Cheering from the Sidelines?
The record of US “non-involvement” in combat is too long to be fully rehearsed here. Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda Gloria’s well-researched book Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao (2000) may be consulted for the larger context of US meddling. Suffice it here to mention some tell-tale examples. Asia News (July 2004) reported that US Special Forces established a training camp in Carmen, North Cotabato, to teach 150 AFP soldiers unconventional warfare tactics, night combat sniping and surveillance techniques (People’s Weekly World, 7/17-23/2004). Two German interns of Bantay Ceasefire, supported by the European Center for Conflict Prevention, witnessed US P-3 Orion planes conducting surveillance flights in contested villages in Maguindanao where the Abu Sayyaf and MILF elements operate (Evgenia Lipski and Tobias Schuldt, “What are US soldiers doing in Mindanao?” Bulatlat, 8/21-27/2005).
One is reminded of an earlier incident in 2002: the house of a Moro peasant in Basilan island, Buyong-buyong Isnijal, was raided. He was shot in the leg by an American soldier, Sgt. Reggie Lane, who participated in the actual operations. Up to now, no serious investigation has been undertaken to render justice to the victim, Just as nothing has been done to clear up the complicity of four US soldiers in the murder of Corporal Ibnul Wahid, as witnessed by his widow Sandrawina Wahid. She was also one of the witnesses who survived the Feb. 4, 2008 Maimbung massacre. She testified to the presence of US troops during the assault of AFP elite forces on Barangay village, Ipil, Maimbung, Sulu, Eight civilians (a three-month pregnant woman, two children, two teenagers, and her husband, a soldier on vacation) were slain in that combined civic-military action (Carol Pagaduan-Araullo, “Streetwise,” Business World, 9/12-13/2008).
In November 2005, 4 fully armed US soldiers joined the AFP in an encounter with the MNLF followers of Nur Misuari in villages around Indanan, Sulu. They were presumably on a “humanitarian mission,” as claimed by Col. Mark Zimmer, public affairs officer of JSOTF-P (Inquirer News Service, 9/25/2005). Two OV-10 planes dropped several bombs and fired rockets on several villages, killing 15 civilians. After the 2004 bombing of a ferry with over 100 victims, the hunt for the ASG and the Jemaah Islamiyah intensified. Two main suspects of the 2002 Bali bombings were supposed to be holed up with Khaddafy Janjalani, the ASG leader, in Jolo (E-Balita 8/2/2006). The MNLF in Sulu were accused of coddling ASG gunmen. Despite the disclaimers, two groups (Union of Muslims for Morality and Truth, and Concerned Citizens of Sulu) demanded the immediate pullout of US troops from Sulu province for violating the VFA. Jolo city councilor Temojin Tulawie asked: “What would US soldiers be doing within the perimeter of the area of engagement right after the bombs have fallen in Indanan if they were not party to the military offensives?” (Inquirer News Service, 9/28/2005). “They are not peacemakers but provocateurs and warmongers,” Tulawie added. Human Rights Commissioner Nasser Marohomsali asserted that the involvement of US troops clearly violated the 1987 Philippine Constitution which prohibits foreign military from participating in direct combat operations on Philippine soil.
One last incident caps this brief review. In December 2007, US troops ordered the shutting down of a hospital in Panamao town, Sulu, and prevented medical personnel from treating patients after sundown with threats to shoot anybody in the hospital if there is an attack (Al Jacinto, Arab News 1/13/2008). This has angered Muslim villagers and activists early this year, amid preparations for Balikatan 2008 war games in Sulu and Zamboanga where hundreds of US troops are stationed. Washington bureaucracy, however, cannot be deterred by native complaints. In the midst of successive military exercises in Basilan, Sulu, and Zamboanga in 2005, US ambassador Francis Ricciardone revealed that the US Agency for International Development was giving two-thirds of its grants to the region at an average of $50 million a year. Why such generosity? Obviously, to suppress the “bad guys” of the Moro and communist insurgencies, Ricciardone confessed. This is the reason why the US “established a semi-continuous military presence,” hence the bases issue is, for Ricciardone, “an artifact of people’s imagination” (Carolyn Arguillas, MindaNews, 1/11/2006).
