Forces 'Prepare for Iran Attack'
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A Third World Country Can Still Defeat a US Military Aggression, Argues
Saturday, May 10 (RHC) -- In an essay entitled The military lesson of Iraq,
German sociologist Hienz Dietrich denies that the United States military machine
is so overwhelmingly powerful that there is nothing that smaller, undeveloped
nations can do to defend themselves against it if attacked. The renowned
academic argues that a small but well- organized, unified nation with enough
weapons and a truly committed leadership can militarily defeat a US aggression.
In his essay, published in Granma newspaper Friday, Dietrich gives a thorough
analysis of the war in Iraq, rejecting in so doing, the interpretation that the
relatively easy US victory in the conflict should lead the world, notably the
Third World, to believe that the US war machine is unbeatable and that,
therefore, it is useless to resist the instatement of what he terms "a new
Fascist project through the Washington-London-Tel Aviv axis."
Dietrich argues that although the most recent wars have made evident the
terrible power of destruction of new armaments, they have revealed, at the same
time, a number of weaknesses in the US war machine. He groups those weaknesses
or limitations into four areas that he considers key for the outcome of any war
the United States may seek to wage: the economic, the media, the political, and
the military areas.
In the economic field, the German scholar asserts that macroeconomic
considerations would render it unsustainable for the United States to wage a
protracted war against a well-organized state. Media-wise, he contends, the war
in Iraq showed that neo-fascist control over the media proved ineffective due to
what he described as "inter-imperialist rivalries that are generating a
tri-polar globalized society"
In the political arena, the illegality of the aggression against Iraq made the
warmongers in Washington and London pay a high price in spite of the discredited
character of the Saddam Hussein régime, so high a political price, argues Heins
Dietrich, that any future aggression could only be successful if its political
and media scenarios are worse that those in Iraq.
But it is in the military field that the war in Iraq was most revealing, with
lessons that Dietrich considers vital for Third World nations if they are ever
faced with the need to defend themselves against a US attack.
In his essay on the war against Iraq and US military might and how the world
should perceive it, German sociologist Hienz Dietrich points to the fact that
Sadam Hussein's military strategy was once again entirely inadequate to face the
US offensive. As in 1991, following his outrageous invasion of Kuwait,
ironically points out Dietrich, the architect of the Mother of All Military
Failures again led his armed forces to destruction, with resistance only being
offered by isolated units and paramilitary forces in some positions in southern
Iraq. Snipers and mines did not play any significant role in the defense, he
notes, adding that Saddam Hussein rejected Fidel Castro's advice that he had won
his revolutionary war with mines and rifles. Saddam never asked the great
strategist how he had won the war against the South African army in Angola,
despite his being so close to the United States and so distant from the battle
field, and in spite of the fact that the Soviet military had allowed the
situation to become one of strategic defeat at Cuito Cuanavale.
With the American military strategy in Iraq clearly defined around strong tank
columns escorted by mechanized infantry and protected on the ground by artillery
and in the air by helicopters and bombers, advancing at night and taking
advantage of their technological superiority, Hienz Dietrich argues that the
only successful defense strategy for a country with a less advanced military
technology has to necessarily include four basic ingredients: internal unity, a
leadership ready to stand up to the challenge, substantial international
support, and five types of weapons. These, according to the German scholar,
short range antiaircraft weapons carried by small mobile groups, anti-tank and
anti-personal mines, night vision gear, and snipers, all integrated into a
military doctrine like that used by the Vietnamese or Cuba's so-called "War
of All the People," with special forces, irregular units, and the
"topography" of the cities playing a central part and resulting in a
protracted war of attrition.
Dietrich also recalls that Fidel Castro has said that "the enemy is strong
in his positions, but weak in his movements," and that 8 well-trained
combatants are a small army that can cause great harm to the enemy. This is the
type of war that the US army can certainly not win, he notes.
German sociologist Hienz Dietrich concludes that the military lesson to draw
from Iraq is therefore not that a US military aggression is irresistible, but
rather that a united people with a committed leadership, capable of generating
international support and having the right weapons can represent a military
challenge of such
magnitude that no US government can deprive them of their freedom, as long as
formal democracy continues to exist in the United States. Only the establishment
of an openly Fascist dictatorship in United States and the extermination of the
whole population of the attacked country could result in victory for the US
military machine. And that, says Dietrich is something that is beyond the reach
of the George Bush administration.
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