On another vein, does the aggrieved “person” in Section 1 include a juridical person? The organizations or associations can claim the right to “security” under Section 1 and may file the writ as the aggrieved party and not as a mere representative. It will be interesting how the court will interpret this considering that currently, organizations, not just individuals, have been subject to attacks and harassments. It must be noted that the court under Section 14 [c] may issue a protection order for the protection of a petitioner-organization
Who may file
Section 2 provides that the following have standing to file the petition “in the following order”
1. The aggrieved party
2. Any member of the immediate family of the injured party
3. Any relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
4. Any individual citizen or organization “if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party”.
This expansion of standing is positive in terms facilitating recourse to the remedy. The problem that may be encountered under Section 2 is the interpretation of the phrase “in the following order” and the requirement that a third party can only file the petition “if there is no known” member of the aggrieved party’s family. This restriction partly stems from the complication brought about by the fact that the writ covers acts or omissions by private individuals. This makes the family of the victim a target for harassment and threats not to file the petition in cases where respondents are state security forces, and at the same time preempt third parties from filing an amparo petition. The state of impunity prevailing today is partly brought about by the fact that families and witnesses are afraid to file a complaint or testify against the police or members of the AFP. By limiting the right of human rights organizations to file the petition only in cases where there is no “known” member of the victim’s family, the rule gives the perpetrators the opportunity to defeat the remedy.
This paper asserts that this limitation should be interpreted liberally in favor of the petitioners and the human rights organizations if the respondents are public officials. Human rights organizations have the institutional capacity and accountability to file these complaints should the victim’s families be reluctant out of fear to file the petition.
It must be noted that the Chilean amparo merely states that it “may be filed on behalf of any person”. The Argentina amparo, states that the petition “may be filed by the damaged party, the ombudsman and the associations which foster such ends” without any hierarchical requirement.
Accessibility through provisions on venue, docket fees and archiving
The rule, under Section 3, is liberal in terms of venue which will indeed facilitate the filing of the petition. This is similar to the Nicaraguan amparo which allows the filing of the petition “any day and at all hours.” Section 3 further allows the petitioner to file in the Regional Trial Court where the threat, act or omission [or any of its elements] occurred, with the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan or the Supreme Court “or any of its justices”. The rule does not impose a strict hierarchy of courts and in fact allows a petition to be filed before any member of these collegial bodies. Decisions by any of these bodies may be immediately appealed to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The amparo rule departs from Rule 45, however, because an amparo appeal to the Supreme Court could raise issues of facts or both law and facts [See Sec. 19].
A novel question on the issue of accessibility will crop up if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Human rights lawyers may argue that such suspension does not suspend the writ of amparo. It will be interesting t see how the Court will decide on this issue since the amparo writ is essentially different from habeas corpus.
One of the most important liberal provisions of the rule is that unlike many other amparos, the Philippine amparo does not require exhaustion of remedies before an amparo court acquires jurisdiction. This possibly stems from the lessons learned in many of the amparos in Latin America which were circumvented by the exhaustion requirement and was generally used by state security forces to delay petitions for the writ thereby rendering the remedy ineffective.
Another important liberal provision in the rule is the absence of any requirement for the payment of docket fees under Section 4, which makes the remedy accessible to the victims insofar as it relieves them of the financial burden to prosecute their case. The only possible danger in this provision is that this may open up the system to abuse by litigious private individuals against another private individual or entity for harassment purposes. Unlike government, private citizens are not equipped to respond to Petitions filed against them in so many possible venues, particularly since Section 9 requires them to file their ‘return’ within 72 hours from receipt of the writ.
