I have a simple interpretation of these seemingly contradicting provisions: “The armed forces shall follow the elected government for as long as the people are fine with it but once the people revolt, the armed forces, being of the people, should go along with them.” Indeed, what if the government turns out that it cheated in the elections? What if the supposedly legitimate government no longer reflects the commonweal, is going against its own people and uses the so-called majesty of the law to hide its corruption and flaunt its powers? If the armed forces continues to protect such government, can we can say that the armed forces is no longer acting as the guardian of the people? What if the armed forces no longer finds “nobility, dignity and honor” in being the guardian?
Our experience in 2001 shows that the Constitution can be conveniently discarded to suit the situation. In other words, the majesty of the law can be ignored to cater to those in power or seeking power without the people’s mandate. In the end, the only justification for rebellion or the extra-constitutional takeover of government is victory. If one fails, he is charged with rebellion and sent to jail. From a constitutional point of view, the AFP leadership in EDSA Dos (i.e., people’s uprising in 2001) was clearly unprofessional. They mutinied against their commander-in-chief who represented a great majority of the Filipino people and they gravely undermined the Constitution. Consciously or unconsciously, the generals preserved the military’s power using a loud and powerful minority as cover against the silent and weak majority. Since there has been no real change in governance and only change in personalities, the action of the AFP leadership in 2001 was misguided and self-serving. They were desperados who merely enabled the trade of one set of crooks and nincompoops for another.
The military’s interventionism in government has created a three-way political power structure in the classic Clausewitzian model composed of people, government and the military. And today, between an inept government and a corrupt military, the people are getting screwed. Church activism in recent years has probably made it four-sided, adding a confusing spiritual element. Though the armed forces is much more in the background today as compared to the martial law period, it has the unobtrusive power to intervene in politics. A strong and healthy democracy, however, hinges on a two-way structure anchored on a contract between the government and the people as embodied in the Constitution. The military should be under the government and not a separate power entity. (See Figure 1)
II. A CONSTRUCTIVE ARMED FORCES
The separation of politics and military is a notable feature of western democracies that was rammed down our throats by the Americans. I think it is time that we question this framework and look at alternative models of governance wherein the military plays a productive role in government and in the development of Philippine democracy.
The power of the government is only as good as it is identified with the good of the polity. What if the government has failed in promoting the common welfare and has committed illegal acts? What if the country is heading towards disaster? Should the armed forces stand idle, detached from politics, and allow the politicians to destroy the country? In a situation of political uncertainty and chaos, what role should the military play? What should it do? Let me attempt to answer these questions by first drawing a simple, rough model showing the relationship of three variables: government, military professionalism and level of intervention. Let’s call this the GPI graph.
a. There is a direct relationship between how good government is to the level of professionalism in the military. Good government means a professional military and conversely, a professional military implies good government.
b. There is an inverse relationship between the level of professionalism and the level of military intervention. As professionalism increases, the inclination to intervene decreases.
c. There is also an inverse relationship between how good government is and the level of military intervention. As government gets better, the likelihood of intervention decreases.
From these relationships, I see three kinds of roles for the armed forces – passive, constructive and interventionist – depending on the political and military situation.
For the situation today, I believe the armed forces should play the constructive role. It is a balanced role wherein it does not stand idle or directly take over government. It is neither indifferent nor destructive. In this role, the armed forces acts within the framework of the Constitution and as a counterweight to an ineffective government of unruly and corrupt politicians to achieve political stability. Further, it acts as catalyst for improving governance and a force for nation-building. If war is too complex to be left to the generals, governance is even more complex to be left alone to the politicians, especially the irresponsible and corrupt. As a crucial stakeholder in governance and society, the armed forces should use its powers and capabilities for the common good, to deter bad government and promote democracy and development. If the AFP can use its intelligence capabilities to monitor the movements of rebel groups, it can use the same to monitor the activities of corrupt politicians and generals. If it can keep an eye on suspected destabilizers, why can it not check a President or any politician who is cheating an election?
Our soldiers are actually very experienced in this constructive role. The military strategy against insurgency calls for winning the hearts and minds of the people in the countryside. In doing so, the soldiers become involved in the political, economic and social life of the community. When I was the commander of a remote detachment in San Mariano, Isabela, a major part of our counter-insurgency effort was community projects. My soldiers and I were involved in backyard beautification and cleanliness, medical civic action and building toilets and classrooms. I advised the barangay leaders on how to manage the village. Before my unit was transferred, we were talking about cooperatives, markets and farm-to-market roads. Through this exposure to the community and seeing the failure of government, our soldiers undergo a subtle process of politicization that has made them sensitive to the political life of the nation. The participation of junior officers in the coup attempts and in the mutiny at Oakwood in 2004 is largely because of this politicized view.
This constructive role can be elevated to a higher level wherein the armed forces strengthens governance and democratic institutions. In the 2004 elections, for example, I wrote to the AFP Chief of Staff exhorting him to play this constructive role by disallowing and evicting all organizations that use military camps for their political pronouncements and sending a public warning to politicians, including the President, that any violence, cheating or fraud will not be tolerated by the AFP and that candidates cannot use AFP personnel, equipment and funds for the campaign. It was, of course, too much to expect. In relation to the corruption case filed against Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, the Chief of Staff can order the AFP finance office to open all documentary evidence. For the jueteng (an illegal numbers game) scandal, military intelligence is more than capable of gathering evidence to confirm the claims of the witnesses in the Senate hearing. As to Gloriagate (allegedly wiretapped conversations between the President and an Election Commissioner), the AFP has the resources to confirm the authenticity of the purported wiretapped conversation. Indeed, if the AFP is convinced that the President has committed improper or illegal acts, it can quietly send her a message to do what is right for the good of the country or lose its support.
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