Two factors will inhibit the effectiveness of a constructive role: lack of credibility and a generally anti-people armed forces. First, the AFP has lost so much credibility with the corruption scandals involving active and retired officers. The Oakwood mutiny showed a deep crack in the system, a fault line in the AFP leadership. It does not have credible and trustworthy leaders, not even among the ex-generals who may use the armed forces for their own ends. The Officer Corps has lost its moral compass and is fragmented. Second, having been a pacification army since colonial times, the armed forces has become an “alien force” defending the interests of the ruling elite against the masses.3 The masses do not trust the armed forces. If a million squatters today hold a people power at the EDSA Shrine, I doubt if the generals will drop their support for the President and join the masses. National Artist F. Sionil Jose described it best: “This officer corps and the Armed Forces are willing instruments of the oligarchy and worse, when the officers become generals, they also become as rapacious as the members of the oligarchy they serve. In fact, they have themselves become the oligarchs.”4

Two inherent risks of this constructive role are the potential abuse of power and unwarranted intervention. Power tends to feed on itself, if uncontrolled, until it becomes so corrupted that a turn-around is very difficult. The experience during martial law all too clearly showed the ill-effects of an overreaching military which has lost touch with itself and the people. It became greedy, corrupt and abusive. To protect itself and perpetuate its power, the armed forces can needlessly intervene using convenient even contrived excuses. To minimize these risks, the armed forces should seek a balance with the people and must always analyze the overarching implications of its actions to society and act with the common good in mind.

But let’s be honest. The armed forces can take over government anytime it chooses and we cannot really do much about it. Sure, there will be condemnation from certain groups and the international community. There will be protests and demonstrations but in the end, if the armed forces persists and it is united, there is not much the people can do against guns and tanks. If it intervenes in a time of political uncertainty, such intervention will most likely be gladly accepted by the people. How long the people can tolerate a military or military-sponsored government will depend on how it is able to govern and fulfills people’s expectations. If unable to do so, there are already existing insurgent organizations throughout the country that can serve as a nucleus for armed rebellion.

Military intervention is a mere power-grab if it only results in a change of personalities in government and there is no real structural change in society, particularly in the equitable distribution of political and economic power. If the intent is really to make society better, then the military government or military-sponsored government should focus on 1) establishing a competent and honest government, 2) building the economy, 3) professionalizing the military; and 4) rebuilding democratic institutions. Of the last one, an important task is to prepare the people for an election and then hold an election as soon as possible. “Preparing” would include disciplining wayward and corrupt government officials; setting up democratic institutions such as political parties and peoples organizations; educating the people about their rights and responsibilities as citizens; and fixing the electoral system.

III. CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR THE ARMED FORCES

A constructive, professional armed forces serves as a buttress to democracy and the Constitution. It serves as the guardian of democratic processes while ensuring that it does not abuse its own power. It uplifts democracy by strengthening the pillars of governance. It will not allow an irresponsible and corrupt government to govern. By being professional, it can pull or catalyze the government and the bureaucracy to become better. Truly, the crucial challenge for the armed forces is how to rebuild itself to a professional and mature organization.

The first imperative is professionalizing the Officer Corps which is the foundation of professionalism in the AFP and the driving force for sustained reform. Among the younger members of the corps, there is an inherent desire to change. Professionalization efforts should nurture this desire by opening up channels for constructive criticism and initiating affirmative action. There must be an organized effort mobilizing the Officer Corps to awaken the generals from their collective self-denial that nothing is wrong with the AFP and to push the chain of command to initiate painful but necessary changes, especially the creation of a performance and merit-based system in promotions and assignments which will ensure that only those who are competent and honest go up. Another key target is the non-commissioned officer corps. If the officers are the brain, the corporals and sergeants form the workforce or backbone of the armed forces. Besides people, the armed forces should develop efficient, effective and ethical management systems in personnel, procurement, logistics and finance incorporating best practices and new information technology. Corruption through conversion, construction and commissions should be eradicated. It should formulate doctrine – how it should fight – and not use foreign, especially American, formulations which are alien to us.

Part of rebuilding is upgrading capabilities to become a multifunctional force capable of dealing with a variety of military and non-military missions (search and rescue during natural disasters; evacuation of non-combatants like OFWs from disaster or war zones; and developmental activities such as building roads and bridges). Procurement should look into multi-functional platforms, i.e., planes the provide close air support in battle and also deliver emergency medical supplies to remote areas, patrol boats that can also provide medical services to coastal barangays, trucks that can provide covering fire and also evacuate people during floods.

Rebuilding will not be easy and it becomes even more difficult as the armed forces has to also deal with security threats and concerns. Besides political necessity, the security environment is another important reason why the armed forces must rebuild and professionalize. Allow me to divert a bit and briefly explain these security challenges so we can appreciate the enormous challenge facing the armed faces as it struggles to reform as well as perform.

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