Why then, are U. S. Military Forces in Mindanao?

1. First, they are here to engage in covert combat operations, in addition to the mission of “training, assisting, advising and supporting Philippine counterinsurgency operations.” Their direct involvement is through covert or clandestine operations. It is an indirect involvement, because U.S. officials are worried that if they directly engage in counterguerrilla operations, they could suffer many casualties and this could have serious political repercussions both here and in the United States. They know that it also fuels Philippine nationalism against foreign forces directly involved in local combat operations. In the March 1, 2003 issue of the Los Angeles Times, an unnamed high ranking Philippine military official in Mindanao, when asked about the political repercussions should U.S. military forces suffer casualties in the course of combat missions in Philippine war zones, said, “We could always cover it up.” Furthermore, the Philippine Constitution bans foreign troops to be involved in local combat operations and the Philippine Supreme Court ruled in 2002 that U.S. troops are not allowed to engage in actual combat, but may only be allowed here for training activities under the VFA. Again, it is noteworthy to note though that the VFA itself only vaguely, allows U.S. visiting forces to engage in unspecified “activities” and the word training is not even mentioned.

2. Specifically, they are here to engage in high tech and on-the-ground surveillance and spying operations. This was why, in a Washington Post interview three years ago, former U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Francis Ricciardone admitted that “a strategic support branch of U.S. intelligence had been formed in the Philippines with 70 U.S. spies working with the Philippine Southern Command to bring intelligence for the AFP and law-enforcement disposal as part of our ongoing cooperation against terrorism.” This is what they call ” OPS-INTEL Fusion,” where technical surveillance operators link up rural areas with computers, linking up data from the U.S. from outside to profile their target groups, landscape, identities, fingerprints, photos as part of technical intelligence. The surveys profiled in these technical operations are often operated by either technical staff of Special Operations Forces or civilian personnel of the U.S. National Security Agency, Department of Defense or even FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). Of course, there is also human intelligence developed on the ground through MEDCAPS or Medical Civic Action Program, medical-dental missions, and other so-called humanitarian missions conducted by U.S. Special Operations Forces who are specialists in counterinsurgency and low intensity conflict warfare. Through these seemingly “humanitarian activities” where government does not render any basic services due to corruption, while being able to penetrate remote communities, and develop their intelligence assets. These activities by these U.S. military and civilian operatives also serve not only as a camouflage for covert and clandestine operations, but also as a public relations program crudely disguised as “Project Bayanihan.”

3. Selling U.S. military hardware with Balikatan exercises as show-windows

During joint military exercises, U.S. forces are able to display their latest firepower to their Philippine counterparts which they later offer for sale. This is why a close U.S. ally, Australia, was also prodded to forge a similar Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines (modeled after the US-RP VFA) so it could engage in regular joint military exercises and to accelerate the sale of its combat patrol boats which are suited for riverine and coastal warfare and operations.

4. Mindanao as laboratory for many COIN operations

Mindanao has been used as a laboratory for past counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns by the AFP and their U.S. military advisers, such as those for vigilante groups in the 1980s and lately Oplan Bantay Laya I which was first tested in ARMM and then later expanded to cover the entire country as a nationwide operational plan.

5. Using infrastructure projects in the Philippines for U.S. military force projection and intervention

On the other hand, the engineering and construction projects, airfields and wharfs (daungan) structurally designed and with specifications for large vessels being poured by the USAID’s (U.S. Agency for International Development) Mindanao Assistance Program and GEM (Growth with Equity in Mindanao) program such as the ones in Saranggani Bay, are meant to provide support for and accommodate the large U.S. naval vessels and combat aircraft for operations here and abroad. The communities are “softened” with GEM projects of USAID to be penetrated for the access of U.S. troops. The Philippines is once again a springboard for intervention by U.S. military forces especially the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Forces based in Okinawa, Japan. The Marine Expeditionary Forces are the mainstay of U.S. interventionary forces and they are now also regularly trained here during the so-called Balikatan exercises. And of course under the VFA and MLSA, the Philippines has been made once again into a communications, surveillance, training and most important, logistical supply base for U.S. interventionary forces against our neighbors.

We have experienced the impact of U.S. military presence and bases before – the loss of self-determination, human rights and sovereignty, as well as the degradation of culture, values, health and environmental destruction as a host nation. Our women and children will surely be sacrificed for the “rest and recreational” needs of foreign soldiers wanting to boost their morale. And only a few domestic elites who are subcontracted by the U.S. military actually benefit from the much vaunted economic benefits, for they are the ones owning if not controlling the base-related businesses. For the U.S., their military presence here allows them to wage illegal wars and military interventions (locally and against other nations) to advance their corporate and strategic interests especially in Mindanao.

The Challenges and What is to be Done?

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