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Southeast Asia and the Philippines: The Second Front in the U.S. ‘War on Terror’
Published on Dec 30, 2006
Last Updated on Feb 5, 2011 at 9:01 am

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U.S.-Philippine joint exercises towards establishing a forward operating base

Consistent to being a most loyal puppet, President Arroyo provided the U.S. with a venue for projecting its military power in the region; a transit point, refuelling station and staging area for its “mobile, expeditionary operations;” and training ground for the troops of both countries in “interoperability” or joint operations for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.

Immediately after U.S. President Bush and Philippine President Arroyo agreed on the conduct of joint military exercises in November 2001, the U.S. lost no time. From January to July 31, 2002 Balikatan 02-01 was conducted involving 1,200 U.S. troops including 150 special forces. It also involved 300 Navy engineers for civic action.[13] Another 2,665 U.S. troops arrived in Central Luzon in April for Balikatan 02-2 (boosting the number of US troops in the country to more than 3,800, the highest number since the bases closed in 1992)[14].

It was also the longest joint military exercise in the history of U.S.-Philippine relations and the first to take place in a combat zone.[15] It is also called as the flagship initiative of U.S. counter terrorism policy in the region.[16]

In February 2003, another 1,700 U.S. troops were sent to the Philippines for joint exercises. In 2004, around 1,000 U.S. troops were involved in major joint exercises. There were 18 joint exercises in 2004.

But aside from these big joint exercises, the U.S. conducted “frequent lower-level training exercises with specialized Filipino counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces.” These low level exercises involved no more than 100 U.S. Special Forces at any one time.

These low level exercises were so frequent that human rights and people’s organizations in Mindanao, in southern Philippines, reported that when combined with humanitarian and civic assistance operations involving U.S. naval troops and SeaBees (Construction Battalions), there has been a continuing presence of U.S. troops in the country since 2002.

The rotation of U.S. troops in and out of the country is such that the U.S. is able to establish what the U.S. State Department calls as “permanent-temporary presence” in the country.[17]

U.S. troops are in the Philippines and the region not simply to fight “terrorist groups” but to enhance U.S. military control over territory in the South China Sea.[18]

The U.S. could not have chosen a better venue for projecting its military power and to use as transit point, refueling station and staging area for its “mobile, expeditionary operations.” The Philippines is at the gateway of the region and is nearest to Guam and Hawaii, the base of the U.S. Pacific Command. A study by RAND corporation also shows that the Philippines is in a key location within the South China Sea and with large airfields that can be used by U.S. Air Force expeditions.

The former U.S. military bases in the country were extensively used as transit point, refuelling station, and staging area in the U.S. wars of aggression in Korea and Vietnam. The Philippines was also used as a rest and recreation stop for U.S. troops involved in these wars.

There are also enough agreements between the U.S. and Philippine governments to enable the former to operate in the country. The gain achieved by the Filipino people in rejecting the continued stay of U.S. military bases in the country beyond 2002 was gradually eroded as subsequent agreements were signed by both governments.

The Visiting Forces Agreement was signed in 1999 to allow U.S. troops to stay in the country during joint military exercises for indefinite periods of time. It also grants them immunity from criminal prosecution for acts committed while “on duty”.

The Mutual Logistics Support Agreement which was passed as an executive agreement, in November 2002, to avert protests allows the U.S. to construct storage and repair facilities and use of the country’s ports, training ranges, and other facilities to support its wars of aggression not only in Southeast Asia but the whole of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Training and Interoperability

Using local proxy armies has always been part of the strategy of the U.S. But in order to project U.S. military hegemony and extend its presence all around the globe, including areas where U.S. forces did not traditionally operate, it is relying more on its proxy forces or puppet armies.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) projects that the U.S. should be able to conduct two simultaneous conventional wars while maintaining small forward deployed forces conducting special forces operations. These two types of operations are defined as direct (visible) and indirect (clandestine) approaches. With the former, the U.S. will work with multinational forces. With clandestine operations, the U.S. will work with puppet armies. According to the QDR, “Building and leveraging partner capacity will be an absolutely essential part of this approach and the employment of surrogates will be a necessary method for achieving many goals.” Thus, the emphasis on training and joint exercises.

And the U.S. has not chosen a better surrogate army in the region than the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Invoking the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the Philippine government sent AFP troops to fight in Korea and in Vietnam. This agreement also justifies Philippine involvement in Iraq where it sent a small contingent.

Through the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, the U.S. is able to control the AFP by providing it with training, equipment, weapons, and supplies. And with the creation of the Defense Policy Board in 2002, the U.S. would control the policies and decisions of the Philippine Department of National Defense, which has command over the AFP. Another mechanism called the Security Engagement Board was created in March 24, 2006 purportedly to serve as the mechanism for consultation and planning of measures and arrangements focused on addressing non-traditional security concerns such as international terrorism, transnational crime, maritime safety and security, natural and man-made disasters, and the threat of a pandemic outbreak that arise from non-state actors and transcend national borders.

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