justifications, Foreign Operations FY 2004/2005; US Overseas Loans & Grants (Greenbook)

Economic aid from the U.S. also increased in 2001. It helped keep the Philippine economy afloat especially since the Arroyo regime was under pressure for its inability to manage the financial and fiscal crisis. Economic and military aid was highest in 2003 when President Arroyo was under heavy pressure forcing her to announce that she would not be running in the 2004 elections. 

It is worth noting that aid has always been a policy instrument of the U.S. It suspended economic aid to South Vietnam when it was working covertly with dissatisfied Vietnamese generals who were then mounting a coup d’ etat against Ngo Dinh Diem. 

On the other hand, data from IBON Foundation shows that U.S. military aid to the Marcos regime increased 120 percent from 1972 to 1973 right after Martial Law was declared. U.S. economic aid also increased three-fold from $1041.2 million during the period 1969-72 to $ 2922 million during the period 1973-76.

 U.S. support for the Arroyo regime has been steady even when President Arroyo was deeply enmeshed in a crisis and was almost ousted in 2005.  Its political support did not waiver even when President Arroyo declared a state of national emergency in February 2006. The support of the U.S. is one of the biggest factors that keeps the Arroyo regime in power.

While the U.S. can be assured that its imperialist interests would continue to be promoted and protected no matter which faction of the ruling elite is placed in power, it found in Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo a most loyal puppet in its “global war on terror.” In fact, when the U.S. attacked Iraq, on March 20, 2003, almost unilaterally because of the refusal of its major allies, except Britain, to condone much less participate in the invasion, the Arroyo regime immediately declared, “We are part of the coalition of the willing…We are part of (the) global coalition against terrorism.”    

 In May 2003, President Arroyo signed a U.S.-RP Non-Surrender Agreement thereby granting U.S. forces in the country immunity from prosecution before the International Criminal Court (ICC).  The Philippines has refused, up to the present, to sign the Rome Statute which created the ICC, in deference to the desires of the U.S.

In the “global war on terror,” the Bush and Arroyo regimes found a common cause. 

In the “global war on terror,” U.S. President Bush, and the hawks in his cabinet, aims to project U.S. military hegemony; attack countries and groups challenging its hegemony and resisting globalization;  and prop up the U.S. economy and Bush’s flagging popularity domestically.

With Macapagal-Arroyo’s support to and emulation of the U.S. “war on terror” it aims to get more economic and military aid from the U.S.; ensure the continuous political support of the U.S. to its regime; and have the means to attack its enemies in order to perpetuate itself in power amid persistent questions regarding its legitimacy and calls for its ouster. 

It is in the interest of the U.S. to keep Macapagal-Arroyo in power unless it becomes too costly politically.  The Marcos dictatorship had the backing of the U.S. until it felt that things would go out of hand if Marcos remained in power.   

It is not a mere coincidence that after the sudden surge in joint military exercises and training in 2001, Oplan Bantay Laya, the Arroyo regime’s counterinsurgency program was launched in 2002.  It was also in 2002 that there was a 1,111 percent increase in U.S. military assistance for use by the regime in counterinsurgency. The Arroyo regime also had U.S. backing when it declared a state of national emergency and a total war against the Left in 2005. 

In the Left, the U.S. and the Arroyo regime found a common enemy.  The legal democratic movement is comprehensively anti-imperialist, anti-fascist, and anti-feudal.  It is steadfastly opposed imperialist plunder and oppression of the Filipino people. Organizations comprising the legal democratic movement, such as the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan or New Patriotic Alliance) and its member organizations such as Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU or May 1st Movement), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP or Peasant Movement of the Philippines), GABRIELA, among others, and progressive party lists such as Bayan Muna (People First), Anakpawis (Toiling Masses), and GABRIELA Women’s Party, are the most vocal and consistent in opposing U.S. military presence and intervention in the Philippines.  They comprise the biggest and most consistent movement working for the ouster of the Arroyo regime and for a patriotic and democratic program.

The revolutionary Left, the CPP-NPA-NDFP, is waging a war of national liberation against imperialism and a democratic revolution against bureaucrat capitalism and feudalism. It aims to dismantle the semi-colonial, semi-feudal character of Philippine society and work for national industrialization and genuine agrarian reform towards socialism .  It is also intensifying its tactical offensives against the AFP and PNP to hasten the downfall of the Arroyo regime.

The CPP-NPA-NDFP is in the company of FARC in the terror-listing of the U.S. Former U.S. State Sec. Collin Powell’s statement in Nepal is instructive of the U.S.’ design in its “global war on terror.” He told King Gyanendra and Prime Minister Deuba of Nepal, "You have a Maoist insurgency that's trying to overthrow the government and this really is the kind of thing that we are fighting against throughout the world."

The joint operations of U.S. troops and the AFP against the Abu Sayyaf is merely a training exercise for the latter does not constitute a real threat to the U.S.- Arroyo regime.  The real target of the U.S. in training, advising, and building the capabilities of the AFP is the legal Left and the CPP-NPA-NDFP.

Oplan Bantay Laya

 Oplan Bantay Laya, which was launched in 2002, is the latest in a series of counterinsurgency programs of the AFP. 

The first “comprehensive and coordinated” counterinsurgency program implemented by the AFP, during the Marcos dictatorship, was Oplan Katatagan (Operation Stability) in 1982. 

This was followed by Oplan Lambat Bitag I , II, III, IV of the Aquino and Ramos administrations.  The Estrada Regime launched Oplan Makabayan in 1998 and Oplan Balangai in 2000.

Essentially, Oplan Bantay Laya is the same as previous counterinsurgency programs. It divided military operations into four stages, clear-hold-consolidate-develop. Military operations are conducted to “clear” the area of insurgents, paramilitary groups and an intelligence network are formed to “hold” the area; the AFP then “consolidates” the area by improving its relations with the civilian population through civic action operations such as medical and dental missions; and at the last stage the AFP “develops” the area by introducing livelihood and development projects. 

In terms of military tactics, Oplan Bantay Laya employs the same combination of intensive military operations, intelligence, and civic action or triad operations. 

AFP documents reveal that Oplan Bantay Laya has three strategies namely, Strategic Holistic Approach, Win-Hold-Win, and Sustained Operations.

The Strategic Holistic Approach is the AFP’s solution to what it perceived as the lack of coordination between and among government agencies, the AFP and Philippine National Police (PNP), and civil society institutions such as NGOs. On paper, the objective of this strategy is to comprehensively approach the insurgency problem.  The president heads the machinery for the Strategic Holistic Approach while the AFP and PNP are in-charge of military operations and Area Coordinating Centers.  These centers coordinate AFP and PNP units, local government agencies, and other sectors such as NGOs in an area for the purpose of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

As part of the Strategic Holistic Approach, the counterinsurgency program is directed by the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, currently the most powerful cabinet cluster on the national level. At the local level, local officials are virtually stripped of decision-making authority and are even threatened by AFP commanders if they question the latter’s actions.  Under Oplan Bantay Laya, civilian authority is practically subjugated by the chain of command of the AFP. Even NGOs and other civil society groups are forced to surrender their independence and to cooperate with the AFP or risk being branded as “terrorist or front organizations” and be dealt with accordingly

Consistent with the strategies of Win-Hold-Win and Sustained Operations, the AFP identified thirteen priority areas in seven regions namely, Ilocos-Cordillera, Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, Bicol, Bohol in Central Visayas, Caraga, Compostela Valley in Southern Mindanao. These areas were subjected to heavy troop deployments and sustained military operations.  Only when the AFP has achieved its military objective of wiping out the insurgency and has formed a civilian self-defense force in an area does it transfer majority of its troops to another area which it then subjects to intense and sustained military operations. 

An example is Mindoro.  The island was subjected to intense and sustained military operations that resulted in numerous cases of political killings and other human rights violations.  When the AFP thought that the island was saturated enough and that all political and people’s organizations had been destroyed, they transferred the troops and the operations to Batangas. In Central Luzon, Tarlac and Pampanga was subjected to heavy troop deployments and military operations before the AFP units were transferred to Bulacan and Nueva Ecija.

 A major change in Oplan Bantay Laya, compared to previous counterinsurgency programs, is its application of target research and the fusion of intelligence and combat operations. With target research, intelligence operations are directed at what it calls “sectoral front organizations”.  The key people in these “sectoral front organizations” are placed in a “sectoral Order of Battle (OB).”  These intelligence operations are carried out by units and personnel of the Military Intelligence Group-Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (MIG-ISAFP) lodged at the battalion level.  These units are given “Intelligence Task Allocations,” with quarterly targets for “neutralization.” This resulted in a surge of killings of political activists from 2002 onwards.  Following is a table tracking the number of political killings per year.

Table 1
Political Killings

2001-2006 (up to December 1)

2001

          101

2002

122

2003

125

2004

75

2005

189

2006

185

Total

797

Added to this are the 207 forcible disappearances since 2001.

These killings and forcible disappearances are carried out by death squads composed by special operations units of the army[1], police, or paramilitary forces based on lists provided by military intelligence units.

The counterinsurgency programs of the AFP are based on the unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency strategies developed by the U.S. Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) particularly that on “low intensity conflict.” These can be found in U.S. Army manuals of the 1960s and 1980s. Later developments incorporated in Oplan Bantay Laya are reflective of U.S. defense strategies after 2001.

 ------------------------------------------------------------

[1] The Philippine Army Special Operations Command was organized in 1996.  It is composed by seven Special Forces Battalions and three Scout Ranger Battalions. Among the tasks of these PASOCOM units are the conduct of unconventional warfare and counter-terrorist operations, and the organization, training, and control of paramilitary units.

 

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